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Abstract 
 
The 1943 battle to free the Black Sea port of Novorossiisk from German occupation 
during World War II was fought from the beach-head of Malaia zemlia, held for seven 
months by Soviet landing troops, including the young Leonid Brezhnev. The heroes of 
this campaign are commemorated through an amalgam of memoir, monuments and 
ritual, rendered particularly paradoxical by the discrepancy between the insignificance 
of the campaign at the time and the importance attributed to it retrospectively. 
Novorossiisk appears to have been honoured as a Hero-City due to myth alone, largely 
dependent upon Brezhnev’s political influence when leader of the Soviet Union.  
 
Using an interdisciplinary historical, cultural and sociological approach, this 
thesis establishes the mechanism and dynamics of the construction of the war myth in 
Novorossiisk under the Brezhnev government and its propagation today under the Putin 
régime. This research on the sociology of myth-making in an authoritarian political 
environment adds significantly to scholarship of the war cults prevalent in the late 
Soviet Union and contemporary post-Soviet Russia. Based on an analysis of agency, I 
demonstrate that, despite pervading state influence on remembrance of the war, there is 
still scope for the local community and even the individual in memory construction. 
 
This is a case study with wider political and social connotations, linking the 
individual citizens of Novorossiisk with evolving state policy since the war. Through 
the prism of this minor Hero-City, the complexity of myth and memory is revealed, as 
new evidence is brought to bear on a myth that most Russians consider dead, along with 
Brezhnev and the Soviet Union. This work demonstrates that the myth of Malaia zemlia 
is still relevant as much more than just local history for citizens of Novorossiisk today, 
remaining an integral part of its identity seventy years after the end of the war.  
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Notes on Translation and Transliteration 
 
All translations from the Russian have been done by the author, unless quoted from 
other sources in English. Transliteration is according to the Slavonic and East European 
Review system, based on a modified Library of Congress convention. 
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Preface 
 
 
On my very first morning in Novorossiisk in 1999 I was taken to the huge Malaia 
zemlia memorial complex on the shore of the Black Sea, where I heard the story of the 
1943 landings. Over the years I gradually became familiar with other monuments 
around the town as my visits evolved from purely professional to social. My desire to 
understand the language and culture of the country prompted me to enrol for an 
undergraduate degree in Russian Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies, University College London. Developing a growing interest in Russian 
monumental remembrance, I started to explore the sociological aspects of 
commemorative rituals with the help of my Russian colleagues who had, over the years, 
become close friends. 
My epiphany moment came after a few glasses together at a vineyard in 
Myskhako, a small village just outside Novorossiisk known for its robust red wine. We 
were touring the wine-making premises when I found myself in an old wine-cellar that 
had, apparently, been used by Colonel Leonid Brezhnev during the war. Until that 
moment I had been confident that I understood the Malaia zemlia campaign enough to 
appreciate the significance of the many monuments in the town, but this discovery nine 
years after my first visit was totally unexpected. After all, Brezhnev was one of the few 
Soviet politicians known to people in the West, so why did I not know about Brezhnev's 
involvement with the war here, despite my known interest in the town's past? And if I 
had not been told, perhaps there was a deeper reason why he remained a hidden secret 
in the history of the Hero-City. Here, tucked away under the former Soviet collective 
vineyard on the outskirts of Novorossiisk, I discovered a ready-made research project 
for the Master's programme I was following, which stimulated my academic interest so 
much that it has been impossible to put aside. 
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Over the last seven years my journey of intellectual curiosity has evolved from 
how society remembers the war to the political history of why war memory is so 
prevalent in Novorossiisk, resulting in a quest to explore the impact of their local 
history on the population today. Throughout this academic journey I have been aided by 
a wonderful, ever-expanding network of friends who have housed and fed me, guided 
me to outlying places, rescued me from libraries, introduced me to key people and 
provided premises for meetings and interviews. They even brought valuable resource 
materials to England, crammed into suitcases already full of Russian chocolates (for 
stamina) and caviar (for inspiration). I am delighted to acknowledge the generous 
friendship of Anna Danilova, Irina Nikitina, El'vina Settarova, Sergei Krasnolobov and 
Irina Rashkovetskaia (and her family), without whose unstinting help this work would 
not have come to fruition. I would like to thank my supervisors over the years for their 
support and advice: Kristin Roth-Ey, Polly Jones and Sarah Young; and all those who 
have kindly read and commented constructively on my work. Finally I am deeply 
grateful to my family for living this project with me for longer than we all care to 
remember. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: What is a war myth and who owns it? 
Вот трубы медные гремят, 
Кружится праздничный парад, 
За рядом ряд, за рядом ряд 
Идут в строю солдаты. 
Не в силах радость превозмочь, 
Поет жена, смеется дочь, 
И только мать уходит прочь... 
"Куда же ты, куда ты?.." 
 
Ведь боль и смерть и пушек 
гром - 
Все это будет лишь потом. 
Чего ж печалиться о том, 
А, может, обойдется? 
Ведь нынче музыка тебе, 
Трубач играет на трубе, 
Мундштук трясется на губе, 
Трясется он, трясется.1 
 
 
1.1 Scope of the thesis 
In the wintry early hours of 4
th
 February 1943 a modest fleet of small craft escorted by 
two motor torpedo boats approached the shore of Tsemes Bay under cover of darkness 
and a thick smoke-screen. Before daybreak 630 Red Army marine infantry troops led by 
Major Tsezar' Kunikov had landed on the beach at Stanichka just outside the occupied 
Soviet Black Sea port of Novorossiisk.
2
 
The Soviet Union had entered the Second World War, which it called the Great 
Patriotic War, in June 1941, suffering a series of humiliating losses for much of the first 
year as German forces pushed eastwards into Ukraine and then Russia. The strategic 
port of Novorossiisk (pre-war population 109,000) was occupied by German and 
                                                     
1
 Bulat Okudzhava, 'Voennyi parad', in Proza i poeziia, Frankfurt: Posev, 1984, p. 149. 'Brass trumpets 
are ringing out, /The ceremonial parade is wheeling round, /Rank upon rank, rank upon rank /Soldiers 
march in formation. /No pleasure is permitted in the forces, /A woman is singing, a daughter laughing / 
And only a mother walks away... /"But where are you, where have you gone?.." //Pain and death and the 
thunder of guns - /All this will come later. /What have we to grieve about, /Maybe we'll just make do? / 
But now the music is for you, /The trumpeter is playing his trumpet, /The mouthpiece is trembling at his 
lips, /He is trembling, trembling.' 
2
 See T. I. Iurina, Novorossiiskoe protivostoianie: 1942-1943 gg., Krasnodar: Kniga, 2008, p. 230. 
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Romanian troops striking towards the oil-fields of the northern Caucasus in September 
1942. However, it was not until the invaders had been defeated at Stalingrad early in 
1943 that a turning point was reached and the battle to re-take Novorossiisk could begin 
in earnest. The main Soviet attack was directed at a spot further along the coast, at 
Iuzhnaia Ozereika. However, this operation failed under heavy enemy fire and, 
ironically, it was the minor, diversionary landings at Stanichka which were successful. 
For seven months a defensive Soviet campaign by the 18
th
 Army was fought against 
superior enemy forces from the small beach-head in the area behind Stanichka and the 
village of Myskhako that became known as Malaia zemlia (The Little Land). 
Novorossiisk was finally liberated on 16
th
 September 1943 following a brief concerted 
attack by Soviet land, sea and air forces. 
 
 
Map of the Novorossiisk landings, 4
th
 February 1943
3
 
                                                     
3
 Reproduced with the permission of Novorossiiskii istoricheskii muzei-zapovednik. 
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The heroes of this localized campaign included Colonel Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev 
(who went on to become leader of the Soviet Union in 1964) and are still remembered 
today through an amalgam of memoir, monuments and ritual. This longstanding 
commemoration, the subject of my research, is rendered particularly paradoxical by the 
strategic insignificance of the campaign in comparison with other major and prolonged 
actions within the Soviet Union such as the Battles of Stalingrad and Moscow, or the 
Sieges of Leningrad and Sevastopol'.  
Collective memory of Malaia zemlia, the publicly shared remembrance linked to 
communal identity, has developed both in Novorossiisk and countrywide against a 
complex historical backdrop in which distinct shifts in the state attitude to war memory 
are evident. A tomb for the heroes of Malaia zemlia was erected in the centre of 
Novorossiisk in 1946, although state-sponsored remembrance of the war in the Soviet 
Union was scant and strictly managed in the immediate post-war years. The 
authoritarian Stalin régime disapproved of public memory, fearing criticism of the 
Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939, the Soviet Union's poor preparation for 
invasion and its weak handling of the early months of the war. Thus although victory 
was celebrated nationally in 1945, with the naming of the first tranche of 
state-designated and decorated 'Hero-Cities of the Soviet Union' (Leningrad, Stalingrad, 
Sevastopol' and Odessa), the anniversary of Victory Day became a normal working day 
from 1947.
4
 
After Stalin's death in 1953 the relative thaw of the Khrushchev period saw some 
easing of the restrictions on remembrance. Eternal flames were lit in Leningrad (1957) 
                                                     
4
 Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The rise and fall of the cult of World War II in Russia, New 
York: BasicBooks, 1994, p. 104; Thomas C. Wolfe, 'Past as Present, Myth, or History? Discourses of 
time and the Great Fatherland War', in The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe, ed. Richard Ned 
Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu, Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2006, pp. 
249-283, p. 262; and Mikhail Ivanovich Gorbyev and Anatolii Ivanovich Dokuchaev, Goroda-geroi i 
goroda voinskoi slavy Rossii, Moscow: Armpress, 2010.  
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and Sevastopol' (1958), the latter acting as the source of the eternal flame lit in 
Novorossiisk in 1958, thereby linking the two maritime towns. Kiev became the fifth 
Hero-City in 1961. However, it was not until the twentieth anniversary of the end of the 
war in 1965 that the official attitude to memory started to undergo more substantial 
change following the accession of Brezhnev, whose cult of personality was strongly 
linked to a burgeoning war cult centred on his own military career. During the Brezhnev 
era the régime created a country-wide mnemonic environment through which 
remembrance of the war was encouraged, with substantial media coverage of war 
memory, the building of monuments, the increased scale of memorial rituals, the 
publication of war memoirs and the military-patriotic education of children and 
students. Victory Day became a public holiday again in a political climate which 
actively promoted commemoration of the past, alongside some re-Stalinization of 
politics in general. Eternal flames were lit in Moscow and Stalingrad in 1967, 
considerably later than in Novorossiisk. Under Brezhnev Moscow (1965), Brest 
Fortress (1965), Minsk (1974) and Tula (1976) were added to the ranks of Hero-Cities 
in addition to two more surprising selections: Novorossiisk and Kerch' (both in 1973). 
These two southern towns, although considerably smaller in both prestige and 
population than earlier nominations, were however strongly linked with Brezhnev's war 
career. The publication in 1978 of Brezhnev's war memoirs entitled Malaia zemlia 
followed a secret public relations campaign by Brezhnev's inner circle, resulting in their 
official dissemination in educational institutions across the Soviet Union.
5
 As Malaia 
zemlia became a household name, the war cult reached a climax: more war memorials 
sprang up across the country, including the enormous Malaia zemlia monument erected 
on the beach at Stanichka in the dying embers of the Brezhnev era in 1982. 
                                                     
5
 L. I. Brezhnev, Malaia zemlia, Moscow, Politizdat, 1978. 
 14 
 
This state deployment of war memory as a political tool changed markedly after 
Brezhnev's death in an apparent backlash against an overemphasis on the 
state-sponsored war myth, which had obscured what some saw as factual history and 
verged on the absurd in his final years.
6
 With Gorbachev's policy of glasnost' 
(openness) in the late 1980s came a period of increasing official transparency and 
questioning about the past, leading to some painful revelations about the war. The 
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 saw a debate about the importance 
attached to war memory: the military parade on Moscow's Red Square was ended under 
El'tsin in 1992, but reinstated in 1995, if on a lesser scale than previously.
7
 The collapse 
of the Russian economy in the 1990s meant also that there was little money or indeed 
appetite for memory matters, which seemed to lose their political priority, leading to 
some lean years of casual public forgetting as the country battled to forge a new 
ideological future. However, a new century and president brought in another change of 
policy. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has experienced a second war cult which has 
returned remembrance of the war to the heart of domestic politics just as living 
witnesses are disappearing.   
Over the years since the war, the myth of Malaia zemlia has developed within a 
changing political and ideological environment. In the twenty-first century memory 
politics has emerged as a potent unifying tool with its slogans and symbolism, not least 
in relation to recent military action in Ukraine. War memory in the states of the former 
Soviet Union is increasingly relevant for today's political agenda and is therefore 
becoming an important area for scholarly study.
8
 My research on the evolution of the 
                                                     
6
 However a further two Hero-Cities (Murmansk and Smolensk) were named in 1985 to mark the fortieth 
anniversary of the end of the war. 
7
 Kathleen E. Smith, Mythmaking in the New Russia: Politics and memory during the Yeltsin era, Ithaca, 
NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2002, pp. 86-90.  
8
 See notably Catherine Merridale, Night of Stone: Death and memory in Russia, London: Granta Books, 
2000; Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the fate of the Bolshevik 
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myth of Malaia zemlia and its associated memorial practices is particularly timely, 
coming just as the Great Patriotic War in Russia is on the cusp of transition from living 
memory to history. 
This work examines how a local Soviet war myth was constructed and propagated 
in an authoritarian national context, largely thanks to the overriding influence of 
Brezhnev and his régime. Under Brezhnev's leadership, Malaia zemlia became an 
overpowering mythical construct to the extent that it was politically impossible to 
establish the historical facts behind the popular narrative. Previous Western and Soviet 
dissident scholars, such as Nina Tumarkin, Roi Medvedev and Zhores Medvedev, have 
dismissed Brezhnev's promotion of Malaia zemlia with more than a hint of ridicule, 
regarding the myth as an exaggerated part of the Brezhnev war cult as do many older 
citizens of other parts of Russia.
9
 In contrast, my original research focuses on how 
Malaia zemlia is regarded today by residents of Novorossiisk of all ages, for whom the 
myth is based on living memory and represents their local history. The more positive 
attitude of the local community to the myth is just as valid as, although different from, 
the dismissive top-down perspective espoused by previous scholars, adding 
much-needed texture to the oversimplified existing scholarship.  
Compared with most major Hero-Cities, Novorossiisk remains a small provincial 
town with a current population of around 240,000 citizens. It lies within the Krasnodar 
Region, nearly a thousand miles south of Moscow. From the Soviet era it has possessed 
its own unique modes of remembrance, whilst also adopting the national norms of 
ceremonial rituals. This thesis is not just a case study of a minor Hero-City to add to the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Revolution, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001; and Stephen Lovell, The Shadow of War: 
Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the present, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.  
9
 See Zhores Medvedev, Andropov, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983, pp. 101-3; Tumarkin, The Living and the 
Dead, 1994, pp. 155-156; and Roi Medvedev, Politicheskie portrety, Moscow: Moskva, 2008, p. 219. 
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valuable bank of scholarship on major Hero-Cities, however.
10
 It is also an analysis of 
the personal influence of Brezhnev, the ultimate representative of the Communist 
ideology of the collective, on the town where he saw war service. I have found that, just 
as there is a tension between the understanding of Western and dissident historians and 
local collective memory as to the significance of Malaia zemlia, so there is a substantial 
difference in the judgment of Brezhnev himself. Similarly I demonstrate a difference 
between the understanding of Malaia zemlia nationally and locally and a continuing 
inconsistency between the self-projected image of the Hero-City and the perception of 
Novorossiisk held by Russians elsewhere in the country. In this thesis I bring 
completely new evidence to bear on a myth that most Russians consider dead, along 
with Brezhnev and the Soviet Union.  Rather than consigning it to the past, I trace its 
mnemonic trajectory into the present and beyond, as I explore the meaning of the myth 
of Malaia zemlia for citizens of Novorossiisk today.  
Brezhnev is not the only leader to have used war memory as a political tool. 
Through an examination of the influence on the local myth of the war cults of two 
different eras, my research makes an original contribution to the wider political science 
of both the Brezhnev and the Putin régimes. I have, however, found that it is not only 
the state and its élite leaders who are responsible for the propagation of collective 
memory. Despite the pervading top-down atmosphere of the two war cults, I argue that 
there is still a place for the proactive agency of the local community and even some 
                                                     
10
 See notably on Kiev, Michael Ignatieff, 'Soviet War Memorials', History Workshop Journal, 17, 1984, 
pp. 157-163; on Leningrad, Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: 
Myth, Memories and Monuments, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006 and 
Alexis Peri, 'Revisiting the Past: History and Historical Memory during the Leningrad Blockade', Soviet 
and Post-Soviet Review, 38, 2011, pp. 105-129; on Stalingrad, Scott Palmer, 'How Memory was Made: 
The construction of the memorial to the heroes of the Battle of Stalingrad', The Russian Review, 68, 
2009, pp. 373-407; on Sevastopol', Karl Qualls, 'Who Makes Local Memories?: The Case of Sevastopol 
after World War II', Soviet and Post-Soviet Review, 38, 2011, pp. 130-148; on Minsk and Brest, 
Bernhard Chiari and Robert Maier, 'Volkskrieg und Heldenstätte: Zum Mythos des Großen 
Vaterländischen Krieges in Weißrußland', in Mythen der Nationen, volume 2. 1945: Arena der 
Erinnerung, Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 2004, pp. 737-751; and on Moscow, Nina Tumarkin, 
'Story of a War Memorial', in World War 2 and the Soviet People, ed. John Garrard and Carol Garrard, 
New York: St Martin's, 1993, pp. 125-146. 
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individuals in remembrance of the local war myth within the national war narrative. 
This is a case study with wider political and social connotations, linking the individual 
citizens of Novorossiisk with evolving state policy since the war. This thesis thus makes 
an original contribution to the sociology of myth-making in an authoritarian 
environment. My research reveals the identity of today's Novorossiisk to be a 
mnemonic social construct as I demonstrate that the myth of Malaia zemlia is still 
relevant as much more than just local history for citizens of Novorossiisk today, 
remaining an integral part of its identity seventy years after the end of the war.  
The relationship between mnemonic time and historical time is key to an 
understanding of the mechanism of the propagation of memory. Events which took 
place in real time over seventy years ago were subjected in the decades after the war to 
the cultural constraints of Socialist Realism, the Soviet Union's didactic approach to 
literature, which tended to merge past and present with future time. I have found that, 
even today, citizens of Novorossiisk experience the phenomenon of mythical time 
during ceremonies of remembrance and reconstructions around the main Malaia zemlia 
monument at Stanichka. Time appears to contract, as the historical temporal distance of 
seventy years is considerably reduced, promoting an increase in empathy with the 
original troops on the part of today's citizens. However, military personnel were not the 
only people killed in the war, and my research reveals a polarity between the centralized 
celebration of the Soviet troops and the apparent collective amnesia on the periphery 
relating to civilians, especially Jewish residents. Furthermore, I demonstrate that society 
is divided over its respect for fallen German soldiers and also displays an ambivalent 
attitude to the role of Cossacks in the war.  
Subsequent chapters analyse the evolution of the myth of Malaia zemlia broadly 
chronologically, with each chapter also exploring a specific aspect of remembrance. 
Chapter 2 examines the assimilation of the war myth into collective memory through 
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literature from 1943 to 1985, identifying the mechanism of the construction of the myth 
by war correspondence and memoir literature. Following a consideration of Brezhnev's 
memoirs in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 analyses the political place of Brezhnev in the myth 
and the difference between national and local attitudes to the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and his links with the Malaia zemlia campaign. 
Moving to the current war cult, an analysis of recent visits by Presidents Putin and 
Medvedev to Novorossiisk demonstrates how the local myth is currently positioned 
politically.       
Chapter 4 analyses the cultural dynamics of the propagation of the myth through 
ritual, notably the traditional 'Beskozyrka' (sailor's hat) ceremony, unique to 
Novorossiisk. It also embarks on a study of the place of the individual within collective 
memory - both the person commemorated and the one remembering. In analysing the 
organization of monumental memory, the tensions between mainstream and fringe 
memory are highlighted. Chapter 5 brings the study up to date by addressing the 
mechanism and agency of the inter-generational propagation of the myth today through 
an analysis of the overlapping roles played by the family, the school and local society in 
Novorossiisk.   
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1.2 What is a war myth? 
However intently you study a map 
of our Motherland, you will not 
find this name on the Black Sea 
coast. It was marked on wartime 
maps and remains only on the 
granite stone of monuments, in the 
yellowed triangular letters from 
the field, and in the memories of 
heroes.
11
 
 
 
Classical war myths are often found in the cultures of ancient civilizations, for example 
tales of the Trojan War, which, according to archaeologists, could have taken place as 
early as the twelfth century BC.
12
 Awash with powerful gods and fearless heroes, myths 
and legends grew up around the protracted siege of Troy by the Greeks, enduring to the 
present day. Modern war myths may superficially have something in common with the 
legends of antiquity: just like the Greeks, the Malaia zemlia campaign had its own small 
fleet and tenacious heroes. The classical legends were traditional narratives often 
simplifying the subject and representing a people's shared system of morality and 
common heritage. Oral propagation was the norm until Homer's epic poem, the Iliad, 
brought together various existing versions of the siege of Troy and other exploits, many 
hundreds of years after the events. In Russian culture the tradition of epic poetry is 
much more modern, but the process of oral myth-making is described by Mikhail 
Lermontov in his poem about the legendary Battle of Borodino against Napoleon in 
1812.
13
  
Myths about ancient Greece or the Napoleonic wars took centuries to mature. 
From the point of view of the speed and scope of propagation, it is impossible to 
compare classical myths and legends with their modern counterparts. Malaia zemlia 
                                                     
11
 Iu. Ponomarenko, 'Bol'shaia slava Maloi zemli: Reportazh iz goroda-geroia Novorossiiska', Izvestiia, 
06/09/1974, p. 1. 
12
 Maria Mavromataki, Greek Mythology and Religion, Athens: Haitalis, 1997, p. 231. 
13
 Mikhail Lermontov, 'Borodino' (1837) in M. Iu. Lermontov: Stikhotvoreniia (volume 1), Moscow: 
Russkaia kniga, 1996, pp. 9-12. 
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became a myth almost before its time, featuring in written accounts even as the 
campaign was being waged. Nevertheless, all myths present a narrative about a 
significant event in the past, often at a turning point in history, a coherent message 
disseminated down the generations, which tells the audience about the characteristics of 
the participants and helps to forge the identity of their descendants. This narrative 
represents collective memory of the event, distilled and simplified from possibly 
disparate original accounts for ease of remembering and effective transmission. The 
current understanding of the term 'myth' by scholars is clearly expressed by John 
Ramsden: 
Historians [...] use 'myth' to denote the way in which memories 
of the past have been selectively organised, an agreed version of 
the past that explains how a people came to be what they believe 
themselves to be in the present.
14
 
Furthermore, writing of the myth of the siege of Leningrad, Lisa Kirschenbaum uses the 
term 'myth' to imply social memory: 'the shared narratives that give form and meaning 
to the recall of past experience'.
15
  Similarly, Malcolm Smith uses the word in the 
context of the myth of 1940 in Britain to mean 'a widely held view of the past which has 
helped to shape and to explain the present'.
16
 These three definitions show that, in order 
to survive, a myth must have utility in the present. The narrative is usually the property 
of victors, proud of their courageous ancestors, with the implication that their heroic 
characteristics are transmitted across the generations to their descendants today. A story 
that portrayed a people in a negative light would have no future: it is the positivity 
inherent in war myths that ensures their continuing popularity.  
                                                     
14
 John Ramsden, 'Myths and Realities of the "People's War" in Britain', in Experience and Memory: The 
Second World War in Europe, ed. Jorg Echternkamp and Stefan Martens, New York and Oxford: 
Berghahn, 2010, pp. 40-52, p. 40. 
15
 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 2006, p. 7. 
16
 Malcolm Smith, Britain and 1940: History, myth, and popular memory, New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 
2. 
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My definition of a war myth is therefore 'a shared and simplified narrative of the 
past with utility in the present thanks to its enduring emotional and moral appeal'. This 
says nothing about the agency of propagation of a myth, but acknowledges that it helps 
to support memory and keep it alive for future generations, as both the product and the 
process of remembrance. In essence, a myth is a narrative developed to portray a people 
in its best light, often depicting characters overcoming huge odds to win in the end. As 
such, a war myth may be exploited by a ruling élite to boost the morale of the 
population, often giving meaning and order to a difficult and chaotic period. For 
example, the martyrdom in wartime evident in the ancient legend of the siege of Masada 
was revived in the 1920s by Zionist intellectuals and is still invoked today in modern 
Israel.
17
  
The local myth of Malaia zemlia offered an ideal political tool to the Soviet élite 
of the Brezhnev era, thanks to its simple ingredients of a town occupied by the enemy, 
the daring night-time landings by a handful of men and its defence against all odds until 
the positive climax of the liberation. Added to this was the presence of the charismatic 
future General Secretary. With details of thousands of Soviet deaths, alleged 
collaboration and betrayal strategically omitted, here was a narrative ripe for 
exploitation by the state within the meta-narrative of the war. Like the overriding 
national war myth, it focused on the simple facts of the invasion by the deceitful enemy 
and the struggle of the people against all odds under the guidance of the Communist 
leadership, until victory was finally won. 
The past offers a potent ideological tool which can be used to reinforce social 
cohesion and stability by reminding a people of their national or local identity. A myth 
may help a nation or community to make sense of the past, and leaders to justify present 
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actions, by deploying a simple code which taps into the patriotic pride of the population. 
A modern war myth is much richer than just agreed collective memory due to the 
inclusion of its own special tropes, rituals and symbols. The coded language in which it 
is often expressed, full of emotional imagery and local significance, is commonly 
appropriated by individuals. Where those more familiar with the Western front may still 
speak of the 'Dunkirk spirit' in reference to the solidarity of troops in mortal danger and 
those who went to save them, the people of Novorossiisk have their own set phrases 
which continue today, for example 'the sacred land soaked in blood'. Rather like 
Dunkirk, the very name of Malaia zemlia can convey the motivating emotional message 
of small numbers stranded on the beach in the face of a strong enemy holding the upper 
ground. The word zemlia (land) has connotations of dry land as seen from the sea, a 
land inhabited by compatriots, zemliaki, rather than the foreign invader. The expression 
Malaia zemlia hence gives the impression of an island, a small homeland, while the rest 
of Soviet territory was referred to as Bol'shaia zemlia (the Large Land). The implication 
was that ordinary people lived on the mainland, while Malaia zemlia was set apart for 
occupation by an heroic species, the Malozemel'tsy, the troops fighting on Malaia 
zemlia. The heroic troops and the ground on and for which they fought are clearly more 
important features of the myth than the intricacies of the battle itself. It also helps a 
myth to have one specific and common enemy, in this case the 'fascist occupiers', who 
may be targeted by leaders past and present to deflect criticism from themselves in a 
process of unification of the people.
18
 Once cleansed of the enemy, the new town of 
Novorossiisk rose from the ashes of the old and the war narrative of Malaia zemlia took 
on the properties of a foundation myth. 
Although nobody would expect a modern war myth to refer to fictitious gods or a 
snake-haired gorgon, myths may be confused with legends and deemed by some to be 
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false representations of the past. By virtue of their collective compilation, myths may 
inevitably lose some of the historical detail in the simplification process; moreover, 
myths compiled gradually will contain only those elements deemed to have current or 
future utility. Any small historical inaccuracy is not too important for the 
self-perception of a community, as long as the overall narrative is unambiguous and 
broadly based on fact.
19
  In the hands of Soviet propaganda experts myths were often 
barely related to the original event: many inaccuracies may certainly be found in 
Brezhnev's memoirs, which were well crafted stylistically but not entirely truthful. 
Urban legends, the contemporary counterpart of traditional myths, are also present in 
today's Novorossiisk. A myth is therefore better perceived as a corpus of tradition, a 
community's cultural heritage, rather than historical fact or fiction.  
The academic subject of war myth may be examined within a range of paradigms 
and with a variety of aims. There is much to be gained from a consideration of 
scholarship on the myth of 1940 in Britain, demonstrating different possible approaches 
to studies of collective memory of the Dunkirk evacuation, the Battle of Britain and the 
London Blitz. On the one hand, Clive Ponting acknowledges his aim of exposing the 
historical facts obscured by what he claims is a deceptive myth, untruthfully propagated 
from above.
20
 This approach assumes a myth to be a false representation, thus 
privileging 'real' history as an objective discipline over the perceived fabrications 
existing as collective memory and cultural tradition. Angus Calder, on the other hand, 
contests Ponting's assertion that the myth of the Blitz was the product of a deliberately 
misleading top-down propaganda campaign. Calder may challenge the finer points of 
the myth, but accepts the need for its promotion, arguing that its dissemination 
motivated people to behave as the myth suggested, bringing into question not only the 
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genesis but also the subsequent appropriation and ownership of the myth.
21
 This 
approach emphasizes the traditional behavioural values promoted by the myth of an 
heroic people, also evident in the Soviet and post-Soviet stress on vospitanie, the moral 
education that ensures the continuation of such desirable national characteristics.  
A different paradigm, less confrontational than Ponting's, is adopted by Malcolm 
Smith, who sees little value in a debunking exercise and seeks to study the myth as a 
social construction in its own right, a conception of the past that stands in need of 
scholarly explanation in order that its effect on the present may be understood.
22
 Smith's 
exploration of the historical evolution and cultural influence of the myth as it was 
incorporated into everyday life is usefully developed by Mark Connelly, who sees the 
study of myths as vital in revealing how people relate to the past.
23
 It is this final 
approach which I shall adopt in my analysis of the culturally specific myth of Malaia 
zemlia - not attempting to undermine or expose its falsity, but rather seeking to 
understand and explain the myth as the contemporary heritage of cultural politics from 
the Brezhnev to the Putin era.  
Soviet citizens lived in a myth-making culture where information was often 
difficult to come by and media reports were sometimes taken with a pinch of salt. My 
research focuses on the complex relationship between historical facts and myth-making, 
whereby a narrative is constructed sometimes after agreed negotiation and sometimes 
by imposition from above. Any positivist preoccupations with the detailed facts of the 
events on Malaia zemlia must therefore fade into the background when evaluating the 
social constructions around the myth. The types of evidence that I have selected reflect 
my chosen paradigm. This interdisciplinary project, with its historical, cultural and 
sociological dimensions, has involved the literary analysis of war memoirs and other 
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published Soviet sources; a sustained overview of the press in Novorossiisk from 1943 
to the present; attendance at rituals of commemoration; observation of monuments and 
historical sites; the detailed examination of current educational practices; and extended 
personal interviews with 124 residents of the Hero-City.
24
  
Any quest for scientific objectivity in the area of memory is hazardous, as the 
perceptions and emotions of the target population are virtually impossible to quantify. 
Soviet war memoirs are subjective documents both politically and personally, while 
monuments, newspapers and school curricula reflect the political agenda of their times. 
Furthermore, memories of the past, if not already biased or simply faded, may well be 
distorted in the process of expression to an interviewer from a foreign background. In 
the face of potential interpretive insecurity, a pragmatic but questioning stance must be 
maintained when gauging the validity of some sources. As one participant amongst 
thousands, I am not too worried that my presence at rituals of remembrance may have 
warped my results, but I have interrogated the closer relationship of interviewer with 
respondents. Although my evidence suggests that the events relating to the myth of 
Malaia zemlia are based largely on what I deem to be historical fact, it does not really 
matter if all aspects of the myth are entirely true. The important thing is that the people 
of Novorossiisk widely accept this myth as part of their social and cultural background; 
it helps them to make sense of their local history with an emotional and moral appeal 
lacking in the dry detail of the history text-books.
25
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1.3 Who owns a war myth?  
To have common glories in the 
past and to have a common will in 
the present; to have performed 
great deeds together, to wish to 
perform still more - these are the 
essential conditions for being a 
people.
26
 
 
The scope of this thesis ranges from the local to the national and back again as the myth 
of Malaia zemlia is traced and placed within the meta-narrative of the state's war myth. 
From the domestic kitchen table to the town centre, from outlying communal graves to 
the Malaia zemlia memorial complex, from Heroes' Square in Novorossiisk to 
Moscow's Red Square, my research follows a complex route, linking individuals, 
families, civic society and the state. All these have a claim to ownership of the war 
myth and all, to an extent, have a role in its propagation.  
Since Maurice Halbwachs first coined the term 'collective memory' for the 
socially constructed memory held within the collective framework of group 
consciousness, scholarship has tended to be polarized in its approach to memory 
studies, adopting either the extreme of state-centric control or the place of the individual 
in remembrance.
27
 My research, however, calls for a more integrated and nuanced 
paradigm which recognizes the agency of different sectors of society at all hierarchical 
levels. While these different stake-holders often reinforce the memory message, 
conflicting narratives sometimes arise, permitting a more three-dimensional, 
multi-vocal analysis. In view of the various political, sociological and cultural 
influences on collective memory, I stress throughout an examination of agency in the 
construction and propagation of the myth of Malaia zemlia.  
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1.3.1 The nation-state 
If the tsar once held the whole Russian empire together by virtue of tradition and 
dynastic right, what could bond its successor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? 
This huge area spanning several time and geographical zones, with regional variations 
in race and ethnicity, language and religion, was not a strong candidate for nationhood. 
A national war myth can help to unify a country, but would not last long unless it had 
some utility in the present for a nation or people. This mutual dependence of myth and 
nation was first expressed by Ernst Renan in 1882 in his classic lecture on the concept 
of nationhood. Renan saw a bonding of a people into a coherent nation through a shared 
heritage which underpins a common ideology in the present.
28
  
In the early stages of the new USSR, a strong ideology disseminated from above 
served to cement the population through the myths of the October Revolution of 1917 
and the subsequent Civil War (1917-1922). The political culture was one which turned 
readily to myth-making, where the form and content of this culturally specific type of 
narrative was determined by state leaders, eventually evolving into a Leninist 
foundation myth of the Soviet Union with its own carefully selected stories of heroes 
and villains. In much the same way as Brezhnev's service on Malaia zemlia was warped 
and exaggerated in his memoirs, the trajectories of individual revolutionary leaders 
were sometimes artificially created, such that, through them, the state acquired its own 
heroic identity as a nation prepared to fight for its new ideology. The myth was further 
promoted by the introduction of official public ceremonies and films mediated by the 
state to convince the population of the ubiquity of the Bolshevik cause and to include 
them in its values. Frederick Corney identifies aspects of the narrative of the Revolution 
which are common to most examples of mythology, including Malaia zemlia: its own 
symbolism (the hammer and sickle) and a language with its own loaded terminology 
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and specialized vocabulary (for example, bourgeois or proletariat). Gradually much of 
the population came to identify with the myth, in some cases re-inventing their own 
back-stories as incipient revolutionaries, either consciously due to coercion or 
unconsciously thanks to the ubiquity of the myth, to fit in with the official 
meta-narrative as it became assimilated into collective memory.
29
 
During the 1920s the myth of the Revolution evolved quickly and pervasively. 
Portrayed as the natural conclusion to the popular struggle, the Revolution became the 
legitimate starting point for further struggles, including the Great Patriotic War, in what 
appeared to be a coherent narrative of an organized and meaningful series of events.
30
 
During the war the Soviet propaganda machine harvested examples of the self-sacrifice 
of heroes such as the young 'martyr' Zoia Kosmodem'ianskaia, who were immediately 
mythologized in order to boost the morale of the people.
31
  
Twenty years after the Second World War the founding myth of the Soviet Union 
was supplemented by a cogent and unifying war myth which effectively glued the 
population together as it re-invoked heroic values to which virtually everybody could 
subscribe. Thus people could make sense of the war as a further step in the ongoing 
revolutionary process, with the added advantage that most people had at least some 
experience of the war, while not all had seen the Revolution at first hand. Furthermore, 
the war myth uncontroversially identified one common enemy, whereas the myth of 
October split the population along the lines of the Civil War. During the Brezhnev era 
the war myth finally became embedded in schools and other institutions as official 
history in a mechanism similar to that by which the myth of October had taken root. As 
it developed, the myth of the Bolshevik Revolution gradually became less prominent, 
                                                     
29
 Frederick C. Corney, Telling October: Memory and the making of the Bolshevik Revolution, Ithaca, 
NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2004,  pp. 8-9; 201-221.  
30
 Ibid., pp. 1-5. 
31
 Karel C. Berkhoff, Motherland in Danger: Soviet propaganda during World War II, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2012, pp. 59-67. 
 29 
 
especially after its fiftieth anniversary in 1967.
32
 Today's élite in the new Russia, in 
search of usable aspects of the Soviet past in the construction of a politically useful 
national identity, have revived the myth of the Great Patriotic War, which has now 
effectively displaced that of the Bolshevik Revolution. War memory is stated by 
President Putin to be 'an excellent cement, uniting people of different nationalities, 
different ethnicities and different religions into one indivisible Russian nation'.
33
 The 
war myth is so culturally ingrained that remembrance even unites people of different 
political persuasions. 
Renan realised that a nation's shared past could also include shared suffering: 
'Where national memories are concerned, griefs are of more value than triumphs, for 
they impose duties, and require a common effort.'
34
 Nationhood breeds martyrdom: 
sacrifice made in the common interest underlines the value of the nation today as 
something (still) worth fighting for, while also legitimizing the continuation of 
ceremonies of remembrance sponsored by the state, notably Victory Day. This 
argument justifies collateral damage in the war for the sake of a positive outcome. Thus 
frequent reference is made in Russia to the nation's gratitude to the millions who gave 
their lives in the war for the sake of their descendants and the country's future. In this 
way a cult of ancestors has been built up, linking the past with a shared vision of a 
brighter future, where a blurring of time lines promotes historical continuity over the 
decades. 
National identity is never more important than in wartime, but is also evident in 
any period when a society needs cohesion and a common goal.  Thus it is often in 
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peacetime that a war myth is invoked in countries experiencing internal or external 
challenges. The use of the national war myth as a metaphor for nationhood by the ruling 
élite in order to promote social and political cohesion may be expected particularly in an 
authoritarian society such as the Soviet Union. Created during the Cold War in a period 
of perceived external threat and re-created in twenty-first century Russia to rally a 
nation facing possible disintegration from within, the national war myth fills the state's 
need for a simple and positive message of a victorious nation. Within the national 
meta-narrative cultivated by the two war cults of the Brezhnev and Putin eras, the local 
war myth of Malaia zemlia has flourished. 
Memory studies which concentrate on the manipulation of history by a dominant 
sector for current utility employ a 'presentist' paradigm, which is superficially applicable 
to studies of the Soviet and post-Soviet cults of war memory. Stressing both agency and 
reason, it emphasizes a top-down, politically motivated approach which aims to unify 
the people and legitimize the prevailing institutions. Those in power are credited with 
re-interpreting a malleable past, picking and choosing its more useful aspects in order to 
render the whole more effective for current use. In this reconstruction there may be a 
degree of state manipulation in what is selected and what is omitted from the current 
narrative. This process is intended to render the message more acceptable to the 
population at large, to whom any manipulation may not be noticeable.  
Renan also suggests an agreed forgetting of past events that may once have 
threatened national unity, deeming collective amnesia crucial to nationhood: 'The 
essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common; and also that 
they have forgotten many things'.
35
 In Renan's view, the forgetting process is passive 
and encompasses the whole population, whereas presentist George Herbert Mead credits 
selective manipulation of what is omitted from the hegemonic meta-narrative to the 
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dominant sector of society alone.
36
 In my analysis of the agency involved in the 
forgetting process, I have found, as may be expected, a substantial role in collective 
forgetting on the part of the state in the Soviet Union, followed by an increased quest 
for historical truth from below in the new Russia. 
None of the early proponents of the presentist paradigm proposes a mechanism 
for the élite control of the use of history; they ignore the processes involved in the 
forging of collective memory from above, concentrating solely on the political and 
social outcome. This omission is addressed by Eric Hobsbawm's politics of memory 
approach, which recognizes the construction and customization of memory from above 
through ceremonial rituals, monuments, symbolism, the media and the education of the 
younger generation.
37
  
Although Hobsbawm's conceptual framework represents a particularly one-sided 
approach, it does have some broad validity in view of the state-centric mnemonic 
environment of the late Soviet Union and twenty-first century Russia. It lacks, however, 
much-needed texture in both agency and local detail. I agree with Hobsbawm's 
presentist approach in viewing the growth of the war cults of the Brezhnev and Putin 
eras as largely top-down phenomena, as his proposed mechanism surrounding the 
construction and propagation of memory from above matches the manipulation of 
collective memory by the state. The construction of monuments is a significant feature 
of the Brezhnev era war cult, which also saw the manipulation of history, notably with 
the publication of Brezhnev's war memoir, Malaia zemlia. Both Brezhnev and Putin 
boosted the scale and importance of the ceremonial rituals of commemoration around 
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Victory Day, while central control of the media and the inculcation of patriotism 
through history in the school syllabus in the context of Putin's 'managed democracy' are 
examples that may be expected of a leader attempting social and political engineering 
according to the presentist paradigm. Furthermore, the concept of vospitanie, the moral 
education of the young, is central to the inculcation in the younger generation of a belief 
system propagated by the state as both patriotic and traditional. My research shows that 
these state-endorsed moral values are widely accepted by the people, thus ensuring 
continuity with selected social norms from the past. 
The functional approach of Hobsbawm may allow for some small agreed revision 
of memory as the political climate changes, for example during the 1990s, but 
emphasizes rather the ideological status quo and the solidarity of society in its collective 
memory, which could potentially lead to the stagnation of memory and commemorative 
practices. War memory in contemporary Russia is also an integral part of the wave of 
nostalgia for the past that is gripping the country.
38
 It is not only some members of the 
older generation who would welcome a return to the conditions of Brezhnevism, but 
also the President, who has publicly lamented the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
reintroduced the Soviet national anthem with new words.
39
 Moreover, Putin's current 
policy of expansionism in Ukraine may be interpreted as a neo-imperialistic attempt to 
turn back the clock. It appears that the war cult is not merely used to validate the 
present, but also marks a campaign to return to some of the social and political values of 
the past. Thus the recent boom in collective nostalgia potentially offers even more 
continuity between past and present, reinforcing the promotion of collective memory. 
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The presentist premise, which assumes that there is a dominant sector of society, 
implies that lower ranks of society are ideologically or psychologically coerced into 
remembrance. This type of tradition is the result of an authoritarian state propagating a 
positive and ubiquitous war myth which appeared to resonate with the masses in the 
Soviet Union. Nina Tumarkin views the Soviet people as universally passive in their 
acceptance of state doctrine vis-à-vis the war, at least in society's public relations with 
the régime. Furthermore, Catherine Merridale acknowledges the monolithic attitude of 
the Soviet state to the ideology of memory, as it channelled the public's gaze largely on 
young, strong, brave, handsome soldiers who were innocent victims of the enemy, while 
excluding the experience of other categories of citizens from official memory.
40
 Both 
these scholars argue for a pervasive late-Soviet mnemonic ideology which promoted a 
singular reading of the past, with little consideration of the scope for public proactivity 
in remembrance. 
Central to Hobsbawm's theoretical position is his emphasis on the invention of 
tradition, a key aspect of my research (see Chapter 4). In many cultures commemorative 
rituals are at the centre of collective memory and provide a regular focus for public 
participation, often around a central monument.  These traditions may involve the 
demonstration of patriotism and the celebration of a triumphant nation, whilst also 
enabling participants to show respect for the dead, whose sacrifice made victory 
possible. Scholars of memory have approached the study of tradition from two different 
perspectives: that of the dominant sector wishing to promote the official state ideology 
as a means of social control and that of the individual mourner or participant with more 
personal concern for those remembered. From the presentist point of view Hobsbawm 
dismisses the possibility of centuries of public ownership of tradition, claiming naïvely 
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that performative rituals are usually invented by states seeking to maintain the political 
status quo by inculcating through repetition those behavioural norms and moral values 
deemed to be desirable in society. Continuing his emphasis on who is in control and 
why, Hobsbawm supports his politics of memory theory with a hegemonic mechanism 
for commemorative tradition, which provides little scope for public debate or individual 
input. Hobsbawm defines an 'invented tradition' as: 
a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to 
inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, 
which automatically implies continuity with the past.
41
 
Hobsbawm's theory of top-down invented tradition does not stand sustained scrutiny in 
the case of many centuries-old Russian customs or rituals, but he correctly recognizes 
many apparently longstanding traditions as relatively recent, as is the case with Victory 
Day in the Soviet Union, intended to boost morale and celebrate victory after the war.  
An invented mnemonic tradition both needs and constructs a powerful state, which 
confirms the place of the élite at the top of the hierarchical social pyramid through 
military-style ceremonies such as the parade of military hardware on Red Square. Any 
potentially problematic issues, such as continuing this tradition from the Soviet Union to 
modern Russia, are overcome by an increasing simplification of the memory message to 
one of popular patriotism and the dismissal of side-issues that may threaten to disrupt its 
coherence. For example, the overpowering commemorative narrative constructed by the 
Soviet state nipped in the bud any potential questioning surrounding the huge losses 
incurred in the war, by presenting the dead as heroes and martyrs, who sacrificed their 
lives for their country and its Communist ideology.  
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This state campaign of remembrance is largely promoted by the media to effect a 
sense of national social unison on a grand scale, what Benedict Anderson would term an 
'imagined community', emphasizing its shared political, social and cultural 
background.
42
 A community is usefully reinforced by badges of membership. Symbols 
such as the St George ribbon, the wearing of which in Russia is a supplementary 
tradition grafted on to an earlier invented tradition, not only promote continuity with the 
past, but also serve to prevent any stagnation caused by the imposed repetition of 
Victory Day ceremonies. This recent addition to collective memory increases the 
political utility of the celebrations through a public proclamation of social cohesion. 
Although the commercial aspects of the ribbon are questioned by some, its ubiquity 
marks the general lack of dissent surrounding war memory by the public, who would 
probably mount a public outcry if this traditional holiday were ended. The high degree 
of popular support for Victory Day signifies the substantial convergence today of a 
manipulative state and a society relatively happy to be manipulated. However, a 
theoretical model based solely on a top-down approach to agency in remembrance of 
the past is too black and white. My research has demonstrated that some, but not all, 
apparently bottom-up movements in Novorossiisk reinforce top-down collective 
memory. This indicates that in both the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia the 
dynamics of memory are much more complex than the simple imposition of 
remembrance on the population for the sake of political utility.  
Despite its superficial validity, an approach based on the politics of memory 
leaves no room for the possibility of alternative mechanisms. It similarly glosses over 
the individual doing the actual remembering of another individual in what may be a 
non-political, purely personal act of remembrance. Furthermore, a state-centric 
approach focuses on the memory message from Moscow, which may not always concur 
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with that in provincial Novorossiisk, where traditional Russian burial and mourning 
ceremonies and customs dating back centuries rather than mere decades live on in 
churches and cemeteries alongside the triumphalist façade of Victory Day.  
The close relationship of the present with the past is key to continued societal 
cohesion. The presentist mnemonic position, espoused by Hobsbawm, whereby the 
present reshapes the past as governments and society's élite employ a preferred version 
of history for current utility, is the political side of the mnemonic coin. The opposite, 
anthropological, side, sees rather the past forging present identity, whereby society 
interprets positive current social qualities as due to historical events, which so moulded 
the characteristics of previous generations that they were then transmitted across the 
generations. This essentialist position is what I term the 'genetic' approach to desirable 
social attributes, founded on longstanding traditional familial values, which my research 
indicates is noticeable in Novorossiisk. There is an evident causal contradiction between 
the two positions, which are not, however, incompatible in this context, but indicative 
of the complexity of memory formation in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, particularly 
when a genetic stance is reinforced by the president. This genetic position 
acknowledges forces already present for centuries within traditional Russian society, 
which act within the overpowering presentist environment of the state war cult to 
reinforce a potent local war myth.  
War cults leave little scope for independence. However, even under these 
prevailing conditions, my research has revealed opportunities for individual proactivity 
and spontaneity in remembrance, calling for the adoption of a more integrated approach 
to the memorial processes linking state, civic society and the individual. 
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1.3.2 The local community 
Scholars of memory have traditionally contended that war commemoration is more 
likely to be invoked by the state than by local groups, since the state sees it as a means 
of political legitimization on the national scale. More recently, however, the importance 
of local groups of memory, at least in the West, has been demonstrated.
43
 These studies 
argue that remembrance on a local scale offers a social framework of united experience, 
which is more meaningful for individual and community identity than a dogmatic 
nationalistic approach to memory. A shift in emphasis down the hierarchical pyramid 
has been evident since the 1990s in scholarship adopting the popular memory approach, 
which acknowledges that remembrance may be shaped by the local cultural system 
instead of or in addition to the state. This bottom-up approach recognizes, unlike 
Hobsbawm's paradigm, that ordinary people in their local social groups have some 
degree of agency, and that they are not simply subjected to social engineering by a 
dominant élite. This type of collective memory is potentially more meaningful to groups 
and individuals as it is designed by the local community and implemented through 
monument and ritual close to home. In my case study in Novorossiisk it is not sufficient 
to accept state domination without analysing the local 'community of memory',
44
 which 
is perhaps more conscious of its own past than of national history. Although they are 
not always in opposition, it is useful to clarify the two different scholarly perspectives: 
vernacular as opposed to official state-sponsored commemoration, and local as opposed 
to national remembrance. Interestingly, many case studies stem from popular response 
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to the Vietnam War in the United States and World War I in Western Europe, while 
academic studies in Eastern Europe remain under-represented.
45
 
John Bodnar's examination of the design and interpretation of the Vietnam 
Veterans' War Memorial in the United States demonstrates substantial tension yet some 
degree of compromise between vernacular and official memory.
46
 Bodnar examines the 
historical consciousness around political issues in the present, considering how the 
values of ordinary people relate to the political goals of government. He finds a 
significant difference between the wishes of the veterans initiating the project, wanting 
to memorialize service personnel who had sacrificed themselves for the nation, and 
those of congressional leaders who stressed the need to promote patriotism and national 
solidarity after a controversial conflict. Alongside these vested interests are those of the 
individuals travelling from far-flung regions, seeking a focus for their own mourning 
and loss. During the project different interest groups emerged as the proposed 
monument mutated from one selected by the people to a grander complex which would 
also satisfy the requirements of the state in a compromise which combined the needs of 
most parties. 
Through this case study Bodnar emphasizes the different degrees of power and the 
different focus of various groups, including those who had never supported the war but 
who had nonetheless lost a family member. Their grief seemed to be in total contrast to 
the requirement of the state for a monument to the nation as a whole, even though the 
war was by no means supported by all citizens. The memorial thus needed to tread a 
fine balance between the sadness of groups of individuals and the national symbols 
demanded by the state, whilst avoiding the extremes of a mass grave or a monument to 
an heroic victory. The resulting memorial, erected in 1982, succeeded in separating the 
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politics of the war from remembrance of those who had died by an expression of loyalty 
to both the community of veterans and to the state. The initial overt opposition to the 
state by the expression of counter-memory from below is deemed by Bodnar to be the 
epitome of vernacular memory, which criticized official interpretations in its demands 
for its own special collective memory to be met. Bodnar concludes that the eventual 
creation of genuine public memory emerges from a dialogue between interested parties, 
where an equilibrium is reached between the real, first-hand experience of groups of 
individuals and the dogmatic, if abstract, political interests of the state.  
Bodnar's scholarly interest lies beyond that of the mere design of a memorial, 
however: he recognizes any debate about collective memory as one involving issues 
fundamental to society and its culture. What was possible in Washington, though, was 
inconceivable in Moscow. This type of open and meaningful discussion has been shown 
by Nina Tumarkin not to have taken place in the Soviet Union of the 1980s and Russia 
in the 1990s, when the capital carried out a similar exercise to construct a national war 
memorial. Spanning different decades and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the design 
process staggered from competition to adjudication on several occasions, sometimes 
involving public input but all too often simply relying on a closed, all-powerful jury. 
Marred by corruption and vested interests, the initial popular empowerment which 
permitted the submission of designs by veterans led to damning condescension by those 
with the power to make decisions. Furthermore, many ordinary people condemned some 
designers for their ethnicity or lack of patriotism, placing the common emphasis on a 
state-centred approach. The final selection incorporated the nationalistic symbolism 
typical of the monumentalism of the Brezhnev era in a conservative move which 
privileged the state over the people, triumphalist glory over individual mourning.
47
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Tumarkin's case study may be of a national debate, but it still prompts doubts 
about the possibility of achieving consensus around the creation of memory within a 
community, even in modern Russia, thanks to the continuing conditions of state and 
local authority hegemony. However, far from the capital in Novorossiisk a small group 
of Soviet young people did manage to invent the successful 'Beskozyrka' tradition, 
customizing remembrance to meet local needs and commemorating specifically local 
history. This tradition was not invented, as Hobsbawm may suggest, by a dominant 
élite, but by members of an ordinary youth club, albeit moulded by the pervading 
influence of the Brezhnev era war cult. This independent expression of collective 
memory was not evidence of counter-memory as encountered around the Vietnam 
memorial, however, which would certainly not have been tenable in the Soviet Union, 
but a purely local means of expressing similar sentiments to those surrounding national 
rituals, if in a more muted and less triumphal manner. In this way the local Beskozyrka 
ritual complements the national Victory Day, putting the emphasis on the group of 
landing troops embarking on a dangerous mission, rather than on the simplistic fact of 
victory. Being closer to home and focused on the beach at Stanichka, the emotional pull 
of local collective identity may be experienced at Beskozyrka, alongside the generalized 
national identity and patriotism imbued on Victory Day. The Beskozyrka tradition does 
not seek to contest the national narrative, but represents a special sub-set of mnemonic 
behaviour which commemorates the myth of Malaia zemlia within the national war 
myth. It is evident, then, that there does not have to be a binary opposition or power 
struggle between state and vernacular expressions of collective memory, as Bodnar 
would suggest: collective memory, even in the Soviet Union, can on occasions 
accommodate both top-down and bottom-up mechanisms. The Beskozyrka tradition is 
not at all conflictual, being accepted throughout the country as specific to Novorossiisk, 
with its significance remaining constant nationwide. 
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In search of shared ground between people's 'intimate, immediate, and real local 
place and the distant, abstract, and not-less-real national world', Alon Confino has 
approached the relationship between the local and the national in a more consensual 
way than Bodnar. Through the idealistic concept of Heimat (home) in German society, 
he has successfully linked the local with the national, arguing for an overlapping of 
symbolism such that local memory may sometimes appropriate the national, while the 
national may acquire and revive different local meanings. Confino thus inverts 
traditional scholarship which sees national interests always moulding local ones, as in 
the invention of the Beskozyrka tradition, to examine how local issues may shape 
nationhood in a convergence of interests.
48
 
The Heimat approach is particularly useful in the case of Germany, embracing 
both local and national connotations and identities. To date scholarship has barely 
addressed this degree of complexity in the construction of local identity within the often 
overpowering national narrative of the Great Patriotic War.
49
 On the local level it is not 
too dissimilar to the concept of Malaia zemlia, a small place that one can call home. 
However, the troops on Malaia zemlia saw the rest of the country as different, Bol'shaia 
zemlia, accepting that their beach-head was only one small part of a larger whole and 
hoping for a reunification of the two as the enemy was expelled.
50
 There is no 
opposition between the two concepts, however, which are largely complementary. The 
myth of Malaia zemlia is simply a strong expression of local identity which would, 
however, later be subsumed within the national war myth.  The approaches of both 
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Bodnar and Confino continue to emphasize the role of politics in the creation and 
dissemination of collective memory, while the incorporation of national symbols on the 
local level recognizes the influence of the dominant political sector in the shaping of 
local memory and identity. These paradigms also continue to stress a collective 
mentality, which may be at best selective and at worst inaccurate. They assume a 
herd-like mentality amongst members of a community who are credited with little 
independence of thought, offering no scope for the place of the individual in memory.  
 
1.3.3 The individual 
In order to obtain the full picture of war memory in Novorossiisk it is necessary to turn 
to the most personal and private aspects at the heart of remembrance, widening the 
scope from a narrow top-down and/or bottom-up paradigm to a less political but 
multi-vocal approach. There is a huge complexity to social remembering which is not 
easily explained by presentist or popular memory theories alone, but which must invoke 
the place of individual at the centre of the remembrance process - the person attending a 
traditional ritual or the fallen sailor whose hat lies at the centre of the Beskozyrka ritual.  
Some scholars of memory recognize that society itself does not possess its own 
real memory, but that memory resides in the minds of the individuals who make up the 
social fabric of a community.
51
 A war myth is a social phenomenon with a collective 
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perspective, but it is formed by individuals and also affects individuals. Therefore an 
examination of the interacting processes, by which individual people shape collective 
memory and are in turn shaped by it, offers a more integrated approach to establishing 
the mechanism for the construction and propagation of memory in the provincial town 
of Novorossiisk. Such a mutually reinforcing mechanism could lead to a mnemonic 
vicious circle, were it not for the fact that accepted collective memory is agreed on the 
basis of numerous individual memories and in turn has the potential to impact 
differently on the consciousness of every individual in the community, depending on 
their discrete experiences. This type of approach is difficult to achieve in studies of 
large-scale commemorative rituals such as Victory Day in Moscow, but is increasingly 
applicable the smaller the scale of the memorial community. My analysis ranges from 
Red Square to the village community centre of Myskhako; it is in the latter case, at the 
intersection of private memories and the collective, where the position of the individual 
may be examined most effectively. 
The individual, as the primary agent of construction of social memory, may help 
shape the collective consciousness in three ways: by the production of memoir 
literature; by the private transmission of memory within the family, often through the 
medium of artefacts such as photographs; and by membership of a 'fictive kinship 
group', where the private is given a social framework by virtue of similar interest and 
experience.
52
 A bottom-up approach emphasizing the individual at the centre of 
remembrance, where personal memory is considered alongside official, public 
commemoration, is stressed in the scholarship of Jay Winter, who, with Emmanuel 
Sivan, positions himself at the mid-point between private and totally social memory.
53
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Winter's individualist approach, considering the psychological needs of a person coping 
with loss while building up a new post-war identity, is largely based on memory of war 
in the West. Even though no account is made of the state-framing of memoirs and the 
role of official censorship of literature prevalent in the Soviet Union, Winter's insight 
with regard to issues of bereavement is of universal humanistic value. Viewing graves 
as an initial focus of mourning and personal consolation, Winter sees the monuments 
erected some time after the war as sites of symbolic exchange, where the dead are 
figuratively brought home and where the living express a debt to the fallen.
54
 It is clear 
that the subtle interpretations and functions of memorial sites may change with time in 
any country, as Winter finds, but the case in the Soviet Union is further complicated by 
the intervention of the state in the construction of monuments, privileging their official 
function of glorifying national victory over mourning the dead. Moreover, the role of 
the individual or small group of people searching for individual bodies still left 
unburied decades after the war, or the sculptor wishing to replace an older monument 
with a new version, adds a further dimension to this perspective. 
The place of women within this paradigm is uncertain in Winter's work. Certainly 
most of the dead were male, as were the kinship groups formed after the war, while the 
mourners were typically female. James Fentress and Chris Wickham suggest that public 
memory is in the control of men, with women often taking a more private perspective. 
They argue that older women may have less nostalgia than men for public memory of 
the war, which predominantly recalls male activities. Women are found to speak less 
about public space and more about domestic and family affairs, especially births, 
marriages and, most importantly in the context of war, deaths.
55
 This generalization may 
be questioned with respect to female memory of the Soviet Union at war by virtue of 
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women's substantial participation in the conflict and their experience of life in an 
occupied country, as well as their wartime responsibility for industrial and agricultural 
production. However, it is notable that public expressions of female memory through 
memoir are rare in the Soviet Union.
56
 
Despite their focus on the individual and the local, Winter and Sivan recognize the 
state as the dominant agency in the organization of rituals of remembrance, relegating 
the role of the individual to a relatively passive one, as seems to be the case in 
Novorossiisk, where many of the ceremonies take place around the original monuments, 
which were state-subsidized with no scope for unofficial or individualized design.
57
 
Merridale adopts a similarly binary approach to the relationship between the individual 
citizen and the state, acknowledging that the individual was subject to substantial state 
dominance in the Soviet Union. She finds that, even though private conversations could 
not be controlled, any attempt by the individual to shape collective memory was 
hampered, often by self-censorship, under oppressive political conditions. Merridale 
explores from the point of view of various bereaved groups how individuals 
accommodated their own memories within Soviet ideology; she acknowledges that 
individual memories may not always coincide with the politically correct version, 
leading to a complex process of myth-building between sometimes competing images in 
cases when counter-memory is retained despite an overriding state narrative.
58
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However, any mechanism for the construction and adoption of the official myth or of 
memory from below by the individual citizen is lacking from this model.
59
 A more 
nuanced view of social interrelationships is necessary to explain how individuals could 
negotiate their own path and create their own interpretations of war alongside the 
official state version.
60
 
Winter proposes a valid mechanism for the decentralization of memory over time 
from the individual to the immediate social circle, as groups of the bereaved create 
memorial ceremonies to express and assuage their joint loss. As memory is displaced 
from the immediate family to the wider community, 'individuals can express and 
compare their memories with the experience of contemporaries, can begin to formulate 
a shared language and identify common themes'. This is deemed to be the point at 
which 'common' memories emerge within fictive kinship groups, forging bonds through 
mourning. Years after the war, these groups may include former comrades-in-arms 
meeting at reunions, each small circle having its own shared identity and playing a key 
role in promoting remembrance activities. The final stage of the progression of memory 
from private to collective memory comes, according to Winter, as individual loss 
becomes public remembering which is assimilated into the national narrative as 
patriotism. The practice of collective remembrance, he argues, acts as a therapeutic 
process, permitting the individual to forget the personal pain of loss amidst the 
communal gathering, evidence of a new type of sharing mechanism and the building of 
a collective identity through bereavement.
61
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It is hard to see how private family memory of the war could endure in the 
oppressive political circumstances of the Soviet Union, when it was often impossible to 
reconcile public and private memory. However, the powerful influence of social 
remembering outlives any individual memory which had contributed to its formation in 
the first place. The vital role of social groups in the propagation of collective memory is 
recognized by scholars adopting a multi-voiced approach, which places the individual at 
the centre of a potentially overlapping framework of different social groups.
62
 These 
groups may be formal or informal, but are largely local, permitting discussions and 
conversations between members which may differ from group to group. Typical groups 
of memory in Novorossiisk may include the family, the school, youth clubs, veterans' 
councils and clubs of people searching for wartime artefacts and even bodies. This 
approach focuses attention on the individual's place at the centre of an interconnecting 
network of social groups, rendered pivotal by virtue of the conversations, both formal 
and informal, which reinforce memory, possibly even enabling individuals to reject or 
ignore the dominant narrative by injecting their own subversive meanings in an attempt 
to make sense of their own past. It has long been recognized that the individual may not 
realise the full influence of these groups on the shaping of communal identity or even 
individual memory.
63
 
Adopting a more nuanced approach, Iwona Irwin-Zarecka proposes that no one of 
the various social groups surrounding one individual may offer a totally correct reading 
of memory, but that, when put together, they establish an elastic range of meanings 
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which shift over time, with different versions of the past having equal validity.
64
 This 
sweeping statement may be questioned, as it allows for some extreme or false views, 
not simply mainstream versions with slight degrees of variation. This dynamics of 
memory approach holds each group of which an individual is a member to have an 
influence on the person, who still has to work out which version of memory sits most 
comfortably in their own case.
65
 For my research it is important to acknowledge the 
potential for various interpretations of a common past, for example in the light of the 
different wartime experiences of individual military personnel, deportees and child 
internees, while recognizing the dominant top-down influence on both collective and 
individual memory. Irwin-Zarecka argues that collective memory is not located in the 
minds of individuals, as claimed by Halbwachs, but in the common resources they 
share, public or private, which may themselves facilitate or impede memory.
66
 If 
memory does demand such a tangible stimulus, however, the response may not always 
be similar, even within one social group.
67
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Irwin-Zarecka, in common with Winter, stresses the emotional and moral drivers 
stimulating war memory. This perspective is foregrounded in Paul Connerton's 
scholarship on socially framed memory, in this case placing the individual at the centre 
of performative ritual. Connerton's arguments complement Merridale's observations on 
the situation in the Soviet Union, where she finds that state repression of potential 
alternative, personal memory was particularly noticeable during the grand military 
parades, which 'were designed to overwhelm, to drown individual memory in the 
clamour of patriotic ceremonial', and where 'observers became participants despite 
themselves'.
68
 Connerton proposes that constant repetition of ceremonies may inculcate 
performative memory and imbue a sense of social stability through their shared 
symbolism and the reinforcement of common values, tending to counteract any 
potential for dissent. Propagation of memory is guaranteed by an unchanging ritual with 
a constant role for the individual. According to Connerton, the resultant collective 
identity produces automatic recall of the war myth in the community as a purely passive 
reaction.
69
 However, a passive reaction to a social ceremony could be a recipe for 
collective forgetting. Scholarship perceives a potential conflict between the need to 
remember of survivors of war, and of their descendants, as the event remembered 
becomes increasingly removed in time and space from those remembering.
70
 Thus the 
responsibility of the children of those who saw wartime service is perhaps even greater 
than that of their parents in ensuring that the emotional legacy of the survivors is 
faithfully transmitted.
71
 Forgetting may simply be a matter of natural decay or it may be 
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deliberately encouraged by a dominant sector highlighting some aspects of the official 
war myth over others. Complementary scholarship views the absence of memory as a 
purely social construct, whereas individual memory and memories may be simply lost 
due to the ravages of time on a frail human brain or even psychologically distorted in 
the face of an all-encompassing war cult.
72
 
In modern ceremonies of remembrance it is legitimate, however, to question the 
more proactive thoughts of the individual participant during the minute's silence. Nor 
can the spontaneous eruption of celebration from below in Myskhako on the periphery 
of official Victory Day commemorations be explained by the merely passive 
compliance of a group of people acting out of habit alone, even though they are still 
influenced by the prevailing culture of remembrance orchestrated by the élite. It is at the 
intersection of the official and the non-official that I have found a finely balanced 
equilibrium in the mnemonic relationship between the state, the local community and 
the individual.  
My theoretical framework started with a Hobsbawmian approach to remembrance, 
which explains both Victory Day ceremonies and the study of patriotism newly 
reintroduced into the school curriculum. However, in-depth probing of war memory in 
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the family and on the periphery of Novorossiisk has revealed some proactivity and 
spontaneity of remembrance activities which confirm the significance of the sideways 
and even bottom-up agency of small groups of searchers and young people, groups 
which actively supplement and complement the war myth disseminated from above 
thanks to their purely local perspective. Furthermore, I have found that notable 
individual citizens of Novorossiisk have made and continue to make their mark on 
remembrance in the Hero-City, sometimes complementing mainstream top-down 
remembrance, but occasionally in conflict with the authorities. Any divergence from the 
official myth or mode of remembrance is to be found on the edge of the town, on the 
periphery of accepted memory, where the authorities may be challenged and the 
emphasis is on the individuals remembering and remembered rather than on passive 
acceptance of a myth propagated from above. 
In this thesis I add a new perspective to the understanding of the mechanism of 
the construction and propagation of memory in an authoritarian environment through 
the prism of a local war myth. My examination of the dynamics between state and 
society challenges latent ideas on the part of Western scholarship about a monolithic 
Soviet society, revealing real complexity in the background. My research indicates 
some genuine reinforcement between top-down and bottom-up mnemonic initiatives, 
while finding that the war cult of the Brezhnev era left some scope for individual 
remembrance and the local dimension. This case study of one community of memory in 
the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia exposes the human perspective of 
remembrance rather than the much-flaunted ideology of a mega-power. In addition, my 
analysis of the evolution of memorial practices and constructions in Novorossiisk 
reveals the complicated twists and turns in the development of the mnemonic identity of 
the Hero-City today in relation to the myth of Malaia zemlia and to Brezhnev himself.    
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Chapter 2 
War correspondence and memoirs:  
The construction of the war myth through literature 
 
J'ai plus de souvenirs que si j'avais mille ans. 
Un gros meuble à tiroirs encombré de bilans, 
De vers, de billets doux, de procès, de romances, 
Avec de lourds cheveux roulés dans des quittances, 
Cache moins de secrets que mon triste cerveau. 
C'est une pyramide, un immense caveau, 
Qui contient plus de morts que la fosse commune. 
Je suis un cimetière abhorré de la lune.
73
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the construction of a modern war myth all actors in and observers of the event in 
question have a potential role to play and hence a possible claim to ownership of 
collective memory. In the case of Malaia zemlia, written personal accounts of war 
correspondents during the campaign and memoirs of veterans after the event were 
central to the construction of the war myth. Undoubtedly the most influential of these 
narratives was the memoir Malaia zemlia by the General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, published in 1978. Although Brezhnev 
won the Lenin Prize for literature in 1979, I examine recent evidence that the work was 
ghost-authored, the subject of political machinations by Brezhnev's inner circle. 
However, Brezhnev's work was only one of a series of written accounts which together 
were instrumental in the formation of the textually mediated myth of Malaia zemlia. 
Scholars of collective memory construction agree that the gradual homogenization 
of different individual accounts over time can produce an unambiguous war myth from 
a single perspective and with a consistent message of unquestionable heroism. Samuel 
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Hynes' study of European memoirs of World War I indicates that individual memories 
undergo a process of selection, gradually converging to determine an agreed and 
sanitized narrative that informs social remembrance, such that, over time, 'a complete, 
coherent story emerges'.
74
 This may be regarded as a process of natural selection, 
whereby dominant narratives with a strong common element and persuasive rhetorical 
style prevail. The process of myth-making also depends on the weighting attached to 
different accounts, with eventual common agreement on what material is selected and 
what is omitted from the myth. This mechanism for the construction of collective 
memory provides a plausible framework for the development of the myth of Malaia 
zemlia, albeit largely dependent on forces from below in the form of the individual 
narratives which are aggregated and homogenized.  
However, this war myth was constructed in the post-war Soviet Union, an 
authoritarian state with a restricted and inward-looking culture. Like all literature, war 
memoirs were subject to the scrutiny of the official censor charged with the protection 
of state secrets, Glavlit,
75
 and the interest of the KGB (the state security service).
76
 
Furthermore, writers had to be authorized members of the national Writers' Union,
77
 
while the Communist Party of the Soviet Union kept a watchful eye on the political 
content of publications. Any deviation from the party line in the strict environment of a 
one-party state resulted in penalties ranging from the 'arrest' of manuscripts or their 
author, to expulsion from the Writers' Union or even the country. 
Furthermore, writers were expected to work within the parameters of the prevalent 
literary system of Socialist Realism, employed as a tool to educate the masses in 
Communist ideology. The relationship between literature and official 'truth' as 
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demanded by the Party was at the crux of this formulaic literary system imposed by 
stringent state censorship on writers, if sometimes with their own pre-emptive 
collaboration. Following a meeting with writers in 1932, Stalin dictated that: 'The artist 
ought to show life truthfully. And if he shows our life truthfully, he cannot fail to show 
it moving to socialism.'
78
 After the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934, Andrei 
Zhdanov, the chief Party spokesman on cultural affairs, further stated that 'Truthfulness 
and historical concreteness of artistic representation must be combined with the task of 
ideological renewal and education of the workers in the spirit of socialism.'
79
 Using this 
cultural tool to educate the masses in Communist ideology, the writer's duty was to 
signpost with optimism the bright ideological future, 'portraying Soviet life, not as it 
was in reality, but as it should become'.
80
 
Life was thus seen as a constant fight, moving towards victory of the workers both 
politically and in the war, in order to guarantee socialism in the utopian post-war future. 
An integral part of this process was the moral and political education of the younger 
generation in Communist ideology, with literature providing role models of young 
people coming to full political consciousness under the guidance of older mentors. The 
'master plot' of Socialist Realist works, as analysed by Katerina Clark,
81
 emphasizes the 
heroic actions and self-sacrifice of Communists, often young men or women, whose 
death renders them both timeless and immortal.
82
 Furthermore, any female companion 
included in a Socialist Realist narrative was usually an assistant in furthering the 
ideological cause, rather than a mere love interest.
83
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The problem to be overcome in the practical deployment of the theory of Socialist 
Realism was that the present struggles did not adequately represent the glorious future 
to come. It was therefore necessary to indicate the implied reality of the future in the 
present and the past, leading to a blurring of the time-line in the service of the promised 
future.
84
 As the protagonist develops into an ideal Communist, 'past, present and future 
are crammed together in the process of a person becoming someone better', according to 
Thomas Wolfe.
85
 Furthermore, Clark observes that the October Revolution, the Civil 
War and Napoleon's defeat in 1812 represented a 'canonized Great Time that conferred 
exalted status on all who played a major part in them'.
86
 To these examples may be 
added the thirteenth-century character of Aleksandr Nevskii, mythologized in 
Eizenshtein's film and Prokof'ev's music of 1938, which effected an implied comparison 
between the courageous forces of mediaeval Rus' and its Soviet counterpart. In a 
recycling of historical precedents, an heroic age from the past was repeated in the 
present as a foretaste of the 'messianic age to come'. With the passage of time virtually 
irrelevant, war victory, a staging post in the building of socialism, became totally 
predictable.  
Re-invoking in the present epic moments in the past, historical 'Great Time', 
Socialist Realism was ideally suited to the creation of war myths for use in both the 
present and the future. With its mythological treatment of time, its adulation of 
(politically conscious) heroes and the formulaic process of its production, Socialist 
Realism was a perfect framework for enforcing the uniformity of narration and 
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interpretation demanded by myth.
87
 As historical time was compressed, myth became 
fiction and fiction fact, such that there were no barriers to performing mythical feats in 
the present to be celebrated in the future. Emphasis was also placed on the location of 
an event,
88
 so that not only the Motherland (Rodina) became sacred, but also the 
individual battle-fields soaked in the blood of heroes. 
Western scholars might assume that under such didactic circumstances there 
would be a monolithic attitude to the process of memory production, even if some 
Western material permeated the borders of the Soviet Union. In fact, my analysis shows 
some variation within this top-down environment, as the official attitude to war memory 
oscillated over the years depending on the internal and external political climate, such 
that approval from above for individual and group forays into memory was affected by 
periods of frost and thaw, often negotiated thanks to some degree of compromise 
between the state and writers. Any heterogeneity in literature was, however, more 
marked in the sphere of fiction, while the climate with regard to war memoir depended 
largely upon the subjective view of the régime, being particularly noticeable under the 
personality cults of Stalin and Brezhnev. In a country grappling with Stalin's war-time 
legacy, enduring a hot and cold attitude to the process of de-Stalinization under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, there was no guarantee that the war myth would remain 
constant or coherent indefinitely, or that its tone would remain static.  
Under normative sociological and literary circumstances in democratic societies, 
the agreed form and content of a myth provide reinforcement and confirmation to all 
agents involved, namely the individual, state and society in general. However, mutual 
ownership of collective memory by multiple actors in the Soviet Union was potentially 
                                                     
87
 'Aspects of traditional myth relating to time, place and ritual actions [...] are echoed in the conventions 
used in Soviet wartime poetry and in Socialist Realist literature in general.' (Hodgson, Written with the 
Bayonet, 1996, p. 141, citing Mircea Eliade, Le mythe de l'éternel retour: archétypes et répétition, Paris: 
Gallimard, 1949, p. 139.) 
88
 Hodgson, Written with the Bayonet, 1996, p. 143. 
 57 
 
compromised within a dynamic memorial environment. Thus the war myth as 
propagated by the dominating agency of the state sometimes differed from the memory 
of the individuals formulating the bottom-up accounts, who were often discouraged 
from publishing their already heavily censored war memoirs. Moreover, once 
Brezhnev's connection with Malaia zemlia became an integral part of the war cult, it 
became so dominant that it even influenced the official interpretation of history, while 
dictating the form and content of published memoirs. Shaped by the myth according to 
Brezhnev, individual veterans and the groups to which they belonged thereby lost 
ownership of collective memory, the culmination of a complex process that is not 
adequately described within the normative Western model of memory formation. 
If the overwhelming influence of the state may cause some distortion of memory, 
particularly with respect to the role of Stalin's leadership during the war, the natural 
processes of distortion and forgetting common to all retrospective demands on memory 
must also be borne in mind. Furthermore, whether for ideological or social reasons, the 
character of memoirs may change depending upon how long after the event they were 
written; the individual memoirist may find it easier to remember specific events shortly 
after the war, but, for the statesman, more historical perspective is available at a greater 
distance from the actual event. Similarly, later memoirs tend to be more reflective, as 
the benefit of hindsight better enables the location of the personal story within the 
collective.
89
 
This analysis of the mechanism of the construction of the myth concentrates on 
war correspondence from the front and memoirs by veterans, all culturally specific 
literary devices to be interpreted as products of their era within the Soviet literature of 
the period. In the establishment of the mechanism of construction of the myth of Malaia 
zemlia, I demonstrate that the myth was born during the actual campaign in 1943. The 
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first tranche of individual memories was then collected together prior to the emergence 
of cohesive collective memory with the publication of Brezhnev's memoirs. Later 
memoirs were more uniform, modelled on the dominant state template, thereby locating 
individual memories within the overarching myth 'owned' by the state.  
If a distinction is made between 'collected' and 'collective' memory, it is possible 
to propose a more sophisticated mechanism for the construction of social memory in 
Novorossiisk than that proposed by Hynes. I demonstrate that the simple collation and 
aggregation of individual memories to produce collected memory was followed by a 
state-sponsored collective representation still residing in the national consciousness.
90
 
Rather than just a vague homogenization of accounts, I prove that in fact four discrete 
stages of the construction of the myth of Malaia zemlia may be identified, based on the 
interacting influences of bottom-up popular memory and top-down state ideology:  
a) the birth of the myth through the attribution of the name and its dissemination 
by war correspondents; 
b) the collection of individual memories into one coherent form by Georgii 
Sokolov; 
c) the construction of official state-owned collective memory by Brezhnev; and  
d) the complete convergence and homogenization of the myth according to 
Brezhnev. 
Collective memory of Malaia zemlia represents one specific example of a local 
Soviet war myth. In order to establish whether or not this was a typical case of Soviet 
myth-making, a comparison will be made with the development of the myth of the siege 
of Leningrad, one of the first Hero-Cities of the Soviet Union, as explored by Lisa 
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Kirschenbaum.
91
 If Hynes notes a growing disillusionment in the face of war in letters 
and memoirs describing the Western Front in the First World War,
92
 and Kirschenbaum 
observes the wish of Leningraders to reveal fully the stories of heroism and human 
weakness in their war myth,
93
 what, then, is the tone of the myth of Malaia zemlia and 
the motives of the memoirists recalling the campaign? 
In my examination of the ownership of the war myth, I demonstrate how the 
massaging and manipulation of war memory served the presentist political aims of the 
Soviet state. Furthermore, I show that the original bottom-up mechanism for the 
construction of collective memory was overtaken by the overarching influence of the 
state war cult of the Brezhnev era, within which memories were mutated and relocated, 
proving that the influence of the state on war memory was eventually more powerful in 
the construction of the war myth than that of groups of veterans, even locally in 
Novorossiisk. Finally, I show that the production of memory is not necessarily the same 
as its reception, proving that the myth of Malaia zemlia disseminated nationwide was 
dominated so much by the persona of the General Secretary himself, that, with 
Brezhnev's death in 1982, the memorial climate changed entirely. 
  
                                                     
91
 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 2006. 
92
 Hynes, 'Personal narratives and commemoration', 2000, p. 218. 
93
 Kirschenbaum, The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 2006, p. 232. 
 60 
 
2.2 A myth is born: War correspondence from Malaia zemlia 
Море всегда неспокойно, 
И берег тревожен крутой, 
Сверкает во мгле освещенный 
Кусочек земли дорогой, 
Волна набегает и брызжет, 
Ночной караван – под огнем. 
Но берег к нам ближе и ближе, 
К нему мы упорно плывем. 
 
Плывем мы, - хоть падает в море 
Близ нас не последний снаряд, - 
Туда, где на склонах предгорья 
Товарищи наши не спят. 
Вот берег причальный и тропка, 
Родные деревья в пыли, 
Высокие гордые сопки – 
Хранители 'Малой земли'.94 
 
 
Paul Carell, the German historian of World War II on the Eastern Front, claims that it 
was Leonid Brezhnev who gave the beach-head of Malaia zemlia its popular name.
95
 
Although this may be understandable in view of Brezhnev's strong link with the 
campaign, there is no other evidence to confirm Carell's statement, nor does Brezhnev's 
name feature in contemporaneous communiqués from war correspondents. In contrast, 
N. V. Kolesov contends that the name of 'Malaia zemlia' became widely known only 
after the liberation of Novorossiisk in September 1943, implying that it was familiar to 
a smaller circle of people even before then.
96
 So who named this small area of 
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recaptured Soviet territory and when did the name 'Malaia zemlia' first appear in 
popular Soviet consciousness? 
As war myths are rarely, if ever, negative in the consciousness of those 
constructing or propagating them, it would seem probable that a myth is more likely to 
be built in the aftermath of victory, with the benefit of hindsight and reflection enabling 
its positive positioning within the agreed national narrative of the war.
97
 However, 
Smith suggests that a myth started during the actual event may help the participants 
make sense of a difficult situation, motivating them to fight on, when the only 
alternative would be to admit defeat.
98
 Evidence shows that the myth of Malaia zemlia 
was articulated by the armed forces and formulated, if only locally, by journalists 
present on the beach-head, even as the campaign was unfolding, only to be reinforced 
and relocated years later within the national master-narrative of the war.  
According to Jeffrey Brooks, the role of the war correspondent as part of the state 
propaganda mechanism was to promulgate the sole objective of 'victory over the 
invaders' by means of a holy, patriotic war.
99
 Widely considered to be a branch of 
politics, journalism was intended both to inspire the troops and maintain discipline.
100
 
However, all information disseminated by the media was controlled by the Soviet 
Information Bureau which disseminated reports through TASS (the official state news 
agency).
101
 In the interests of public motivation and cohesion, reports were often far 
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from truthful and barely credible in the case of Soviet losses, especially in the difficult 
early days of the war, when bad news was rarely reported in the press or on the radio.
102
 
Some scholarly debate about the degree of journalistic licence under the climate 
of stringent censorship has ensued: while Brooks concentrates on the end result of 
censorship in print, Louise McReynolds points to the skill of the war correspondent in 
navigating 'the treacherous waters of communication between the state and a largely 
mistrustful readership'.
103
 This indicates that the public was probably aware of the 
official deception, if not of the details of any omissions, while the journalists 
themselves were at risk of losing more than their jobs if deviating from the official line. 
Karel Berkhoff, more recently, focuses on the grey area of backstage negotiations 
between journalists anxious to publish the truth about Soviet losses and warn the public 
about the advancing enemy, and editors wishing to avoid too much criticism from the 
censors. In some rare cases the editors, as middlemen, sided with the journalists, 
publishing very occasionally without approval from the censor.
104
 Although the 
regulation of writers was slightly relaxed during the war years, offering more 
independence for journalists than previously,
105
 Socialist Realism continued to 
influence war correspondents, dictating the tone of newspaper articles.
106 
 
At the onset of war, civilian writers and poets were drafted in to work on military 
newspapers, with most holding army ranks, while others were enlisted from the armed 
forces.
107
 The most enduringly famous of the war correspondents on Malaia zemlia was 
Major (later Colonel) Sergei Borzenko, whose dispatches regularly appeared in the 
pages of the 18
th
 Army's weekly newspaper, Znamia Rodiny. Although not of the same 
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national stature as Il'ia Erenburg, Vasilii Grossman or Konstantin Simonov,
108
 Borzenko 
took part in military action, going on to work for the national newspaper Pravda and to 
write his memoirs in the post-war period.
109
 When Novorossiisk was finally liberated in 
September 1943, an influx of reporters sent telegraphic dispatches back to Pravda and 
Izvestiia in Moscow, including Anatolii Sofronov, who would later write a fictional 
play about the Malaia zemlia campaign.
110
 Other correspondence from the front 
includes articles by army officers, notably Izvestiia's Captain N. Petrov and Znamia 
Rodiny 'special correspondents', usually Captain A. Svetov and Senior Lieutenant (later 
Captain) Boris Milianskii.  
Although Georgii Sokolov claims that the name 'Malaia zemlia' was used from the 
earlierst days of the campaign,
111
 the first correspondence from the front mentioning 
'Malaia zemlia' appeared in newsprint, as Kolesov suggests, in the local pages of 
Znamia Rodiny in June 1943,
112
 well into the seven-month campaign, which had started 
with the tentative February landings. However, one letter written home from the front 
by a certain E. D. Goncharov in the weeks before his death on 4
th
 May 1943 already 
refers to Malaia zemlia.
113
 Although the name may have been used amongst the troops 
as early as April 1943, it may be argued that it only became public once there was good 
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news to tell and victory was in sight, at least for the Soviet North-Caucasian 18
th
 Army, 
after the favourable conclusion of the critical April battles around Novorossiisk. 
National wartime communiqués still referred only to the 'Novorossiisk front' and did not 
generally use the name 'Malaia zemlia' until immediately after the liberation of the town 
in September 1943, when it appeared in only one article in Pravda concentrating on the 
specific location of the troops in and around the village of Myskhako just outside 
Novorossiisk.
114
 Thus the myth of Malaia zemlia appears to have been born amongst the 
armed forces serving on the beach-head at least four months before knowledge of the 
full nature of the campaign and its popular name had become widespread.
115
  
Such rapid myth creation was not exceptional during World War II.
116
 In her 
study of the siege of Leningrad (1941-1944), Kirschenbaum documents the birth of the 
war myth through local media during the actual event.
117
 However superficially similar 
the circumstances of the besieged coastal city of Leningrad and the small Black Sea 
beach-head, both surrounded by German forces and with escape possible only across the 
water, there are many significant differences. The siege of Leningrad, the important 
second city of the Soviet Union, lasted four times longer than the 225-day campaign on 
the provincial beach-head of Malaia zemlia. During that time, Leningrad was still 
occupied by a large number of its pre-war population of civilians, whereas Malaia 
zemlia involved only troops, mainly soldiers from the 18
th
 Army and the marine 
infantry,
118
 as all the citizens in and around Novorossiisk had been either evacuated, 
interned or executed in 1942 as the enemy advanced on the town.
119
 In Leningrad, the 
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radio was a large factor in the dissemination of information and in boosting morale in 
addition to the newspapers,
120
 whereas its use on Malaia zemlia was restricted to 
military purposes only. Troops on Malaia zemlia had not only the army newspaper to 
hand, but also the morale-boosting sheet of articles and sketches, Polundra (Watch 
out!), produced by the Communist Party team in the caves and bunkers housing the 
military headquarters and field hospital.
121
 An occasional publication, Novorossiiskii 
partisan, was also passed from hand to hand by the partisans on the hills around the 
town.
122
 
In comparison, the myth of the siege of Leningrad became widespread nationally 
even in its early days. By July 1943, at the time the name 'Malaia zemlia' was appearing 
regularly in the military press, the city newspaper Leningradskaia pravda spoke about 
the 'boevaia sem'ia' (military family), indicative of the community spirit of 
Leningraders, all in it together, rather like Londoners in the Blitz.
123
 However, the same 
article also makes it clear that all the nation was aware of the struggle: 'The whole 
Soviet people are carefully following our fight and work'. Hence the siege of Leningrad, 
started in September 1941, had already become a national myth before Malaia zemlia 
was present in the popular consciousness. 
However, evidence suggests that Malaia zemlia was even further along the road to 
epic mythical status than Leningrad, as, even while the campaign was still being waged, 
future memory of it was being invoked.  A myth normally involves memory of the past 
in the present. Here, however, future memory of the present was invoked not merely as 
a hopeful dream, but as a quite detailed prediction along the Socialist Realist lines 
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analysed by Clark, where there is 'no collision [...] between "is" (or "present") and 
"ought to be" (or "epic past" – or future)'.124 Thus Konstantin Simonov wrote in his 
memoirs: 
Our job as war correspondents, as patriots, and as writers was to 
find, in the mass of wartime actions, not that which spoke about 
the difficulties of today, but that which spoke about the 
promises of a better future, about the triumphant end.
125
 
As an example of this blurring of time boundaries, and in an extreme statement unusual 
even for the Soviet Union, war dispatches firmly place Malaia zemlia within an 
historical continuum linking the difficult wartime present with a bright future in the 
aftermath of predicted victory. In an article of June 1943 referring already to 'pamiat' o 
Maloi zemle' (memory of Malaia zemlia), the war correspondents claim that the fruits of 
Malaia zemlia would inspire the memory of both civilians and veterans: 
There will come the day when once again people here will drink 
wonderful juice from the fruit of the vineyards. And from the 
'Malaia zemlia' glass people will become as drunk as former 
soldiers on their memories. This is not just a lovely dream. [...] 
Flowers will bloom in the gardens here. [...] That is for 
tomorrow. But today war is being waged on 'Malaia zemlia'.
126
   
Unlike the normal situation in wartime papers, this article stresses by implication the 
hardship of the battle at the time of writing, in contrast with the promised victory ahead. 
At virtually the same time the focus of Leningraders was fixed on the present and the 
more immediate future. Articles on the awarding to civilians of medals for the defence 
of Leningrad, which could easily have been written in a similarly epic vein, made no 
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mention of future memory or an historical continuum.
127
 Indeed, in June and July 1943, 
Leningradskaia pravda took a different, less triumphant tone, pointing to struggles still 
to come and the serious lessons to be learned in the future from history:  
It is not in the character of the defenders of Leningrad to give in 
to self-deception, reassure themselves about the achievement, to 
boast about their services in the past. No! We analyse the past 
seriously, absorb its experience and at the same time look ahead 
vigilantly. But ahead of us lie new trials, new difficulties, 
decisive battles with the enemy.
128
 
Both these articles reveal the immediate problems of conflict rather more truthfully than 
would have been expected at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, in an article about 
children finishing the academic year in June 1943, the same Leningrad paper gives only 
pragmatic details of everyday life, rather than taking the opportunity to elaborate on the 
memories of these children as adults in a utopian socialist future.
129
 This omission 
possibly reflects the overwhelming emphasis on survival in the present to the detriment 
of enforced ideology embracing the future. 
The only 1943 article in Leningradskaia pravda to mention memory of the heroic 
past in the future attributes any success to Stalin's 'titanic will' rather than to military 
prowess: 
When future historians come to study this time, they will above 
all be amazed at the unity, the strength, the endurance of the 
citizens of Leningrad, whose thoughts and actions are 
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permanently directed by the titanic will of that great genius – 
Stalin.
130
 
In contrast, one of the more popular songs about Malaia zemlia cited in Znamia Rodiny 
compared the troops to the giants more often found in classical legends: 
Споем же о тех великанах, 
Что ходят по 'Малой земле', 
О людях, в борьбе неустанных, 
По крепости равных скале.131 
There is a marked difference between these verses in the attribution of success: to 
Stalin in the case of Leningrad, and to the military heroes on Malaia zemlia. Brooks' 
research indicates that mention of Stalin in the press had decreased significantly during 
the months of defeat and retreat from November 1941 to the end of 1942, while 
Berkhoff points rather to the continuing presence of Stalin as censor-in-chief and 
supervisor of the press in the wings.
132
 While Soviet forces were being pushed back, 
more press-columns were devoted to the generals, especially Georgii Zhukov, the troops 
and even the correspondents themselves, in an overlapping of interests of the military 
and the journalists.
133
 Although censorship had increased with the onset of war, literary 
critics became gradually less demanding, such that there was more freedom and 
authority for journalists from the end of 1941 to 1943, as reflected in the song about 
Malaia zemlia, where the 'giants' of Malaia zemlia boast an exaggerated stature similar 
to that of Stalin himself. However, once the tide of the war had changed after the 
victory at Stalingrad, previous conditions were re-asserted as mentions and photographs 
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of Stalin reappeared in the press with the re-establishment of his cult of personality 
towards the end of the war.
134
 This is reflected in the Leningradskaia pravda article of 
July 1943,
 135
 demonstrating the closeness of the second capital to the political influence 
of the centre, in comparison with the relative freedom of expression in the same month 
of Znamia Rodiny on the periphery, still to be reined back into the Stalin-centric fold.
136
  
Journalists also privileged the role of the individual over the state in the 
development of morale-boosting mythology in the first two years of the war. While not 
mentioning Stalin by name, Znamia Rodiny refers rather to the many individual 
Communist heroes on Malaia zemlia, with the dedicated troops dubbed 'dvazhdy 
kommunisty' (doubly Communists) and 'trizhdy partiinye' (thrice Party-minded), linking 
their heroism with their political ideals as in Socialist Realism, though without reference 
to their political leader.
137
 All the same, Znamia Rodiny correspondents Svetov and 
Miliavskii make use of Soviet clichés in describing Malaia zemlia as: 'one of the most 
unforgettable pages in the history of the war'.
138
 Articles and photographs of individual 
Malaia zemlia heroes in July and August 1943 appear to confirm the statement that 
'stories of its heroic defenders will pass down from generation to generation.'
139
 The 
oath taken by the troops before departure for Malaia zemlia was similarly invoked to 
place the heroes of the campaign in a genealogical continuum of strong Soviet men.
140
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According to the military press, the great desire of the troops was to reunite their 
small beach-head with the rest of the country.
141
 The trope of liberation and 
reunification was also incorporated into predictions for the not too distant future: 
There will come the day when 'the Small' will merge with the 
large Soviet land. But it will always remain Small in the 
memory of the men who recaptured it from the Hun. Nor will it 
die in the memory of those who will benefit from its fruits, 
breathe its air, live freely and happily beneath its sky.
142
 
Therefore, when Novorossiisk was finally liberated on 16
th
 September 1943, Borzenko 
was able to write about the accomplishment of what had already been predicted by the 
developing myth, while diplomatically uniting Stalin's image with that of Communism 
by affirming that the victory had been achieved thanks to Stalin's leadership and Lenin's 
Communist ideology:  
The epic Malaia zemlia campaign is over. Everyone who 
stepped onto its shores was a hero. [...] The burning Small Land 
was thirsting for reunion with the Large Soviet land, and this 
time has come to pass. [...] Malaia zemlia has been united with 
the mainland. Soldiers and sailors took off their caps and 
marched victoriously past the monument to V. I. Lenin, the 
name of Stalin on their lips.
143
 
Furthermore, in the same article, Borzenko lauded the decisive role of the landing 
troops: 'The Malaia zemlia landing troops played a large role'. Although this judgment 
cannot be doubted, Borzenko was one of the commentators who, in the Brezhnev era, 
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built up the myth of Malaia zemlia by exaggerating this role and thereby the strategic 
significance of the military campaign in Novorossiisk. 
A folkloric mechanism for the future construction of collective memory of the 
past was identified in romantic vein by Svetov and Miliavskii as early as July 1943 in 
the culmination of an article about a concert of poetry and songs on Malaia zemlia. 
These home-grown concerts were mainly staged outdoors on quieter evenings,
144
 unlike 
their more famous counterparts in Leningrad, which occasionally boasted the music of 
Shostakovich in its concert halls. Concluding the article, Svetov and Miliavskii employ 
Socialist Realism theory to extrapolate from the present situation to the future, drawing 
a parallel between the construction of the war myth and that of a memorial to the recent, 
but already legendary events on Malaia zemlia: 
'Malaia zemlia' is one of the most glorious pages of the Great 
Patriotic War. Generations will remain grateful to stories of the 
steadfastness and selfless courage of its heroic defenders for the 
sake of the motherland. That is why the folk-tale, song and 
proverb transmitted from mouth to mouth are already carving a 
monument not made by hands to those unparalleled events 
taking place in our own age.
145
 
Recalling the troops' songs and poems about Malaia zemlia, this memorial is not a 
monument physically created by human hands, but constructed by the more traditional, 
oral means of evolution of classical myths. In using the phrase 'nerukotvornyi pamiat'' 
(a memorial not built by hands), Svetov and Miliavskii invoke the more classical 
literary source of Pushkin's famous poem 'Ia pamiatnik sebe vozdvig nerukotvornyi'  
                                                     
144
 See Borzenko, Zhizn' na voine, 1958, p. 166; and Brezhnev, 'Malaia zemlia', 1979, p. 18. For an 
extended discussion of frontline entertainment, see Richard Stites, 'Frontline Entertainment', in Culture 
and Entertainment in Wartime Russia, ed. Richard Stites, Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1995, pp. 126-140. 
145
 Svetov and Miliavskii, 'i pesnia i stikh – eto bomba', 12/07/1943. 
 72 
 
(I created a monument to myself not built by hands), 1836, in which Pushkin predicts 
his own immortality thanks to the enduring legacy of his poetry. Pushkin's poem recalls 
Derzhavin's 'Pamiatnik' (The monument), 1796, while Derzhavin in turn refers back to 
Horace's 'Exegi monumentum' (I have made a monument), 23BC.
146
 Thus allusions to 
enduring remembrance of Malaia zemlia were made two months before the liberation of 
Novorossiisk in the context of the canon of traditional Russian poetry and the classical 
legends of ancient Rome, in a fashion typical of Socialist Realism both with its 
reference to 'Great Time' and the compression of time. 
All three poems claim that the poet's oeuvre builds an everlasting monument to 
himself, a creation that will outlast any physically constructed monument.
147
  In using 
the expression 'nerukotvornyi pamiat'' during the Malaia zemlia campaign, the war 
correspondents are already looking ahead to the future, according to the norms of Soviet 
culture, when its memory will have attained mythical status on a par with the classical 
legends, while postulating a traditional mechanism rather than textual mediation. Just as 
an historical continuum is an integral part of Socialist Realism, so a continuum of 
literary excellence connects Pushkin to Derzhavin and to Horace before them, effecting 
an implicit comparison between the mythical greatness of the exploits on Malaia zemlia 
with the feats of the classical heroes.
148
 In an interesting juxtaposition of folkloric and 
high culture and, despite its appearance in the printed press, the article concludes that 
the oral tradition of propagation, by 'folk-tale, song and proverb', is more enduring than 
any physical monument that may be erected in the future in memory of the dead. This 
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claim can only be supported by a detailed study of the relative efficacy of the main 
methods for the propagation of memory considered in the rest of this thesis.  
It has been shown that war correspondence broadly followed the national 
guidelines on Socialist Realism, if marginally behind the trend with respect to the 
lauding of Stalin. By Victory Day the local Communist Party newspaper, Novorossiiskii 
rabochii, reflected the re-integration of Malaia zemlia with the Bol'shaia zemlia: it was 
completely at one with the national press with its large photograph of Stalin on the front 
page and full of official national and international news by courtesy of the Soviet 
Information Bureau.
149
 However, this was at the expense of the new-born mythical 
identity of Malaia zemlia, which was mentioned only briefly on an inside page two days 
later. It would have to wait until Brezhnev came to power to become a fully-fledged war 
myth. 
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2.3 The construction of collected memory by Georgii Sokolov  
Да, были люди в наше время, 
Могучее, лихое племя.150 
 
 
Many of the North-Caucasian 18
th
 Army were either born locally or chose to remain in 
the Krasnodar region after the war, with some veterans even choosing to settle in 
Novorossiisk.
151
 For this reason, the incipient myth of Malaia zemlia remained for 
several years far more localized than the myth of the siege of Leningrad or the London 
Blitz which were known nationally. Despite the far-reaching claims of war 
correspondents Svetov and Miliavskii, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of the 
oral propagation of memory in the aftermath of war. Although Elena Zubkova notes 
considerable nostalgia for the front and its camaraderie, observing that veterans 
remained in touch through informal meetings in cafés, snack bars, and beer halls, it is 
questionable whether this so-called 'Blue Danube' network was operational in 
Novorossiisk in the three post-war years before it was closed down by the state, as 
veterans in Novorossiisk rarely managed to see each other in the difficult post-war 
period.
152
 All but annihilated by German and Soviet artillery during the action of 1942 
to 1943, the town had to be both rebuilt and repopulated after the war, doubtless 
exacerbating any post-war fatigue and compromising physical and emotional 
recovery.
153
 As in Leningrad, the trials of everyday life in the post-war Soviet Union 
were pressing to the exclusion of virtually every other activity.
154
 It is probable, 
therefore, that discussions about the war remained within the family and immediate 
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social circle during the difficult post-war years, particularly as the recounting of war 
stories was discouraged by Stalin.
155
 Nor did the official climate welcome war memoirs, 
only a few of which were published by veterans during Stalin's rule.
156
 Observing that 
Stalin did not want to risk personal humiliation by criticism of his wartime leadership or 
the questioning of officially established war myths, Lazar Lazarev notes that Stalin 'said 
that it was too early to be writing memoirs so soon after these great events, at a time 
when passions were still too much aroused, and thus the memoirs would not have the 
required objectivity'.
157
  
After the death of Stalin in 1953 and following Khrushchev's attack on Stalin's 
war record in 1956, a temporary thaw permitting remembrance led to the publication of 
Konstantin Simonov's popular war novel, Zhivye i mertvye (The Living and the Dead) 
(1959), and the production of iconic films which saw huge box-office success.
158
 The 
1956 radio programme in search of the heroes of Brest' Fortress mutated into the 
successful Saturday evening television series 'Rasskazy o geroizme' (Stories of 
Heroism), which started in 1962 and ran for a decade.
159
 Hosted by war veteran Sergei 
Smirnov, this programme broke through previous barriers to public discussion by 
opening up debate on hitherto closed subjects; thus ordinary Soviet citizens learned, for 
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example, of the harsh treatment by Stalin of Soviet soldiers taken as prisoners of war in 
1941 through no fault of their own. At times it was, however, deemed to be rather too 
open in its discussions, falling foul of both the KGB and the Communist Party in the 
mid-1960s.
160
 
Taking advantage of the thaw, several war memoirs by high-ranking military 
commanders appeared towards the end of the 1950s, although simple soldiers were 
usually not able to publish.
161
 In Leningrad, too, memoirs of individual citizens were 
published from 1957, serving to increase local identity,
162
 although few memoirs 
specifically about Malaia zemlia were published in this period.
163
 With continuing 
swings in the Party's attitude to memoirs, the national memory climate again became 
more welcoming from the early 1960s, although the prevalent Communist ideology 
dictated a highly standardized approach, with some distortion in the rendering of the 
historical past to conform to present policies.
164
  Memoirs were also reliant on a good 
memory in most cases, as military personnel had not been allowed to keep a diary or 
notes about their war service, in contrast with civilians, journalists and writers who later 
benefited from their wartime documents.
165
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While in Leningrad in the 1960s most of the memoirs were published by 
civilians,
166
 only military personnel had been present during the Malaia zemlia 
campaign.
167
 Georgii Sokolov, a twice-wounded captain commanding the 165
th
 Marine 
Infantry Reconnaissance Brigade had spent virtually the whole 225 days of the 
campaign on Malaia zemlia, latterly working as editor of a front-line newspaper.
168
 
Although Sokolov, as a privileged military veteran, had written his first short book of 
war memoirs in 1949,
169
 it is his later, longer works that remain on the library shelves in 
Novorossiisk. The first of these was produced only after Sokolov had collected together 
the addresses of many of his former comrades-in-arms such that he was able to organize 
the first reunion of just over sixty Malozemel'tsy in September 1963, on the twentieth 
anniversary of the liberation of Novorossiisk.
170
  
Like the television programme 'Stories of Heroism', this first reunion provided a 
valuable forum for the assembly and exchange of war memories, enabling Sokolov to 
expand his personal perspective. After a period of enforced latency, this meeting proved 
to be the catalyst for other Malozemel'tsy to contribute their own stories, while 
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correcting inaccuracies and expanding on Sokolov's original to enable him to publish a 
collaborative work of collected short stories in 1967.
171
 
Eighteen years after his first publication, the time was indeed ripe for a 
completely new version of Sokolov's memoirs. As soon as Brezhnev came to power at 
the end of 1964, following his ousting of Khrushchev, the flourishing of the memory 
climate was apparent. A book of Brezhnev's first important speech about the war was 
published for export and Victory Day was reinstated in 1965, with its new minuta 
molchaniia (minute's silence) ritual introduced to all Soviet radio and television 
channels, which would later include a specific tribute to the Malaia zemlia campaign.
172
  
Television increasingly brought war memory to the masses, with the series 'Vyzyvaem 
ogon' na sebia' (We draw fire on ourselves) and 'Podvig' (The Exploit) both starting in 
1965, the latter, in particular, focusing on the stories of individuals and their 
regiments.
173
  
Although under Khrushchev's leadership the publication of memoirs had 
coincided with periods of thaw with respect to de-Stalinization, Brezhnev introduced a 
degree of re-Stalinization with increased censorship and repression of writers.
174
 
Paradoxically, at the same time the publication of memoirs by top military commanders 
was encouraged after 1965.
175
 However, Lazar Lazarev also observes that 'those few 
memoirs which journals or other publishing houses made bold attempts enough to 
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accept for publication, required approval by a special commission'.
176
 All memoirs were 
referred to Voenizdat (the military publishing house), having to conform strictly with 
the official master narrative which attributed victory to a united people which saved not 
only Eastern Europe, but the whole of Europe, from the fascist enemy.
177
  
In the context of a growing war cult, Sokolov's work, Malaia zemlia: Rasskazy i 
ocherki, (Malaia zemlia: Stories and essays) of 1967 was one of many memoirs to 
appear across the country. Published in the regional capital of Krasnodar, the book 
measures twenty-one by thirteen centimetres, comprising 408 pages. While the red and 
cream hard-backed cover proclaims its Soviet provenance, the frontispiece reflects the 
military theme through the black and white image of a sailor in the act of throwing a 
grenade, machine-gun in hand and dagger in belt. The publishers obviously envisaged 
substantial local interest, in view of the relatively high quality and price of the book 
(eighty-five kopecks), with an initial print-run of 50,000. Their confidence was 
rewarded: Sokolov was made a member of the Writers' Union as a result of the first 
edition of his memoirs, and the book ran to a further nine editions, with key updates in 
1971, 1979 and 1985, some of the subsequent editions being published centrally in 
Moscow and with print-runs as large as 200,000.
178
 
The book's thirty-one chapters include an introduction by the author and a 
supportive, validating epilogue, 'Pamiat' serdtsa' (Remembrance from the Heart), by 
Colonel A. Ryzhov, Hero of the Soviet Union and former commandant of the political 
section on Malaia zemlia. Ryzhov praises Sokolov for his wartime service, while also 
mentioning the author's efforts over several years to trace the veterans of Malaia 
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zemlia.
179
 The bulk of the book, twenty-three chapters in all, is devoted to a series of 
broadly chronological discrete stories about individual people and events. It is 
noteworthy that, in line with national trends, Stalin appears rarely in the work, with 
merit being given rather to individuals even over military units.
180
 Collating the 
memories of his former comrades, Sokolov's work narrates in the third person the 
exploits of both officers and other ranks, living and dead, many of whom had been 
made Heroes of the Soviet Union. Not only decorated Heroes, but also heroes 
conforming to Socialist Realism, they are often writers and sometimes musicians. 
Although serious in tone, the work is lightened by conversations, some of them 
reminiscences of the home life left behind and many of them between the protagonist of 
the particular episode and his senior officer, a mentor in the Socialist Realist mould. 
Women also feature in the work, usually medical orderlies, with one chapter devoted to 
Klavochka, the morale-boosting 'postman' who risks her life carrying the mail in her 
leather bag to and from Malaia zemlia in the nightly boat convoy over the bay from 
Gelendzhik, the nearby port remaining in unoccupied Soviet territory.
 181
 
One unusually young hero's exploits are described in the chapter 'U iungi tozhe 
serdtse moriaka' (A Sea-cadet also had the Heart of a Sailor), about fifteen-year-old 
Viktor Chalenko.
182
  Son of a fisherman and a natural seaman, Viktor joined the navy 
straight from school in 1942, following the marine infantry to Malaia zemlia in 
February 1943. One week into the campaign, during the battle for the village of 
Myskhako, the agile Viktor managed to approach and destroy an enemy machine-gun 
post by hand-grenade attack, losing his life in the consequent explosions. This 
spontaneous heroic action is an example of the reality of the times, when the rigid 
Soviet pre-war rules ceased to apply and 'both troops and officers learned the necessity 
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of making independent decisions and acting on them without specific, detailed orders 
from above.'
183
 
The young 'Vitia' was not forgotten amidst the chaos of war, as he left behind in 
his notebook a letter to his mother, written in pencil: 
If I should die on active service, I ask the leader of the political 
section, Vershinin, and Senior Lt. Kunytsin to go to my home in 
Eisk and tell my mother that her son died fighting for the 
liberation of the Motherland. Please give her my Komsomol 
card, my medal, this notebook and my sailor's cap, that she may 
keep them in memory of her son, the sailor. 
Fifteen-year-old sailor, Viktor Chalenko. 
184
 
 Although Vitia's two mentors, Vershinin and Kunitsyn, both died in the fierce April 
engagements on Malaia zemlia, his request was eventually fulfilled and a school named 
after him in his home-town.
185
 With death an inevitable part of war and self-sacrifice an 
integral aspect of the prevalent Socialist Realism, Sokolov does not flinch from 
examining the tragedy of the fall of young combatants. He avoids, however, any 
consequent ethical or moral dilemmas such as those that arose in similar circumstances 
in the trenches of World War I and gave rise to a degree of cynicism in subsequent 
Western memoir literature about the waste of young lives, often attributed to poor 
military leadership.
186
  
                                                     
183
 Deming Brown, Soviet Russian Literature since Stalin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978, 
pp. 171-172. 
184
 Sokolov, Malaia zemlia, 1967, p. 111. Vitia was already part of the national mythology of Malaia 
zemlia, thanks to his letter's appearing in the official state history of the war: P. N. Pospelov, et al., eds, 
Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945, Moscow, Voennoe izdatel'stvo 
Ministerstva oborony Soiuza SSR, Vol. 3, 1961, pp. 94-95. 
185
 Sokolov does not mention, however, that a street in Novorossiisk was named in honour of this Hero of 
the Soviet Union in 1968 ('Vitia Chalenko. V pamiat' o geroiakh: ob ul. V. Chalenko', NR, 15/10/1968). 
186
 See, for example,  C. E. Montague's Disenchantment (1922); Herbert Read's In Retreat (1925); E. 
Blunden's Undertones of War (1929); and Robert Graves' Goodbye to All That (1929). 
 82 
 
While the main body of the work is narrated in the third person, the final six 
chapters of the book cover Sokolov's post-war encounters with former comrades, which 
are narrated in the first person by the author. Written during the Cold War, the chapter 
'Tsvetok Korei' (The Flower of Korea) is both unusual in providing some retrospective 
analysis and revealing as a political statement in comparing the troops of Malaia zemlia 
fighting the 'fascist occupiers' with the North Koreans waging their own war of 
independence against the 'American imperialist' invaders.
187
 This chapter is the only one 
in the book in which Sokolov considers the Malaia zemlia campaign from a presentist 
political perspective, emphasizing the ravages of capitalism in what appears to be a 
concocted tale. Furthermore, in a convoluted comparison of capitalism and 
Communism, the still devastated Chemin des Dames, a First World War battlefield in 
France, is contrasted with the green and regenerated area of Malaia zemlia during the 
period of the Korean War (1950-1953). This comparison renews the Socialist Realist 
symbolism found in the wartime articles of Svetov and Miliavskii of the perfect future 
built as a result of the Malaia zemlia campaign.
188
 The latter thereby takes its place in an 
historical continuum of wars against the invader over the previous half-century, in a 
specific instance of a general national pattern of artificial associations between the 
present and great moments in Soviet history.
189
  
Sokolov's democratic bottom-up venture both determines the form of the memoir 
and its content, while ignoring the weighting attached to any one individual's memory 
by virtue of their social position or military rank. Sokolov, with the official censor, had 
the opportunity to remove any stories not conforming to his own and the state's ideal of 
the heroic myth they wished to construct on behalf of others. Through his unifying pen, 
these collected memoirs offer a varied yet coherent account of the Malaia zemlia 
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campaign, conveying the single ideological message necessary for a myth. With one 
dominant voice pervading a work written from several different perspectives, Sokolov's 
memoir may be considered collected rather than collective memory.
190
 Just as the 
former comrades-in-arms reinforced their group identity at the first official reunion in 
1963, so that identity was maintained through Sokolov's work, with his epilogue 
'Twenty Years Later' describing their interaction on the twentieth anniversary of the 
liberation of Novorossiisk as a synthesis of the preceding individual stories.
191
  
While Sokolov's book of collected memories of Malaia zemlia was not published 
until 1967, in Leningrad a book of stories written during the siege, 900 Days, had been 
published ten years previously, in 1957. This was, however, not a work under a single 
authorship, rather a multi-voiced anthology of civilians' experiences of the blockade. 
This anthology was not to be followed until the thaw and the war cult permitted a wider 
collection, Blokadnaia kniga (Book of the Siege), published in 1979. Although the latter 
was under the sole authorship of Ales Adamovich and Daniil Granin, it differs from 
Sokolov's book in that it represents the authors' hundreds of (heavily censored) 
interviews with citizens of Leningrad, including some diary extracts in its substantial 
forty-four chapters (496 pages).
192
 Thus the work simply records a collection of 
sometimes brief interviews, using the words of those interviewed, unlike Sokolov's 
memoirs, which relate episodes from the war in the words of the author, including the 
literary device of conversations which render the work more immediate and personal.  
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Furthermore, these two Leningrad works were devoted entirely to civilians during 
the siege, whereas Sokolov's work was exclusively based on the memories of military 
personnel, albeit occasionally mentioning civilians. Treading a fine balance between the 
Party and the individual, Sokolov recognizes the initiative and heroism of individuals, 
in common with the earlier works on Leningrad which, from the civilian perspective, 
focus on family life in the city.
193
 With the family one of the key tropes of Soviet 
wartime propaganda, Sokolov's more intimate conversations between the troops often 
relate to those left behind, or plans for a happy family future together, sometimes, 
however, thwarted by events. Moreover, in common with Blokadnaia kniga, it is to the 
family that Sokolov attributes his motivation for writing his work, stating that his book 
is intended for the young reader.
194
  This was in line with the tenets of Socialist 
Realism, re-iterated by Zhdanov in 1946, shortly after the relative liberalism of the war 
years, whereby its didactic function was to offer Communist role-models of physical 
and moral heroism in the Socialist Realist mould to the younger generation.
195
 This idea 
of social moral education (vospitanie), particularly applied to young people by means of 
the war narrative, exists to this day, if latterly without its overt political connotations.
196
 
At the end of the book, Ryzhov applauds Sokolov for fulfilling his military and 
literary duty in writing these memoirs of comrades. Dedicating his work as a 'pamiatnik' 
(a monument) to those who gave their lives, Sokolov appears to have considered his 
work to be a creative tribute, a monument in the Pushkinian literary tradition.
 
In this 
case, however, it was not intended as a monument to himself as its creator, but rather as 
a memorial to his fallen comrades.
197
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However well Sokolov crafted a coherent narrative from collected individual 
memories, the position of the individual within the construction of collective memory 
remains complex. James Young argues that individual memories must remain personal, 
as people are not able to share others' discrete memories, despite their potentially 
collective experience of past events. However, in the case of veterans of the same 
campaign, it is possible that individuals may retain similar, if not perfectly uniform, 
memories of a past event, which, however subjectively they may affect the individual, 
can nevertheless result in a collective representation of individual memories. All shared 
a similar type of experience, such that their individual memories offer the 
complementary perspectives collected by Sokolov, reinforced by their mutual 
interaction over reunions, where any differences could be discussed and mutual 
agreement reached. Jerome Bruner and Carol Fleischer Feldman propose that groups 
develop shared stories to define their identity and in order that members may find a 
common significance in their own memorial narratives which make use of a shared 
culture, an argument which would certainly apply to former comrades-in-arms attending 
reunions.
 
It is probable, therefore, that contestation by any individual of the final version 
was limited by the overriding strength of group identity.
198
 
Sokolov's first published collected version of the myth achieved a convergence of 
story and tone, by bringing the private memories of witnesses into the public domain as 
socially constructed memory with a consistent and self-confirming heroic tone and no 
element of defeatism or disillusionment present.
199
 Concentrating mainly on the 
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nationally recognized Heroes of the Soviet Union emerging from the campaign, and 
some, but by no means all those characters singled out by the original war 
correspondents, the collaborative work speaks more authoritatively than the voice of 
any one individual. These discrete memories, freely given to Sokolov and formulated 
collectively, became subsumed into the overall myth under construction, as ownership 
of war memory passed into the public domain in the Krasnodar region.  
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2.4 The construction of official state-owned collective memory by 
Brezhnev  
Old men forget; yet all shall be forgot, 
But he'll remember, with advantages, 
What feats he did that day.
200
 
 
Individual memories continued to become collective property during the 1970s, when 
popular memory of the war was very much influenced by the television programme 'Ot 
vsei dushi' (From the Bottom of my Heart). Travelling around the country to highlight 
the previously unknown ordinary heroes of the recent past, the programme emotionally 
evoked memory of the war and immediate post-war years, serving to reunite veterans 
separated for decades. This family show was presented from 1972 to 1978 by the 
well-known actress Valentina Leont'eva, a survivor of the siege of Leningrad, reaching 
not only individual families in their homes, but also provincial audiences assembled in 
local palaces of culture.
201
 
Denis Kozlov attributes a nationwide manifestation of an interest in history to the 
fact that it was a more 'culturally acceptable' subject of discussion in Soviet society than 
internal or external politics, which invariably strayed into the realm of uncertainty. This 
may have been true for the politically conscious intelligentsia, but 'From the Bottom of 
my Heart' was riveting viewing for the masses, as everybody in the country could 
identify with the courage and death toll of the war. The preoccupation with history did 
not only concern the recent war, however, but still encompassed a general concentration 
on and even idealization of the past. Although Socialist Realism was by then less 
stringently applied, the identification of historical continuities remained a developed 
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literary form, recalling both the wartime article by Svetov and Miliavskii and Sokolov's 
convoluted comparison of the Korean and both world wars of the twentieth century.
202
 
The propagation of war memory through a burgeoning war cult during the late 
1960s and early 1970s reinforced Brezhnev's own political position as a high-ranking 
veteran. By the end of the 1970s, according to Hedrick Smith, a Western journalist 
based in Moscow, Soviet cultural life had become 'saturated with the war theme'.
203
 
While Merridale condemns the whole Brezhnev era as 'a golden age of concrete and hot 
air, an era of state-sponsored multivolume histories of the war, of solemn speeches of 
commemoration, handouts, new medals, and the mass design and construction of 
memorials', there was substantial popular support in the early years for a policy which 
aimed to unify the country. Merridale refers to the gratitude of successive generations 
for a 'hero-myth' giving them a sense of purpose in the face of foreign antagonism, 
whilst at home Kirschenbaum has argued that the cult may have diverted the 
intelligentsia's attention from state clamp-downs on freedom of speech following the 
arrest and trial of dissident writers Iulii Daniel' and Andrei Siniavskii in 1965-1966 and 
the persecution of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn from 1969 to 1974. Tumarkin similarly 
attributes the growing war cult to the state's wish to 'mobilize loyalty [and] maintain 
order', in what could have become an explosive situation amongst people questioning 
the whole ideology of Communism. The cult helped also in the identification of an 
unambiguous Western enemy. In view of Brezhnev's appropriation of the 'great victory' 
for the Soviet people alone, with the denigration of the other wartime Allies, it is 
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probable that any conscious political target of the cult was the capitalist West as a 
whole, particularly at the height of the Cold War, with distraction from internal politics 
a useful by-product.
204
 
It is difficult to establish the main instigating agent for the growth of the war cult: 
Brezhnev himself or the ruling élite or the people.
205
 If the cult had been established as 
suggested by Tumarkin, by the early Brezhnev régime, many aspects of it resonated 
with the ordinary people in the early years.
206
 It was widely disseminated not only by 
literature, but also through the Communist Party's Komsomol organization for young 
people and the programme of monumental commemoration which expanded during the 
1970s. Certainly the overall dogmatic environment regulated the production of culture, 
encouraging on the one hand while restricting content on the other. Television 
programmes about the war were genuinely popular in the country, although it is 
indisputable that the General Secretary took advantage of the memory environment to 
establish further his own military and leadership credentials, evidence for which is 
examined in Chapter 3. It may be deduced that Brezhnev encouraged the originally 
largely popular development of the war cult for his own personal ends, while also 
aiming to unify the country politically through the inter-generational propagation of war 
memory. With Brezhnev's physical and mental decline towards the end of the 1970s, 
however, it seems that the cult was employed as a tool for self-protection amongst the 
ruling élite: playing to Brezhnev's vanity and cult of personality within the war cult, his 
political comrades awarded him a series of medals in what appears to have been a 
concerted campaign to keep him in power whilst protecting the governmental status 
quo. My analysis of the plotting around the production and dissemination of Brezhnev's 
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war memoirs sheds considerable light on the machinations of the Soviet inner-circle in 
the late 1970s.  
With memory of an heroic victory cementing the population and the leadership 
together, more and more veterans were encouraged to produce their war memoirs in the 
1970s, in marked contrast to the general restrictive literary environment. Memoirists' 
freedom to publish in principle did not, however, imply a total freedom of content. 
Authors were supposed to reinforce the Party line on the war, adhering to the material in 
the official history books and situating their works within the state's master-narrative, 
which by then attributed victory to the Party and the people working together against 
fascism, rather than to Stalin or even the military commanders.
207
 However, official 
history was, in turn, mutually reliant on memoir literature, such that an edifice of 
incontestable mythology of the war was generated. The post-war memoirs of Sergei 
Borzenko provide a relevant example in the case of Malaia zemlia; they also emphasize 
the growing position of Brezhnev within the myth, whilst serving to promote 
Borzenko's own reputation through his (indirect) association with Brezhnev thanks to 
his work on Malaia zemlia as a war correspondent. As early as 1958, Borzenko lionized 
Brezhnev as Colonel in charge of the political section of the 18
th
 Army, a senior 
representative of the Party, in a chapter dated 1943:  
Brezhnev was the soldiers' favourite. He knew their moods and 
thoughts, knew how to make a joke at the right time and 
inflamed their thirst for heroic deeds. The landing troops knew 
him by sight, and in the noise and din of battle they were able to 
distinguish his authoritative, calm voice.
208
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Borzenko also reveals that Brezhnev had his own validating encounter with 
danger at the front when knocked unconscious as the boat he was taking from 
Gelendzhik to Malaia zemlia hit a mine, the tone of the section suggesting that 
Brezhnev was never far from the sound of battle.
 209
 In a case of what Roger Markwick 
terms 'institutionalized mendacity', Borzenko's at best exaggerated and at worst 
inaccurate 'memory' is cited as historical fact in the official history of the war, published 
in 1961, even before Brezhnev had ousted Khrushchev and started the war cult.
210
 This 
is perhaps an indication of Brezhnev's growing influence or simply the desire of an 
ambitious writer to flatter the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. 
Nonetheless, Malaia zemlia and Novorossiisk featured only briefly in Soviet histories of 
the war: the official six-volume publication (1960-1965) contained only four pages 
about Malaia zemlia, a mere 0.1% of the whole. Reading in places more like a myth 
than an historical record in the fact-dominated Western sense, more space is allocated to 
the young hero Viktor Chalenko than to Brezhnev.
211  
Whether benign mythology or 
institutionalized mendacity, Soviet historiography since the October Revolution 
certainly played a political function which must be acknowledged when situating 
Soviet-era works on Malaia zemlia in their historical context. This degree of mythology 
in the official history paved the way for further aggrandizement, as a vicious circle 
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developed whereby only 'facts' already in print were allowed to be deployed or cited in 
future history texts.
212
 
With memoirs officially sanctioned, the censor remained busy, 'neutralizing', for 
example, any potentially embarrassing comments on the defeats of the early weeks of 
the war.
213
 Authors, forewarned, therefore avoided sensitive topics, producing 
sometimes less than honest, formulaic works, full of sentimental clichés about the 
'sacred' battle with no comments of an anti-war nature.
214
 Few, if any, of these memoirs 
went as far as Sokolov in synthesis, being content with description rather than 
analysis.
215
  
During the decade from 1967 to 1977 Voenizdat published memoirs by the 
nationally famous Marshals Rokossovskii, Konev and Zhukov.
216
 Zhukov, highly 
respected during the war and the veritable symbol of military victory, paid tribute to 
Brezhnev by inserting a few lines in his memoirs about seeking Brezhnev's military 
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advice in April 1943, around which an historical debate has since ensued.
 217
 According 
to Zhukov's daughter, Mariia, her father had never heard of Brezhnev during the war, a 
claim supported by Roi Medvedev, an unflinching Brezhnev critic, who held this 
passage to have been fabricated when Zhukov's editor was 'advised from above' (po 
sovetu svyshe) to insert a paragraph about seeking Brezhnev's advice.
218
 In contrast, 
however, Aleksandr Khinshtein unconvincingly pushes all possibilities to their limits in 
order to give Brezhnev the benefit of the doubt, whilst accepting that Brezhnev 
probably asked Zhukov not to forget his role in his memoirs.
219
  This is the likely 
scenario, as, in a similar vein, Orlando Figes cites the case of the documentary war film 
'A Soldier Went' (Shel soldat) (1975), based on Konstantin Simonov's interviews with 
veterans, which was not passed by the censors until a sequence paying homage to 
Brezhnev as a war leader had been inserted.
220
  
Brezhnev's own war service on Malaia zemlia became increasingly highlighted 
and exaggerated in representations of the war. While Brezhnev was held responsible for 
the liberation of Novorossiisk in an Ogonek article of 1973, Borzenko had written in 
Pravda as early as 1968 that Brezhnev was on a par with the main hero of the Malaia 
zemlia landings, Major Tsezar' Kunikov. It is probable that Borzenko, always closely 
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linked with reporting and commentary about Malaiz zemlia, was able to promote his 
own career by his association with and flattery of Brezhnev. Moreover, according to 
Thomas Wolfe, such not absolutely truthful works were accepted by the public as if 
they were authentic documents.
221
 
Anatolii Sofronov, another former war correspondent familiar with the 
Novorossiisk front, also promulgated Brezhnev's role fictionally.
222
 While his play, 
Deviatyi val (Storm Force 9) (1968-1973) includes some real historical characters, the 
chief protagonist is not a military leader, but a certain Colonel Berezhnov, a Party 
official on Malaia zemlia clearly intended as a fictional representation of Brezhnev, 
whose main function is to check that all the troops carry their Party cards, at the same 
time boosting their morale.
223
 Reminding his audience of the importance of the 
transmission of war memory, Berezhnov concludes the play with the words: 'Memory 
[...] is propagated from generation to generation. We shall never forget the heroes. 
Eternal glory to them.' Reinforcing the by then mythical qualities of Brezhnev as a 
wartime political leader, the name 'Berezhnov', barely changed from that of Brezhnev, 
signifies by implication the attributes expected of a great statesman: caring and 
solicitous of others, careful and thrifty economically. A photograph in a review of the 
play's première in Uzbekistan on the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the war further 
underlines the identification of Berezhnov with Brezhnev, as the actor playing 
Berezhnov looks remarkably similar to Brezhnev himself. Emphasizing not only the 
importance attached to the brotherhood of different nationalities in the war, particularly 
relevant outside Russia, the review also reiterates the nationally required theme of the 
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importance of the Party during the campaign through the role of the political 
commissar. Furthermore, the role of Malaia zemlia is inflated, with Novorossiisk 
dubbed 'the Stalingrad of the Caucasus' by virtue of its deemed strategic significance for 
the outcome of the war.
224
  
Brezhnev's connection with Malaia zemlia was disseminated even further than 
Uzbekistan: Brezhnev gave a gift to Fidel Castro on his visit to Cuba in January 1974 of 
a book of pictures of Malaia zemlia produced by former 18
th
 Army war artist,  
P. Ia. Kirpichev.
225
 Thus, during the 1970s, the status and significance of Malaia zemlia 
in the national and even international consciousness increased considerably, thanks to 
Brezhnev's association with the campaign. Whereas Stalin had opposed any propagation 
of the myth of the siege of Leningrad in order to retain his own reputation, Brezhnev 
actively promoted his connection with Novorossiisk and Malaia zemlia,
 226
 finally 
resulting in the publication of his own war memoirs.  
By 1977, with his physical and mental health deteriorating, Brezhnev's growing 
cult of personality depended increasingly upon his popularity with veterans and his 
reputation as a modest, wise and organized wartime leader, the desirable qualities 
typical of a mature mentor in the Socialist Realist mould. Although Clark concludes that 
Brezhnev's dominant cult of personality was reminiscent of Stalin's, in that he gave the 
impression that he was controlling every aspect of government,
227
Brezhnev's 
democratic leadership style and collective decision-making, still allowing for substantial 
delegation of responsibility, won him more supporters than enemies amongst the ruling 
élite, the Politbiuro. Brezhnev had, however, been astute enough early in his leadership 
to defuse any potential threats to his leadership: Iurii Andropov (who would eventually 
succeed him), for example, was demoted early in Brezhnev's leadership from the 
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Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to become Chairman of 
the KGB. Known increasingly for his legendary vanity and love of military awards, 
Brezhnev was honoured on his seventieth birthday in December 1976 with yet another 
war medal and more flattering films.
228
 It was the following month, January 1977, on 
the journey to Tula, the latest in the growing list of Hero-Cities of the Soviet Union, that 
the plot to write Brezhnev's war memoirs was hatched by his closest allies.
229
  
Popular debate about the authorship of Brezhnev's memoirs has flourished over 
the last few years, with Russians anxious to elucidate the 'truth' about their 
provenance.
230
 The man apparently behind their inception was Konstantin 
Chernenko,
231
 leader of the Soviet Union after Andropov, then a member of the 
inner-circle of the Politbiuro and Brezhnev's 'political shadow'.
232
 Anxious to please the 
General Secretary, who, it seems, had the habit of boring colleagues with his wartime 
stories while freely admitting that he had no writing skills, Chernenko enlisted the 
support of Leonid Zamiatin, head of the state news agency, TASS. A team of 
ghost-writers was signed up, notably Anatolii Agranovskii of Izvestiia, Arkadii Sakhnin 
of Novyi mir, Aleksandr Murzin of Pravda and Vladimir Gubarev, science 
correspondent for Pravda. Each had responsibility for a part of the memoirs, for 
example, Gubarev wrote about Brezhnev and Soviet space developments in 
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Kosmicheskii oktiabr'. Russian scholars agree that Sakhnin started and Agranovskii 
completed Malaia zemlia.
233
 
With Brezhnev refusing to take part in the project, according to Brezhnev 
detractor Leonid Mlechin, the writers had to use archival material and trace his former 
comrades-in-arms, such as Sergei Pakhomov, Brezhnev's wartime deputy. Once the text 
was approved by Zamiatin and Chernenko, only four or five copies were typed up in 
what amounted to a top-secret military strategy, being kept deliberately from Andropov 
at the KGB. No explanation for this is given, but no doubt the commissioners of the 
work remembered the relatively recent controversy leading up to the publication in the 
West of Khrushchev's war memoirs in 1970, in which Andropov was also implicated.
234
  
As soon as the work was finished, Brezhnev asked for it to be published 
immediately in the literary journal Novyi mir, entailing a last-minute cut-and-paste 
exercise in 500,000 copies to replace the intended middle section of the next edition 
with 'Malaia zemlia'.
235
 Brezhnev's work finally appeared in February 1978, on the 
thirty-fifth anniversary of the Malaia zemlia landings,
236
 to be followed later the same 
year by the two other sections of the original trilogy, Vozrozhdenie (Regeneration) and 
Tselina (The Virgin Lands). After the appearance of Brezhnev's 'Malaia zemlia' in the 
press, several books followed.
237
 The main publication of two sections of Brezhnev's 
memoirs, Malaia zemlia. Vozrozhdenie, was a paperback clearly produced for mass 
consumption, priced cheaply at twenty-four kopecks and measuring twenty-two by 
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fourteen centimetres.
238
 With a wartime picture of the troops on the cover and a current 
image of Brezhnev as the frontispiece, the scene was set by a photograph of Brezhnev 
in uniform with the troops during the war. Just less than half of the book's ninety-four 
pages (thirty-nine in all) relate to Malaia zemlia, with the second half, 'Vozrozhdenie', 
covering immediate post-war events. The popularity of Brezhnev's work was 
guaranteed, extending to several editions. With an overall print-run of fifteen million 
over twenty editions, it appeared in over one hundred countries in sixty-five 
languages.
239
 
In contrast to Sokolov's substantial memoirs published eleven years previously, 
Brezhnev's work was concise, short enough to fill only four pages of Novorossiiskii 
rabochii. The print run for the first book published locally was similarly modest, at 
3,000 rather than the 50,000 copies of Sokolov's 1967 edition. This edition of Malaia 
zemlia was a correspondingly small hard-back volume measuring only fifteen by ten 
centimetres, with 136 pages, produced in time for the thirty-fifth anniversary of the 
liberation of Novorossiisk in September 1978.
240
 Its quality was proclaimed by the 
glossy, maroon cover, boasting a photograph of landing troops, with a picture of 
Brezhnev opposite his signature in maroon as the frontispiece, and further photographs 
of the campaign inside the front and back covers. At thirty-five kopecks, it was cheaper 
to access than Sokolov's eighty-five-kopeck edition. 
As Brezhnev's personal memoirs depended on a team of ghost-writers, their 
credibility as an historical document or even a witness account may rightly be 
questioned. Despite the standardization of war memoirs by the constraints of Socialist 
Realism and the indirect source of much of the information they contain, Brezhnev's 
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work agrees with Sokolov's to reinforce the myth of Malaia zemlia by agreeing on 
several key tropes. The name of the beach-head is introduced by Brezhnev, quoting 
from a letter claimed to have been written by himself to the troops and copied to Stalin: 
'The small piece of land outside Novorossiisk retaken by us from the enemy [...] we 
named "Malaia zemlia".'
241
 The small area of the re-conquered territory is emphasized 
by both authors; Sokolov writes without elaboration of the troops 'on a small area of 
land',
242
 while Brezhnev plays on the significance of the name in an elevated literary 
style indicative of the authorship of his memoirs, elaborating: 
In a geographical sense, Malaia zemlia does not exist. If you 
want to understand it further, you should clearly imagine this 
rocky area of dry land right up against the water. It measured six 
kilometres along the front-line with a depth of four and a half 
kilometres in all.
243
 
Playing on the emotions of his readers, the Brezhnev memoir invokes the meaning of 
defending this small piece of Soviet land: 
 It may be small, but it is ours, Soviet land, soaked with our 
sweat and our blood, and we shall never under any 
circumstances return it to the enemy.
244
   
Both Sokolov and Brezhnev endow the small plot of land with a significance greater 
than its mere size. For Brezhnev, Malaia zemlia is portrayed as a small section of the 
Motherland and thus a smaller representation of the Soviet Union. His memoir starts 
with a claim to the greatness of Malaia zemlia: 
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It is certainly small – less than thirty square kilometres. And it is 
great, as only a scrap of land can become great when it is soaked 
with the blood of selfless heroes.
245
 
There is a distinct difference, however, in the perspective of the respective 
memoirs, Brezhnev emphasizing negatively the sense of isolation and separation from 
the mainland, while Sokolov stresses the positive wish to rejoin Malaia zemlia with the 
mainland: 'The Malozemel'tsy cherished a dream to unite the Small with the Large'.
246
 
While the overall tone of Sokolov's work is optimistic, Brezhnev writes rather of the 
constant hardship and mortal danger. As his memoirs are written in the first person, in 
contrast to Sokolov's, this may be interpreted as a testament to Brezhnev's own implied 
courage.
247
 Sokolov's more positive approach is demonstrated by the inclusion in his 
memoirs of several songs sung by the troops, some of which look forward to victory.
248
 
Brezhnev, however, despite the literary provenance of his memoirs, only resorts to verse 
when speaking of the death of a comrade in the political section, when the man standing 
next to him in a dug-out was blown up, again serving to promote Brezhnev's reputation 
as a brave soldier.
249
 Individual, rather than mass death is mentioned by both Brezhnev 
and Sokolov, albeit usually with an heroic aspect and without any ethically problematic 
examination of its value.
250
 
Although Brezhnev's memoirs were produced by committee, they do not 
demonstrate the variety of perspectives inherent in a collaborative venture such as 
Sokolov's. Both have a performative style, with substantial amounts of fictionalized 
dialogue between characters. However, with only one main protagonist in Brezhnev's 
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memoir, it has even more cohesion than Sokolov's collected work; where Sokolov 
concentrates on individual acts of heroism, Brezhnev recounts mainly his own role in 
boosting the morale of the troops. Promoting his own bravery, Brezhnev starts his 
memoirs on the night of his arrival by boat on the beach-head, repeating the story of the 
mine explosion which left him unconscious.
251
  
With Brezhnev's influential position as leader of the Soviet Union, his memoirs 
were more significant than Sokolov's collected work in shaping the myth of Malaia 
zemlia as national collective memory, which thus attained a higher status than its brief 
mention in the history books warranted. Reactions to Brezhnev's memoirs were mixed. 
Andropov's response to a political fait accompli was to telephone the 'author' in hospital 
to express his rapture;
252
 the national press immediately provided extensive coverage, 
praising Brezhnev as a military and literary hero,
253
 and commenting on the high level 
of interest within the Soviet Union.
254
 As early as 29
th
 March 1978 a conference with 
over a thousand delegates, mainly Party officials, was held in Rostov-on-Don in order 
to scrutinize and approve Brezhnev's conclusions.
255
 In the introduction to the published 
proceedings, the work's political importance is highlighted: 
Workers of the Don region rate highly the memoirs of Comrade 
L. I. Brezhnev, 'Malaia zemlia'. [...] They agreed unanimously 
and wholeheartedly that the publication of the book 'Malaia 
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zemlia' was the most important socio-political event in the life 
of our country.
256
 
The work was not only acclaimed for its political content,
 257
 however: Brezhnev was 
also awarded the Lenin Prize for Literature in 1979,
258 
despite the fact that he had used 
the services of a team of ghost-writers for the project.   
In contrast, however, the memoirs did receive some subdued criticism. Following 
the controversy over Khrushchev's memoirs and the fact that Stalin, the leader of the 
country during the war, had not published memoirs himself, it may have been viewed an 
extreme move for Brezhnev, albeit already leader of the country for over thirteen years, 
to promote himself so boldly in what was clearly a bid for political one-upmanship. 
Furthermore, although ghost-writing and group-authorship was widely practised 
amongst the country's highest ranking politicians, in this case newspaper editors 
disapproved of the rumoured non-payment of the anonymous writers who had earned 
him 'hundreds of thousands of roubles', while allegedly embellishing Brezhnev's 
military career.
259
 Popular opinion judged the issue with yet another Brezhnev anekdot, 
one of a wealth of relatively good-natured popular jokes told at the expense of the 
General Secretary and his war cult: 
Brezhnev found an extremely positive review of his 'Malaia 
zemlia' in the national press. He hurriedly summoned an aide 
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and asked if he had read the book.  "Yes", replied the aide.  
"And what did you think about it?", asked Brezhnev.  
"Amazing!" replied the aide. Seeking confirmation, Brezhnev 
went through the same daunting interrogation with two further, 
increasingly frightened officials. In the face of unanimous 
positive response, Brezhnev declared: "Well, in that case, I 
really must read it myself!"
260
  
It is likely that Sokolov's memoirs are more accurate than Brezhnev's, as a first 
edition was recorded in 1949, relatively soon after the war.
261
 Although arguably 
historically more useful,
262
 Sokolov does make occasional mistakes, notably the exact 
date of the February landings, whilst claiming that Malozemel'tsy never forget.
263
 If 
Brezhnev's work was inaccurate, it may possibly be attributed to the fact that it, like 
Sokolov's, was a collaborative venture, although not in the same sense. Brezhnev had 
already suffered a stroke by the time it was written, so that the drafts were read to him 
while he was ill and probably not alert in hospital.
264
 Being written by a third party, it 
was reliant on other memoirs and contemporaneous news reports, which were often 
themselves inaccurate. Certainly, Brezhnev includes in the book accounts of much of 
the action which accord with Sokolov's memoirs, including the February landings, 
although he was only there on occasions from April onwards.  Other sections were 
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obviously politically motivated, for example the continued propagation of the myth that 
Brezhnev's military advice was sought by Marshal Zhukov.
265
  
However, despite criticism of factual errors and claims of exaggeration of the role 
of Brezhnev, his memoirs went on to influence the nation as a whole.
266
 By 1978, the 
story of Malaia zemlia was firmly established in the national consciousness, showing 
more characteristics of myth than of an historical account. Under the domination of 
Brezhnev's memoirs, collective memory attained one authoritative voice, rather than 
just the coherent collection authored by Sokolov, or the multiplicity of perspectives 
normally encountered in historical publications in the West, if not in the Soviet Union. 
Encouraged by the pervading war cult, one ideological meaning was attached by 
Brezhnev to the campaign, with motivation for its success attributed solely and 
subjectively to the heroism of Communist troops. No doubt, disillusionment or 
cynicism features, and there is no objectivity or room for differences in its 
interpretation. 
It seems that Malaia zemlia is remembered nationally mainly thanks to Brezhnev's 
overpowering top-down intervention, rather than Sokolov's bottom-up project which 
remained largely local. Especially in the Krasnodar region around Novorossiisk, 
Brezhnev's memoir was praised as a literary monument not only to the defenders of 
Malaia zemlia, but to the whole Soviet people: 
A monument, created by a man who has lived through all that 
the heroes of his work lived through, comprehending entirely 
the greatness of the feat not only of his comrades-in-arms, but of 
the whole Soviet people.
267
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However, if Brezhnev's memoir is considered to be a monument, it is, like Pushkin's 
poem, a creative monument to himself, the central character in the work created in his 
dotage, rather than to his fallen comrades, as in the case of Sokolov. If Brezhnev 
propagated the myth of Malaia zemlia through his memoirs, he also used them to 
construct a mythological version of himself for posterity. Just before his death, 
quotations from Brezhnev's work were engraved on the giant Malaia zemlia memorial 
erected in Novorossiisk by the state in 1982, guaranteeing Brezhnev and his memoirs a 
certain degree of physical, if geographically limited, immortality.  
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2.5 Beyond Brezhnev's memoir and Brezhnevism  
Memory is never shaped in a 
vacuum; the motives of memory 
are never pure.
268
 
 
After its publication, Brezhnev's memoir Malaia zemlia went on to dominate 
remembrance of the war in Novorossiisk, canonizing collective memory according to 
Brezhnev. The myth gained its own momentum nationally, affecting individual Soviet 
citizens of all ages, particularly those subjected to political lessons in schools and 
universities, and veterans wishing to contribute their own memoirs to the war myth. 
Thus, as a consequence of the domination of Brezhnev's memoirs came a period of 
homogenization of memory of Malaia zemlia through further memoirs, from 1978 until 
shortly after Brezhnev's death in November 1982. 
Despite the minor nature of the Malaia zemlia campaign, its significance and 
Brezhnev's role were systematically exaggerated, becoming a major part of the official 
story of the war. Brezhnev's master-narrative became the authoritative work on the 
Malaia zemlia campaign, studied by academics and the subject of numerous scholarly 
works.
269
 Immediately after its publication, school teachers were involved in its 
propagation, being encouraged by the Ministry of Education to include mandatory 
courses on its content for children in Pioneer and Komsomol summer camps. In the 
light of the work's 'most important significance for the Communist education of the 
Soviet people', the young generation was targeted for the 'moral' and 'spiritual' 
education it offered. Furthermore, following a series of training conferences for teachers 
over the summer period, the memoirs were to feature prominently in the academic 
curriculum from September 1978. The exact nature of the approach to Brezhnev's work 
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was detailed for every school year, being included in the schemes of work from even 
the youngest classes. With the tension between history and myth removed, its 
'importance as an historical document' was lauded. With 'examples of mass heroism', 
'analysis of historical facts' and the demonstration of the 'leading role of the Communist 
Party' in the war, its 'truthful, factual' account provided exemplar material for history 
and politics lessons for younger pupils, while its artistic merit guaranteed it a place in 
the study of twentieth-century literature for older students, alongside such luminaries as 
Fadeev, Sholokhov, Tvardovskii and Simonov. In the case of university students, 
Malaia zemlia appeared in the ubiquitous courses on the history of the Communist Party 
in the Soviet Union, guaranteeing its influence on lecturers and students alike.
 270
 
Furthermore, even outside school, children were taken on educational tours of Malaia 
zemlia and its memorials,
271
 while the recommendation of the book for reading at home 
with subsequent homework ensured the engagement of parents.
272
 The military 
campaign, which in 1961 merited four pages in the official history book of the war, had 
become by 1978 an integral part of the school and university curriculum, leading to 
sales of Brezhnev's memoirs of about one million copies annually.
273
 
Michael Shudson observes that, once canonized in the curriculum, a 'work 
accumulates a self-perpetuating rhetorical power', gathering an expanding circle of 
validating proponents and followers: 'It gathers partisans, partisans beget schools, 
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schools beget cultural authority, cultural authority begets an established tradition'.
274
 In 
the case of Brezhnev's memoirs, however, although the outcome was the same, it was 
achieved through a different mechanism from that observed by Schudson in the 
dissemination of Western literature. In Brezhnev's case, the cultural authority and 
canonization were established from above before the work became widely known to the 
masses. Once actively promoted in schools and universities, the authority of Brezhnev's 
Malaia zemlia was set in the concrete of Socialist Realist iconography. 
'Malaia zemlia' was produced as a record version, read by well-known actors.
275
 
Popular songs about the heroic campaign sprang up,
276
 some included in a musical 
produced in 1979,
277
 while Sofronov had his verse set to music in an oratorio by  
K. Akimov, 'V serdtse i v pamiati' (In Heart and Memory), based on Brezhnev's 
memoirs.
278
 In a probable attempt to align himself with the correspondent's flattering 
comments, Brezhnev 'recalls' in his memoirs the contribution of Sergei Borzenko, 
working alongside political worker Mariia Pedenko and the poet Pavel Kogan; however, 
this 'memory' is flawed, as Kogan was killed in the fighting immediately following the 
German occupation of Novorossiisk in 1942,
279
 and Brezhnev did not arrive on Malaia 
zemlia until April 1943. This invented incident features, however, in the musical 
adaptation of Brezhnev's memoirs, which further propagates Brezhnev's version of 
events. Although this musical was in the same sentimental vein as Sofronov's play, 
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composer Iurii Levitin and lyricists E. Dolmatovskii and Iu. Miliutin did not, however, 
attempt to fictionalize the protagonist. Rather, the narrator, book of memoirs in hand 
which he quotes extensively throughout the musical, represents the author Brezhnev 
himself.
280
 Although the start of the musical is relatively faithful to the book, 
commencing with Brezhnev's arrival on Malaia zemlia after his boat struck a mine, the 
campaign is further embellished by the introduction of sentimental and patriotic songs. 
The musical starts with Shostakovich's 'Novorossiisk Chimes',
281
 the 18
th
 Army gathers 
in Gelendzhik to a stirring military march, while later more solemn music proclaims a 
funereal tribute to Major Kunikov.   
The most nationalistic sentiment is reserved for political worker Mariia Pedenko's 
song about the birch tree, a symbol of the Soviet Union. A woman also featured in the 
dramatized version of 'Malaia zemlia'. Sofronov's play included the female spiritual 
companion demanded by Socialist Realism, a certain Masha Kuzina, a kind-hearted 
character who tended the sick, like Mariia.
282
 In Levitin's musical, Mariia dies during 
the fighting, only to re-appear at the end as a representative of the three million Party 
members who fell during the war.
283
 The cult of Mariia Pedenko gained ground in the 
1970s, spawned by the cult of Brezhnev, an example of an individual whose identity 
was re-shaped in line with the war myth according to Brezhnev. In his memoirs, 
Brezhnev recognizes Pedenko's morale-boosting contribution to the Malaia zemlia 
campaign, where she not only undertook clerical and librarian duties, but also worked as 
an 'agitator', a member of the political section, in the production and dissemination of 
the locally produced news-sheet, Polundra. Far from dying on Malaia zemlia, Pedenko 
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was wounded during the liberation of Novorossiisk, only to settle in Kiev after the war 
until her actual death in 1957.
284
 
Pedenko had already published her memoirs in the form of her wartime diary 
shortly after the war, but it was not until her contribution was publicly recognized by 
Brezhnev that she was included in the official war cult.
 285
 Georgii Sokolov notes that 
Brezhnev recalled Mariia during the reunion of 18
th
 Army veterans in Moscow in May 
1970, saying: 
Do you remember Mariia Pedenko? A girl in the political 
section of the 255
th
 Marine Infantry Brigade? For me, her face 
was the personification of many women who fought shoulder to 
shoulder with the men.
286
 
Following Brezhnev's lead, Sokolov went on to include her story, 'Ryzhaia Polundra' 
(Redheaded Polundra), in his later memoirs,
287
 with further comments about her 
belatedly recognized role in the introduction and epilogue.
288
 An academic article 
published in Ukraine the following year confirmed her new status as Brezhnev's 
protégée, quoting extensively from his memoirs.
289
 Susanne Conze and Beate Fieseler 
find that memory of women participants in the war relied mainly on private, oral 
accounts. This may well have been the case for many women in the Soviet Red Army, 
with silences in memory due to the perceived stigma of often alleged sexual relations 
during the war. Thanks to Brezhnev, however, Mariia Pedenko was singled out from 
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several women on Malaia zemlia, with her place in the myth further propagated by 
Sofronov, Levitin and Sokolov.
 290
 
Many authors and publishers jumped on the band-wagon, recycling and 
re-working material from Brezhnev's Malaia zemlia.
291
 Once mythologized, a narrative 
may further influence other individuals contributing to social memory to locate their 
own stories within the myth.
292
 This indicates a continuing myth-building process, 
where the existing myth influences the individual, diametrically opposed to the 
mechanism proposed by Hynes whereby individuals contribute to the original 
construction of the myth. 
Pedenko's is not the only story to have been revived by Brezhnev. Due to the 
overriding influence of Brezhnev's memoirs, many responses were spawned and 
individuals re-defined within Brezhnev's master-narrative, leading to a second stage of 
homogenization of memory according to the myth propagated by Brezhnev. Following 
the appearance of Brezhnev's memoirs, several veterans of Malaia zemlia suddenly 
published their own memoirs, once the door had been opened to them. A whole series of 
such memoirs was published in the Krasnodar region between 1978 and 1985 in the 
series 'Ratnyi podvig Novorossiiska' (Novorossiisk's Military Feat), with the stated aim 
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of setting the war events in Novorossiisk alongside those of other better-known 
hero-cities.
293
 The series continued well after Brezhnev's death in 1982, probably due to 
the local interest generated by the regionally published works. Identical in size, format 
and style,
294
 the uniformity of the individual books in the series was possibly enforced 
due to increased censorship at the time,
295
 while their content was shaped by and 
conformed to the growing myth.  
As a collection of memoirs influenced by collective memory, where each 
individual author relocates his own story within the Brezhnev myth, Brezhnev's 
appearance in these works is virtually mandatory. Most memoirists include a 
photograph of and a memorial tribute to Brezhnev, who was apparently recalled by 
them all, thereby reinforcing and further endorsing Brezhnev's memoirs in a spiral of 
myth-making.
296
For example, Galatenko boosts Brezhnev's reputation as a wise 
commander, recalling him making a useful suggestion on the training of troops: 
"Colonel Brezhnev requested the sailors to help the landing 
troops with respect to the crossing and landings. He says that 
you already have previous experience in landing operations, 
which should be shared with our troops and commanders."
297
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In a similar vein, reinforcing the argument for homogeneity of content as well as form, 
Kaida relates how Brezhnev recommended the passing on of experience from sailors to 
soldiers: 
Leonid Il'ich suggested directing experienced Malozemel'tsy 
sailors to instruct the soldiers who were taking part for the first 
time in such a difficult military operation as landings from the 
sea.
298
 
By contrast, however, perhaps the most personal, least formulaic passage is by Bondar', 
who not only recalls Brezhnev on Malaia zemlia, but also met him as leader of the 
Soviet Union. Grigor'ev similarly recalls meetings with Brezhnev in 1974 and 1976 on 
key anniversaries, while even Savitskii, a former pilot, who would not have met 
Brezhnev during the war, speaks of his memoirs with authority.
299
  
In the 'Ratnyi podvig Novorossiiska' series individuals clearly demonstrate a 
tendency to smooth out differences for the sake of simplification and coherence of the 
war myth. Noting rather less state manipulation in her study of Leningrad than in 
Novorossiisk, where Brezhnev had seen action, Kirschenbaum similarly finds the 
increasing appropriation of the war myth by survivors in their own accounts towards the 
end of the Brezhnev era.
300
 While earlier works were produced by veterans with a 
genuine gift and motivation for writing, these later authors were not talented writers. 
They do not stand out amongst the memoirists of Malaia zemlia, their identity being 
subsumed by the overarching state ownership of the war narrative, and their own real 
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stories transformed into myth.
301
 Thus, by the time of Brezhnev's death, there was a 
state of total visible convergence of published war memoirs in Novorossiisk, due largely 
to state coercion and under the complete ownership of the state.  
The overt inflation of Brezhnev's role in his memoirs and the self-aggrandizing 
monumentalization of war memory drew criticism from both dissident and Western 
scholars immediately after Brezhnev's death.
302
 Michael Ignatieff, for example, is 
scathing of the war cult of the Brezhnev era: 
Compared to the other great battles, the fight for Novorossisk 
would have been a minor skirmish had it not been for the fact 
that a young party propaganda officer named Leonid Brezhnev 
played a minor and inglorious role in the rear. [...] When 
masters invent tradition, they have the past re-written as the 
history of their own glorious beginnings.
303
  
From a more personal point of view, Zhores Medvedev recalls both the campaign and 
Brezhnev's memoir: 
Brezhnev's attempts to rewrite the history of the war were a 
source of derision amongst the military. As his 'personality cult' 
became more insistent, so he was more and more often 
described as an outstanding military leader who had played an 
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active part in the most important battles of the war. This was 
simply not true. The battle which took place near Novorossiisk 
in 1943, where he was the deputy of the commander for political 
work [...] was part of a not very successful military operation 
and not one of the crucial battles of the war as it is depicted in 
works written to elevate Brezhnev's role. I am in a position to 
form an independent opinion about this isolated section of the 
Southern front [...] for as a seventeen-year-old private in the 
infantry I was in the same army at the same place.
304
 
This comment demonstrates the validity of the memories of two different people of the 
same event. In the face of Brezhnev's dominant narrative, however, Medvedev's opinion 
from the point of view of a hospitalized junior soldier would count for little. However, 
his opinion four decades after the events carried more scholarly authority in the West. 
Roi Medvedev is similarly scathing of the 'forged' memoirs, while Lazar Lazarev 
condemns Brezhnev's memoirs as a 'ghost-written biography, which included a glowing, 
fictionalised account of his own modest wartime service as a military commissar'.
305  
The literary response within the Soviet Union after Brezhnev's death was more 
muted but equally pervasive. If Brezhnev had defined other memoirists involved with 
the Malaia zemlia campaign for his own purposes, it was Brezhnev who was later 
re-defined by the memoirists. On the national level, the section relating to Brezhnev in 
Borzenko's original article on Malaia zemlia written in 1943 no longer appears in a 
collection of wartime dispatches published in 1982,
 
while a later version of Zhukov's 
memoirs has the questionable paragraph about seeking Brezhnev's opinion removed.
306
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Locally, however, the response was less drastic. Sokolov retains in all later 
editions of his memoirs the same brief passage about the kind and modest Colonel 
Brezhnev, narrated by the young Vasilii Zelentsov, to whom Brezhnev issues his Party 
card: 
A colonel is sitting at the table. Thinnish, but with bushy, black 
eyebrows. He's wearing a simple soldier's uniform and 
greatcoat. He turns to me, smiling. His eyebrows lift a little, and 
I can see his bright, jolly eyes. [...] And do you know who that 
colonel was? [...] Brezhnev, the head of our landing army's 
political section.
307
 
Similarly, the passage describes Brezhnev's rallying speeches, while the part about 
Brezhnev having been blown out of his boat by a mine remains.  
It is the epilogues of Sokolov's memoirs, however, which clearly demonstrate the 
rise and fall of Brezhnev's cult of personality. In his final chapter of the 1967 edition, 
'Dvadtsat' let spustia' (Twenty Years Later), four lines are devoted to Brezhnev, by then 
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who joined the veterans 
for the first major reunion on Malaia zemlia in 1963.
308
 This section was repeated 
verbatim in the 1971 edition of the book.
309
 By 1979, Brezhnev's memoirs were cited in 
the prologue by Admiral Kholastiakov,
310
 who 'recalled' that Brezhnev took part in the 
actual planning of the landings,
311
 aligning both himself and Sokolov with Brezhnev's 
version of events. By then, the Malaia zemlia campaign was so famous that 
Kholastiakov compares it favourably with the Battle of Stalingrad. In Sokolov's 
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epilogue, 'Tridtsat' let spustia' (Thirty Years Later), Breznev makes an early appearance 
in the second paragraph, by virtue of his attendance at reunions and his visit to 
Novorossiisk in 1974, which permeates the rest of the epilogue and will be analysed in 
detail in Chapter 3. Exaggerating the number of times Brezhnev crossed to Malaia 
zemlia and emphasizing the danger involved, Sokolov repeats the story of Brezhnev's 
boat hitting a mine. Details of his Party work on the beach-head follow, with the 
information that Brezhnev never forgot a name or a face. Furthermore, Sokolov 
attributes to Brezhnev in this edition the suggestion that he supplement his original 
book of memoirs with the memories of his comrades-in-arms. Brezhnev is given credit 
for supplying Sokolov with a list of addresses for this reason and also with helping in 
the organization of the first reunion in 1963. Thus Brezhnev is characterized alongside 
other leading military officers as a brave soldier, a trusty comrade and an organized 
leader.
312
 
Memory of the past has an important function in the building of an identity in the 
present. James Wertsch observes that, for an individual's identity, memory is more 
likely to privilege accuracy, while for a country collective memory is based rather on 
the need for a politically usable past.
313
 In Sokolov's case, however, as in the 'Ratnyi 
podvig Novorossiiska' memoirs, accuracy seems to have been discarded by the 
individual memoirist for the sake of toeing the Party line in the context of group and 
national identity. There may be two possible reasons for the homogeneity of memoirs 
after the appearance of Brezhnev's works, especially in relation to Brezhnev himself: 
either an unconscious reaction to a subliminal influence on collective memory, or a 
proactive response indicating a degree of pragmatic political awareness. Wertsch 
demonstrates how, in some cases, 'a text can structure meaning, communication and 
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even thought', while 'another author's words may be appropriated by the recipient who 
then passes them on as his own words'.
314
 This type of unconscious organic influence 
may be recognized in pervasive media content, with television and press coverage in the 
Soviet Union probably subjecting the malleable memory of an individual citizen (who 
may not even have read Brezhnev's memoirs) to the dominance of the collective. 
Alternatively, the pragmatic memoirist of the era may effect a deliberate reconstruction 
of personal memory, encouraged or coerced by the censor, to accommodate the 
unwritten literary guidelines of the era. 
While it is probable that both mechanisms may be operating in the 'Ratnyi podvig 
Novorossiiska' series, it is noticeable that Sokolov carefully crafted different editions of 
his memoirs to situate them within the memorial climate of the Soviet Union over 
nearly two decades, changing them proactively to suit the presentist attitude of the state. 
By Sokolov's final edition, published in 1985, most of the material is similar to previous 
editions, except the epilogue, 'Sorok let spustia' (Forty Years Later). Here, in complete 
contrast, while repeating sections from both 'Twenty Years Later' and 'Thirty Years 
Later', Sokolov removes every reference to Brezhnev.
315
 Sokolov's reaction to the death 
of the agent of centralized memory suggests that the predominant influence on memoir 
relating to Brezhnev from 1978 to 1982 was the proactive type, residing mainly in the 
hands of the author, rather than an unconscious reaction to an overwhelming collective 
memory from above. Having largely removed Brezhnev from his memoirs by 1985, 
Sokolov finally left a probably more truthful version than Brezhnev's own memoirs for 
posterity.
316
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With Brezhnev written out of his own myth, copies of his memoirs were removed 
from school libraries and destroyed after his death, while references to Malaia zemlia on 
television were cut.
317
 Thanks to Brezhnev, Malaia zemlia had become a national and 
international subject of derision and a symbol of the stagnation of the Brezhnev era. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
The periodic oscillations of frost and thaw during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras 
cultivated a delicate equilibrium between the state and would-be memoirists, within 
which both parties charted unknown waters and where historical accuracy was 
compromised in the interests of presentist politics. The outcome remained dynamic, 
with writers tacking to port or starboard according to the prevailing political wind. 
Although the earliest, pre-Brezhnev memoirs contain much detailed evidence, later 
works, particularly the 'Ratnyi podvig Novorossiiska' series, are more general and 
appear to have been influenced by the political need to conform to the Brezhnev-centred 
myth. 
In my analysis of the mechanism for the construction of the myth of Malaia 
zemlia, I have demonstrated that the myth developed over four distinct stages thanks to 
war correspondents and memoirists. Both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms were at 
play at different stages of myth formation; subject to variation in the official attitude to 
war memory, the memories of individuals were firstly collected, only to be subsumed 
within the official state war cult of the Brezhnev era to produce the authoritative 
collective myth which increasingly homogenized further memoirs. Individual memory 
thus became collective property, while local ownership of the myth was appropriated by 
the state, which also controlled the dissemination and interpretation of so-called 
documentary history.  
In view of the state's didactic attitude to the production of culture, it is not 
surprising that the myth of Malaia zemlia developed in this way. The formulaic nature 
of Socialist Realism which led to the uniformity of literary form observed in many 
memoirs facilitated myth formation by their very homogeneity. This represents an 
extreme example of an epic myth in the Socialist Realist mould, situated within a 
glorious historical continuum from classical times to wars against the twentieth-century 
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invader. In this respect, and with the invocation in the present of memory of the event in 
the distant future, it seems to be even further developed than the myth of the siege of 
Leningrad, which, while known nationally at the time, concentrated rather on the 
immediate future. The two distinct war myths may be compared with the British myth 
of the mainly military conflict of the Battle of Britain in the case of Malaia zemlia, and 
the myth of the London Blitz in the case of Leningrad, which concentrated on the 
community spirit of ordinary citizens and the continuation of family life in a key city 
under bombardment. 
If the siege of Leningrad was known nationally and internationally at the time, the 
myth of Malaia zemlia only became fixed in the national consciousness years after the 
war, thanks to the strong Brezhnev connection, without which it is likely that it would 
have remained local. The influence of Brezhnev's memoirs was so overwhelming that 
they permitted no contestation during his leadership, clouding and distorting history for 
the sake of political utility, although in the end Brezhnev's exaggerated claims probably 
served to sound the death-knell for the war cult. Their content did indeed represent a 
monumental memorial to Brezhnev's war service, although the sudden change in the 
memorial climate after Brezhnev's death underlines the greater integrity of Sokolov's 
memoirs as a memorial to his fallen comrades. It may be argued that memoirs are more 
useful to future generations than physical monuments in the commemoration of the 
dead, as they not only describe events, but also ascribe meaning to them, in this case as 
the justification for fighting a 'sacred' war to free the Motherland from the fascist 
invader. It will be left to later chapters to analyse the role of performative ritual and 
monuments (Chapter 4) and oral transmission (Chapter 5) in the further propagation of 
the myth of Malaia zemlia, while the following chapter will focus more closely on the 
special relationship between Brezhnev and Novorossiisk.  
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Chapter 3 
Leonid Brezhnev: Local legend or national statesman? 
 
People, their deeds and works, are 
remembered by history only if they 
succeed as story. Their lives may 
be told and retold as legend, 
altered to fit the needs of 
succeeding generations.
318
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In 2004 a bronze statue of Leonid Brezhnev was erected in the centre of Novorossiisk, 
decades after other statues to the General Secretary had been removed from public 
spaces across the country. Although Brezhnev's name was not linked with Malaia 
zemlia for the first twenty years after the war, during the late 1960s and 1970s a special 
relationship had developed between Brezhnev and Novorossiisk, cemented even before 
the publication of his memoirs by the General Secretary's visit to the town in 1974 to 
present the Gold Star representing its newly conferred status as a Hero-City of the 
Soviet Union. The new statue, an artistic representation of a local legend which has 
developed around Brezhnev's visit, encapsulates the personal rather than the political 
side of this relationship, serving to define the current identity of Novorossiisk with 
respect to Brezhnev. The Brezhnev statue is grounded in local society and is thus more 
specific than national memory, which barely recognizes the events to which it refers. 
National and local views of Brezhnev's place in history are not necessarily in opposition 
however, but offer complementary perspectives of the General Secretary, seen from a 
distance or in close detail through opposite ends of a telescope.  
Much of the original evidence which I bring to bear in this chapter depends on a 
close study of the local press in Soviet Novorossiisk, which was subject to the political 
control of the Communist party. This media propaganda renders my evidence difficult 
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to interpret from the viewpoint of the individual Soviet citizen, whose attitude to 
mnemonic events was subject to ideological pressure and the influence of the pervading 
war cult. Contemporaneous newspaper articles and recent oral interviews provide only 
subjective testimony of past circumstances: the former acting as the political tool of a 
Communist government and the latter as citizens subjected to manipulation by these 
very media sources. Both types of evidence are valid, however, if interpreted as social 
constructs of their time, the tangible product of memory matters in the Soviet Union. 
They are backed by other sources, including sound recordings of Brezhnev's speech, 
punctuated by noisy applause.
319
 Similarly, promotional photograph albums and 
contemporaneous film provide valuable evidence of official priorities at the time of 
publication, if potentially subject to distortion and editing to guide viewers' 
interpretation.
320
  
Even today, citizens of Novorossiisk have their attitude informed by the mass 
media, although views expressed in research interviews I conducted may be accepted as 
accurate reflections of current opinion on war memory. Malleable individual memories 
of the past are not only shaped by the press, however, but are also potentially subject to 
distortion by virtue of forgetfulness, blocking, bias or even misattribution.
321
 It is 
therefore impossible to accept without interrogation statements made today as either 
factual evidence or representative of attitudes pertaining in the past. In contrast, the 
recently erected Brezhnev statue and the debate around its adoption suggest that 
collective memory represented artistically is one significant indicator of the current 
mnemonic identity of Novorossiisk. 
In this chapter I demonstrate that Brezhnev's visit to Novorossiisk in 1974 
affected the mnemonic environment in Novorossiisk such that an eventual divergence in 
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interpretation of Brezhnev's association with Malaia zemlia arose between national and 
local audiences. The visit shows characteristics of what Aleksandr Etkind terms a 
'memory event'. This type of secondary mnemonic phenomenon occurs some time after 
the original, historic event, but is dependent upon memory of the original for its impact 
and (re-)interpretation.
322
 Brezhnev's visit to Novorossiisk in 1974 was both secondary 
to and a product of his presence in the original Malaia zemlia campaign, in turn giving 
rise to its own memorial consequences in a series of reverberations through time. The 
Brezhnev visit, the agency and mechanism of subsequent reverberations and the extent 
of any consequent re-interpretation and divergence from national collective memory is 
the subject of this chapter. 
I show that the public persona of Brezhnev, which had been carefully constructed 
during the war cult only to be deconstructed nationally shortly after Brezhnev's death, 
was re-constructed in Novorossiisk alone after the fall of Communism, overriding the 
connection still ingrained in national collective memory between Brezhnev and his 
myth of Malaia zemlia. With a national re-assessment of Brezhnev around his centenary 
in 2006, however, a more empathetic and nostalgic view has arisen nationally, which is 
closer in some aspects to the view consistently held in Novorossiisk. Moreover, the 
onset of a new war cult under President Putin has led to a rapprochement of perceptions 
of Malaia zemlia nationally and locally, albeit allowing for a revised role for the 
General Secretary in collective memory.  
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3.2 Brezhnev comes to town 
 
 
Heroes' Square, Novorossiisk
323
 
 
Twenty-eight years after the naming of the first Hero-Cities of the Soviet Union, 
Novorossiisk eventually joined their ranks on 14
th
 September 1973. On Heroes' Square 
a wall was erected overnight to mark the award, so that, by the next day, the words 
'Hero-City' were evident, made of cement at first, with a later inscription carved in 
granite.
324
 The national press reported a celebratory rally of thousands of workers in the 
town, with a special sitting of the town's Communist Party Committee. The country was 
reminded of the reason for the honour, while in the local newspaper, Novorossiiskii 
rabochii, a brief history of the campaign was provided by Georgii Sokolov, the first key 
memoirist of Malaia zemlia.
325
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The scholarly verdict in the West was less laudatory. Observing the noticeable 
escalation of the war cult at the beginning of the 1970s, Nina Tumarkin finds that 'there 
is no question that Novorossiisk was given the honored title of hero-city exclusively 
because of the Brezhnev connection.'
326
 It is indeed indisputable that Brezhnev was 
closely involved with the award at this specific time, in view of his letter of 
congratulations written on 15
th
 September 1973, which was reported nation-wide in 
Pravda the following day, the thirtieth anniversary of the liberation of Novorossiisk: 
Dear Comrades! 
Today is one of the most significant days in the history of the 
glorious town of Novorossiisk! Together with you, I feel sincere 
joy and pride in my links with the awarding to Novorossiisk of 
the supreme and honourable title of Hero-City. [...] 
 L. I. Brezhnev
327
 
However, it is claimed by the former head of culture in Novorossiisk that Brezhnev had 
needed some prompting from the town, which had allegedly sent delegations to 
Moscow over a period of five years prior to 1973 to lobby his aide, V. A. Golikov, 
backing up their claim to fame with a portfolio of historical evidence supplied by the 
Novorossiisk museum director, Evgeniia Makarovna.
328
 It is unclear whether these 
visits actually initiated the idea of making Novorossiisk a Hero-City, or whether they 
simply substantiated an idea suggested by Brezhnev himself. In view of the fact that 
Kerch', which the 18
th
 Army had liberated shortly after Novorossiisk, was made a 
Hero-City on the same day as Novorossiisk, the evidence points to the instigation of 
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both awards by Brezhnev, with the inevitable need for supporting documentation from 
the town itself perhaps leading to a perception amongst some residents of successful 
lobbying from below.  
In his newspaper article, Sokolov stressed the pride of Novorossiisk in its 
connections with Brezhnev, while Izvestiia reported the content of a greetings telegram 
dispatched to Brezhnev after the rally, which, in common with other publications, 
over-estimated his involvement in the campaign 'as an active participant and organiser 
of the engagements for Novorossiisk'. The evidence thus points to Novorossiisk's 
having been honoured as a Hero-City mainly due to the Brezhnev connection, rather 
than to the military significance of the historical events.
329
 
Brezhnev had written his letter of congratulations from the Crimea and did not 
capitalize politically on his links with Novorossiisk by visiting the town that month.  
Neither had Brezhnev visited Novorossiisk when the town was awarded the Order of the 
Great Patriotic War (first class) in May 1966, less than two years after he had become 
leader of the Soviet Union.
330
 As the momentum of the war cult built up, however, 
Brezhnev started to attend 18
th
 Army veterans' reunions in Moscow, notably on the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of Victory Day in 1970.
331
 Thus, although Brezhnev's name 
had been associated with Novorossiisk in the national press from 1966, the town had to 
wait until September 1974 for Brezhnev to return to Novorossiisk and present 
personally the Hero-City's Gold Star.  
The official marking of the award of Hero-City status in both 1973 and 1974 
enabled the town to celebrate the occasions in two different ways. While the festivities 
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of September 1973 were devoted solely to the award, the events of 1974 focused on the 
person of Brezhnev himself, consolidating his position with regard to Novorossiisk in 
the past and in the present, with more significant consequences for the future than 
simply the Gold Star he brought with him. 
Brezhnev left for Novorossiisk on 6
th
 September 1974 from Moscow's Vnukovo 
Airport,
332
 with the tone of his visit to Malaia zemlia having been set in the national 
press by articles in Izvestiia reminding readers of the significance of the campaign and 
the constant danger to those fighting there: 
So what was Malaia zemlia, then? It was the landings; then 
standing in trenches nearly up to your knees in hot, spent 
cartridges, with the cold water of the Tsemes Bay behind you; it 
was when you could never retreat by even one step.
333
 
Establishing Brezhnev's credentials under these testing conditions, the correspondent 
writes: 
In the hottest days on Malaia zemlia, Colonel L. I. Brezhnev, 
Head of the Political Section of the 18
th
 Army, was often to be 
seen. In the hardest days, he was alongside the troops.
334
 
According to TASS, Brezhnev and his three aides, V. A. Golikov, G. E. Pukanov and 
A. M. Aleksandrov, arrived by helicopter to the welcome of veterans at the aerodrome 
on the site of Malaia zemlia, proceeding immediately to the stele of remembrance on the 
sea shore at Stanichka.
335
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Photographs of Brezhnev, the monuments and crowds testify to the atmosphere of 
the occasion, where veterans wearing medals joined 'tens of thousands' of citizens on 
the newly cleaned streets to greet the General Secretary. Brezhnev then visited 
significant monuments and sites in the Malaia zemlia hinterland in the village of 
Myskahko outside Novorossiisk, including the wine-cellar in the main building of the 
communal vineyard which had acted as the headquarters of the 83
rd
 Marine Infantry 
Brigade where Brezhnev had 'once talked with the heroes of Malaia zemlia'.
336
  
 
Brezhnev's wine-cellar bunker in Myskhako
337
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The spot in Myskhako where Brezhnev planted a tree in 1974
338
 
 
 
The 'Calendar' monument in Myskhako (1974)
339
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Brezhnev planted a memorial tree by the 'Calendar' monument in Dolina smerti (the 
Valley of Death) in Myskahko, where large steles represent the days of the fiercest 
fighting in April 1943. His historical tour ended back in the town centre with a visit to 
the monument to the Unknown Sailor and the laying of flowers at the Eternal Flame.
340
 
The following day, the official correspondent described 'tens of thousands' of 
citizens carrying red flags and banners, all heading for the 'Trud' Stadium:
 341
 
We are walking in a dense flood of people to the stadium on this 
notable day, 7
th
 September 1974. [...] Workers from the cement 
factories and the port, sailors, builders and teachers [...] are 
carrying bouquets of bright flowers, grown on the rocky slopes 
of Tsemes Bay. The dress uniforms of officers and generals are 
sparkling with awards and medals.
342
 
As Brezhnev mounted the podium in the stadium, he was apparently greeted with a 
standing ovation, captured by press photographers, before speaking at length to the 
assembled crowd, and finally presenting the Gold Star to the town.
343
 
In his speech Brezhnev outlined in the literary tradition of Socialist Realism 
Novorossiisk's military and political past, emphasizing the continuity of the devotion of 
its citizens to Communism and the building of socialism: the town's role in 1905 when 
setting up the first Council of Deputies in the country; its loyalty during the Revolution; 
the deliberate scuttling in 1918 of a squadron of ships rather than allowing them to fall 
into the hands of 'Imperial Germany'; and the rout of the White Guards in 1920 which 
precipitated their flight from the country at the end of the Civil War. Reminding the 
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audience of the lasting impression made by the fighting on all participants, Brezhnev 
noted the durability of memory, again invoking prime examples of Soviet history, 
which served to enhance the status of the Malaia zemlia campaign: 
If a man has been a direct participant in some important event or 
other of his times, an event which comes to be the most 
important turning point in world history, this remains in his 
consciousness for all his life. It is comparable with the October 
Socialist Revolution and the Civil War for our Party's older 
generation.
344
 
Further inflating local events, Brezhnev set them in the context of the strategic Battle 
for the Northern Caucasus with its rich supplies of oil. He also referred to the overall 
campaign in the Don region, thus expanding the significance of the 'bastion' of 
Novorossiisk and enabling a realistic comparison with Stalingrad, an uncontroversial 
example of a Hero-City.    
Acknowledging creative artists in general, Brezhnev singled out the war 
correspondent Sergei Borzenko with poet Pavel Kogan for 'their fighting, passionate 
words'; sculptors of monuments; and Dmitrii Shostakovich, composer of the 
'Novorossiisk Chimes'. Creative work was also evident throughout the visit. Local and 
national interests combined in the showing of the film 'Pamiat' navsegda' (Memory is 
forever) in Novorossiisk's 'Moscow' cinema, showing Brezhnev meeting 18
th
 Army 
veterans. Furthermore, on the day of Brezhnev's arrival, a group of workers was called 
to the cinema studios to film another documentary, 'Bitva za Novorossiisk' (The battle 
for Novorossiisk),
345
 presumably to add retrospective credence alongside other shots of 
Brezhnev's visit. This artistic response to Brezhnev's visit ensured its national coverage, 
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while a commemorative album produced by teachers in the region, Rodina slavit 
gorod-geroi (The Motherland salutes the Hero-City) circulated locally.
346
 
The tone of Brezhnev's speech and further meetings was not only military and 
retrospective. It was evident throughout the visit that not only war memory was at play, 
as Brezhnev also praised the role of local industry in the country's economy: 
Novorossiisk apparently produced 'one quarter of the national tonnage of cement', while 
the port was 'well-known internationally'. Visits were made to the growing port and the 
'Proletariat' cement works, where Brezhnev was reportedly 'welcomed everywhere by 
thousands of residents'. National and local journalists highlighted the post-war 
regeneration that had brought new life to the ruined town, with the vision of a 
prosperous future implied by the building of a new school and a maternity hospital with 
two hundred beds.
347
 
This new emphasis on the future appears to have left the townspeople with no 
little responsibility. According to the press, the response from Novorossiisk was to 
express a wish to work even harder to fulfil the tasks of the five-year plan,
348
 with a 
certain P. Belen'kin of the 'October' cement works promising 'shock work' tactics: 'To 
the supreme award from the Motherland, the cement workers of our factory will 
respond with supreme productivity.'
349
 Belen'kin reminded readers of progress since the 
war: 'Our factory lay in ruins. In 1948 the citizens of Novorossiisk decided to build a 
new cement factory on the site of the former one.' By the following year, the new 
factory produced its first cement, in the context of a country-wide determination to 
rebuild factories and increase productivity: 'We worked as excellently as we fought in 
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the war.'
350
 In this way the fight against the invader during the Great Patriotic War was 
likened in 1974 to the fight for socialism and the inherent economic productivity 
attributed to Communist ideology. However, in tacit acknowledgement of the benefits 
of capitalism and Western investment, Brezhnev also visited the new Pepsi-Cola factory 
built with American finance.
351
 Thus, while the national media covered mainly the 
history behind the award of Hero-City status, the local emphasis was on the present and 
even the future. 
It appears that, although the events took place in Novorossiisk, the official 
communiqués were written in Moscow, then telegraphed to Novorossiisk for minor 
'correction' by local journalists.
352
 With TASS firmly in control, in what was standard 
practice at the time, no local interpretation or deviation from the official line was 
possible. While the Novorossiisk press still reproduced the TASS reports, local 
reporting was different from the national. In Novorossiisk it was possible to see the 
monuments on Malaia zemlia on a daily basis, which may have caused them to have 
less impact than when their photographs appeared in Pravda or Izvestiia. In contrast, 
Brezhnev's interest in the town's post-war regeneration, housing and employment was of 
more interest locally than in the distant capital. However, official collective memory of 
the war and of Brezhnev's role on Malaia zemlia remained identical: the town professed 
particular thanks to the General Secretary for its award of Hero-City status, while 
Brezhnev's visit endorsed the town, thus promoting Brezhnev's own growing cult of 
personality through his historical connection with the Malaia zemlia campaign. 
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For a few years after Brezhnev's visit its memory lived on in Novorossiisk. A full 
account of the event was published the following year,
353
 while nationally the war cult 
increased to a climax with the publication of Brezhnev's memoirs in 1978. The 1979 
edition of Sokolov's memoirs covered Brezhnev's visit in depth in the final chapter, 
'Thirty Years Later'.
354
 Similarly, Grigor'ev, Savitskii and Grezin recalled 7
th
 September 
1974 in the 'Ratnyi podvig Novorossiiska' series of memoirs.
355
 Grigor'ev described the 
mood in the stadium as Brezhnev appeared on the podium: 
There we were in the stadium. Everyone was rooted to the spot 
in expectation. Suddenly a wave of animation swept through the 
stadium. Thousands of people stood up, as enthusiastic applause 
broke out.
356
 
According to Sergei Kudryashov, there is always the danger that the experiences 
of memoirists become 'fixed', being 'committed to memory, at later points in time', thus 
leading to biased recollections.
357
 Although this is noticeable when witnesses repeat the 
assertions of previous memoirists,
358
 in this case it is less likely, as these recollections 
are supported by photographs, newspaper reports and the testimony of others present at 
the time. However, these memoirs represent the final phase of adulation of Brezhnev 
both nationally and locally, as the war cult was dismantled centrally on Brezhnev's 
death in 1982. By 1985, Sokolov had removed all references to Brezhnev's visit, 
'forgetting' this event, while expanding instead on the mood in the town when it was 
named a Hero-City in 1973.
359
 Although the visit of Brezhnev to Novorossiisk had 
caused the press and other media to reflect on the Malaia zemlia campaign for a time, its 
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lasting repercussions did not become apparent until twenty-five years later, by which 
time aspects of the visit had developed into local legend. 
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3.3 The Godfather 
 
  
'Malaia zemlia' by Aleksandr Kamper
360
 
 
Artist Aleksandr Kamper works near the Valley of Death in Myskhako. On his studio 
wall hangs a collage entitled 'Malaia zemlia', composed from an old, torn canvas 
depicting a beach, which could well be the beach-head at Malaia zemlia, with the 
frontispiece of Brezhnev's memoir mounted on a hill overlooking the shore, rather as 
Mount Koldun overlooks the battle-field outside Novorossiisk. According to the artist, 
this work represents the memory of Malaia zemlia, with Brezhnev's book depicted as a 
monument overlooking an act of remembrance in which the viewer is taking part.
361
  
Kamper interprets the holes in the picture as gaps in collective memory of the Malaia 
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zemlia campaign, which have inhibited informed remembrance, thanks to Brezhnev's 
overpowering intervention of the 1970s. According to Kamper's explanation, Malaia 
zemlia is remembered almost exclusively thanks to Brezhnev, but because of 
Brezhnev's domination that memory has remained incomplete, overpowered by his 
memoirs to the extent that the full, factual picture has been prevented from emerging.  
My research shows that this may well be true on the national, mythical level, 
despite the emergence of more recent historical perspectives on the war which have 
influenced collective memory since Brezhnev's death. On the local level, however, the 
gaps have been filled in two different ways: by hard historical facts derived from 
material and documentary evidence, and by local legend. Recently unearthed artefacts 
shed considerable light on the engagement, while schools' local history courses and an 
authoritative recent history of the campaign by local academic Tamara Iurina serve to 
propagate a more detailed narrative.
362
 The rest of this chapter, on the other hand, will 
examine how a local legend sprang up around Brezhnev's visit, such that collective 
memory of this event as an addendum in its own right to the wartime campaign has 
reverberated through the town since 1999. 
Brezhnev's visit to Novorossiisk marked a notable bifurcation of attitude to both 
Malaia zemlia and to Brezhnev himself on the national and local levels. For the country 
as a whole, the visit had a single significance: the bestowing of the Gold Star of the 
Hero-City on the town, thereby ratifying the award of 1973. This event was connected 
to the war alone, such that Brezhnev's name is integrally linked to that of Malaia zemlia 
and the war myth he constructed around it. Despite the subsequent deconstruction of 
both the Brezhnev era war cult and Brezhnev's cult of personality, this is the perception 
of Brezhnev and Malaia zemlia that has remained ingrained in the older generation, 
with the publication of Brezhnev's over-inflated memoirs providing evidence for this 
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public interpretation. Perestroika, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the difficult 
decade thereafter saw the national demise of official war memory. Only Izvestiia 
marked the significant fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war with a sarcastic article 
about Malaia zemlia, indicative of the scornful attitude to Brezhnev's memoirs still 
extant in society years after his death, a view that continues to this day, dormant in the 
minds of those old enough to remember the Brezhnev era.
363
  
In Novorossiisk, however, the Brezhnev connection was evolving along a 
different path, as Brezhnev's visit of 1974 largely superseded the formal award of 
Hero-City status the previous year. Brezhnev's visit was a personal triumph for himself 
and the town, with the General Secretary's charisma in the present more than eclipsing 
distant memories of his wartime service on Malaia zemlia. Winning over officials, 
veterans and the public alike, Brezhnev's character and overt identification with 
Novorossiisk endeared him to the population, who claimed him as their own. If 
Brezhnev's wartime function on Malaia zemlia had played a minor role in shaping the 
post-war town, this visit of the General Secretary would influence the development of 
the newly-nominated Hero-City for a further thirty years, whilst marking a 
reconstruction of the persona of Brezhnev with the establishment of a burgeoning local 
legend in the process. 
In 1999, towards the culmination of an era of instability, Novorossiisk looked 
back to a heyday in the town's history as the twenty-fifth anniversary of Brezhnev's visit 
approached. A key investigative newspaper article in Novorossiiskii rabochii exposed 
new evidence from witnesses that had been suppressed in 1974 in favour of the TASS 
reports which had dominated the local press.
364
 It is this first public examination of the 
significant event which both expressed and continued to formulate local opinion on 
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Brezhnev in the town, as the press still delves into 'hidden' aspects of Brezhnev's now 
legendary visit. 
The national press had made no mention of where Brezhnev stayed in 
Novorossiisk, with only a passing comment about where other guests were 
accommodated.
365
 Since 1999 attention has been firmly focused on this aspect of the 
visit, which has become almost as important as his official schedule. According to 
journalist Tat'iana Besedina, the proposed hotel among the vineyards of Abrau-Diurso, 
the champagne-producing region of the Black Sea coast, offered insufficient suites of a 
suitably high standard. Furthermore, the long, winding road from the hotel to 
Novorossiisk was deemed by his staff to be uncomfortable for the General Secretary. 
For these reasons, on the day before Brezhnev's arrival, they suddenly started to assess 
other options in Novorossiisk itself, finally deciding on the Hotel Brigantina, which 
offered luxury suites, if not luxury furniture within them. In a last-minute compromise, 
the better quality furniture from the rejected hotel in Abrau-Diurso was rapidly 
transferred to suite 309 of the Hotel Brigantina, displacing existing guests.
366
 
As part of my research I have interviewed several people in Novorossiisk who had 
either witnessed Brezhnev's visit or had heard about it from other family members, all 
proud to have seen him.
367
 Memories reinforce one another, tending to support in this 
case Kudryashov's view that they had been committed to memory at the time and then 
permanently 'fixed'.
368
 It is probable that they are all genuine, as my respondents span a 
broad age spectrum: F4G, for example, was in the first class at school, while M9A was 
already an elderly veteran at the time. F5H recalls how Brezhnev 'gave her his hand' 
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from his car, while he was on foot when F6F saw him. M7A saw Brezhnev on the road 
in his open car and then in the stadium, where he waved flag along with the crowd. F8D 
met Brezhnev at her workplace, the sovkhoz (communal vineyard) in Myskhako, where 
'he came to our corpus and talked to us'. Her colleague F8B was one of the workers 
lucky enough to meet Brezhnev at the aerodrome, standing alongside two women with 
babies:  
He came up to us with open arms and greeted us [...] He gave 
presents to the children, writing on them 'a present from 
Grandfather Brezhnev'. [...] The next day we [...] gathered in the 
vineyard where we worked and we were all really happy. He got 
out of the car and said 'thank you'. 
This story has been passed down through F8B's family with photographic clarity, 
mediated by a contemporaneous photograph depicting a bent old woman giving flowers 
to the General Secretary, taken when Brezhnev visited Mar'ina roshcha, another 
outlying village across the bay from Myskhako.
369
 According to F8B's granddaughter, 
she likes to imagine that this woman is indeed her own elderly grandmother, hardly 
conscious of the fact that the original woman was much older than her grandmother at 
the time, if nonetheless resembling her now, decades later. This example of what 
Marianne Hirsch terms 'post-memory' demonstrates the appropriation of a real memory 
by a younger generation who did not experience the event, with the projection of a later 
image onto an earlier one in a 'merging of people and times'.
370
 In this case, the woman 
in the photograph which has passed into local collective memory has been claimed by 
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another, younger individual in her attempt to reconstruct her own picture of that 
event.
371
 This small-scale social construct has produced a sense of familial 'ownership' 
of public memory, which here is on a purely emotional level and without any rational 
basis, a product of the cultural environment surrounding Brezhnev's visit. 
Brezhnev was not only the subject of photographs in 1974, but also used the 
occasion to gift some of his own wartime photographs to the Novorossiisk museum. 
Evdokiia Prialkina, then director of the museum, remembers Brezhnev's arrival on  
6
th
 September, 'immediately surrounded by women', in what was apparently the norm. It 
seems that Brezhnev was a great hit with the opposite sex, embracing them on his 
departure: 'a real man', as recalled by Larisa Kolbasina, the current director. Both 
women were struck by Brezhnev's insistence on simplicity: 'No need for fine-sounding 
words, such as “Dear Leonid Il'ich, we are very pleased...”.'372  
It is noteworthy that considerably more female than male respondents in my 
survey spontaneously contributed their memories of Brezhnev's visit. This may 
demonstrate a reflection of the demographics of the ordinary citizens who encountered 
the General Secretary combined with the greater proportion of women in my interview 
sample. This phenomenon should, however, be compared with published local memoirs 
of the war, which were largely written and consumed by men who had played an active 
part.
373
 Memory of Brezhnev's visit in 1974 was claimed by the population as a whole, 
with the women more vocally endorsing Brezhnev's masculinity. 
The outcome of the visit was that the museum was given a new building with 
extra exhibition space in the town centre.
374
 It is this type of aid which remains firmly in 
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the minds of witnesses and has informed the opinion of many of the residents of 
Novorossiisk today, including newcomers to the town. Brezhnev's interest in the town's 
industry was emphasized in the local press shortly after his visit, with substantially 
more coverage of his meetings in the port, the cement factories and the new Pepsi-Cola 
factory than evident in the national press.
375
  
When I first spoke to people in Novorossiisk about the town's attitude to Brezhnev 
I was told by the archivist of the Maritime Academy that I would not find anyone in 
Novorossiisk with a bad word to say about Brezhnev.
376
 And this, incredibly, seems to 
be largely true: Brezhnev certainly seems to enjoy more popularity in Novorossiisk than 
elsewhere in Russia. However, the majority of my subjects who volunteered this 
information reminded me not of Brezhnev's role on Malaia zemlia or his Communist 
ideology, but of the post-war support afforded to the almost annihilated town thanks to 
Brezhnev's intervention.
377
 Although younger respondents voiced more general 
approval of Brezhnev's help to Novorossiisk, more mature interviewees specifically 
credited Brezhnev with improving infrastructure (particularly the new trolley-bus 
lines);
378
 supporting the cement factories;
379
 expanding the port;
380
 and building better 
accommodation for the townspeople.
381
 Three respondents cited this aid as an excuse 
for Brezhnev's not having visited the town in 1973 as soon as it was made a Hero-City, 
'recalling' that Brezhnev had stated that he would only return to the town once 
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Novorossiisk looked worthy of its new status.
382
 Although this is reinforced by 
Brezhnev's favourable comments on the excellent appearance of the town in his speech 
of 7
th
 September 1974, a recent publication refers to Brezhnev's more disparaging 
remarks about the town on a visit to the 'Proletariat' cement works later the same day.
383
  
Evidence suggests that state aid to Novorossiisk was supplied in one way or 
another from the late 1960s onwards throughout the first decade of the Brezhnev 
régime - assistance seen by many in Novorossiisk as proof of Brezhnev's special 
relationship with the town. There is no evidence to indicate that every Hero-City 
received special state support, but it is possible to surmise that this was in fact the case, 
as these strategic cities were largely destroyed during the war and needed substantial 
rebuilding. However, in the case of Novorossiisk, it is possible to postulate a rationale 
and mechanism for preferential development without Brezhnev's intentional 
intervention. Although Novorossiisk was not unique in enjoying new housing, 
infra-structure and industrial development during this period, its position on the Black 
Sea made it an ideal location for the export of wood from the north and oil from the 
Caucasus or Caspian regions, rendering development of the port and its infra-structure 
an economic priority for the Soviet Union. This led to a marked increase in population, 
requiring in turn the construction of new living accommodation and concomitant social 
amenities, until the town's appearance was indeed considered to be commensurate with 
its status as a Hero-City.
384
 
Favouritism by Brezhnev may, however, be implied in the financial assistance to 
and economic promotion of Novorossiisk in the first half of the 1970s, which served to 
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increase the status of the town with respect to other cities in the region. Novorossiisk 
continued to receive state aid, despite the fact that its leadership had been denigrated for 
economic incompetence by the regional authorities in Krasnodar in the late 1960s.
385
 
Furthermore, it must be concluded that the illogical decision to build the first Soviet 
Pepsi-Cola factory in Novorossiisk was indeed a sign of Brezhnev's favouritism, as 
asserted by local residents.
386
 The town has never been able to rely on a stable source of 
drinking water, a problem which is not totally resolved to this day,
387
 rendering it a 
dubious contender for American investment, despite its strategic position on the Black 
Sea. Contemporary journalists and the official town guide claim that Brezhnev arranged 
to send tankers by sea to bring badly needed water to the town, giving money for the 
construction of underground reservoirs.
388
 Once the water was flowing, and despite 
ongoing supply problems, the Pepsi-Cola factory was constructed in Novorossiisk when 
trade links with the United States were initiated.
389
 For these reasons, it seems that 
Brezhnev's soft spot for the town was in fact translated into targeted economic aid. 
However, Brezhnev's connection with drinks and drinking water operates also at 
the more subtle level of local legend. It is documented that, when he was taken to the 
Valley of Death outside Myskhako, he was shown the Kolodets zhizni (Well of Life), 
where the defenders of Malaia zemlia had gone at night to fetch precious drinking water 
in the face of fire from Germans holding the upper ground.
390
 In an incident reminiscent 
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of Jesus' encounter with the Samaritan woman at the well, television cameras following 
Brezhnev showed how he was re-introduced to a grey-haired woman, who as a young 
girl during the war had given him water from a bucket at the height of the battle.
391
 This 
unexpected meeting apparently reduced Brezhnev to tears, supporting the claim of one 
elderly respondent that Brezhnev uncharacteristically declined the wine or vodka he was 
offered on that occasion, preferring to walk off, alone with his memories, to drink water 
from the adjacent spring.
392
 
The links between Brezhnev and drinking water as a symbol of life and renewal 
are potent. The arrival of mains water, thanks to Brezhnev's intervention, was celebrated 
in 1973 by the erection of a statue on the promenade, Dariashchaia vodu (the 
Water-giver), the only statue to mains water in Russia.
393
 The original sculpture was 
replaced in 2006, on the reconstruction of the promenade, by a more elegant version by 
sculptor Aleksandr Suvorov, under the direction of the Mayor of Novorossiisk and with 
money donated by businesses, reinforcing the town's continued gratitude for a stable 
supply of drinking water.
394
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The Water-giver
395
 
 
A female with softly sculpted features, the statue kneels in thanks and 
supplication with cupped hands holding water outstretched towards the sea, whence the 
water originally came. Offering the water to the people, she allows it to sprinkle into the 
pool at her feet, the source of a fountain, the first in Novorossiisk, which would not 
have been possible before the advent of the mains supply.
396
 Galina Krympokha, former 
archivist at the Maritime Academy, attributed the original statue to funds from 
Brezhnev himself,
397
 while M6F, a senior architect, connects the statue with Brezhnev's 
instructions to send water to the town and its ongoing importance as a result of the 
fragility of the supply even today. Reflecting the primitive emphasis on the gift of life 
through water, the statue continues to be linked with Brezhnev by some residents in his 
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symbolic role of a beneficent water god, complementing that of benefactor and patron 
to the town.
398
 
Evidence for the changes in the attitude of the Hero-City to its patron may be 
found in promotional photograph albums of Novorossiisk published over the last three 
decades. While 1978's edition contains several pages dedicated to both Brezhnev's 
wartime role and his 1974 visit, by 1998 there was little interest in the General 
Secretary, when the equivalent publication had only one wartime photograph including 
Brezhnev in a total of fourteen, with no indication of his visit or his connection with the 
conferment of Hero-City status, in line with the more derogatory national understanding 
of Brezhnev's role. Following renewed interest in his visit, however, the latest luxury 
edition, published in 2012, indicates a reversal of attitude, with just one small 
photograph of Brezhnev on Malaia zemlia in 1943 amongst a total of forty-six, while 
his visit in 1974 is given much greater coverage alongside images indicating the 
increased status of the town as an industrial centre.
399
  
In contrast to the national attitude to Novorossiisk, it is clear that not only war 
memory is at work locally today. Brezhnev's post-war role in Novorossiisk linked to his 
visit is indeed considered now to be more meaningful than his time on Malaia zemlia or 
his once-famous war memoirs. Brezhnev put this provincial town on the map of the 
Soviet Union to the extent that he has been likened to Lenin,
400
 deemed a 'godsend' by a 
priest,
401
 and described as the town's 'godfather'.
402
 Over the years, personal and public 
memories have been incorporated into the larger cultural narrative such that even 
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newcomers are inculcated with a duty of thanks to Brezhnev,
403
 who, according to all 
my respondents, did more than any other statesman for Novorossiisk. The town's 
popular sentiment is summed up by former Museum Director Prialkina: 
If you ask anyone about Brezhnev today, they will talk about 
'the era of stagnation', linking it with Brezhnev. This may be the 
political verdict of his rule. But in Novorossiisk we 
acknowledge the truth that, for us, we want to remember with 
sincerity Leonid Il'ich, 'the man who did more than anybody else 
for the development of our town.'
404
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3.4 'A man walking through the town': The making of a modern 
legend 
 
Надоело говорить и спорить, 
И любить усталые глаза... 
В флибустьерском дальнем море 
Бригантина подымает паруса...405 
 
3.4.1 The erection of the Brezhnev statue 
Exactly a decade after the publication of Brezhnev's memoirs, the state under the 
leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev decided to tear down the statue in Moscow erected on 
Brezhnev's death: 
Where a monument to Leonid I. Brezhnev once stood, there is 
now an uneven sidewalk, covered with a dusting of snow and 
frozen dirt. The large black Cyrillic letters that spelled out his 
name on a nearby metal and concrete billboard have been 
erased.
406
 
With Brezhnev consigned to national political oblivion and Moscow's Brezhnev Square 
renamed,
407
 the war cult of the Brezhnev era was formally dismantled. Indeed, 
following his discredited predecessors, two marble statues of Brezhnev are now to be 
found off the beaten track in Moscow's Muzeon sculpture park, relegated to the 
periphery next to the portable toilets in a corner full of superfluous Lenins and 
Stalins.
408
 These busts depict a statesman fallen from his pedestal, both literally and 
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metaphorically, reinforcing the inflexibility in interpretation of monuments, which are 
rarely able to accommodate changes in the political scenery around them.
409
 
In the light of Brezhnev's national fall from grace as a victim of Gorbachev's new 
official narrative of the Brezhnev era, it is all the more remarkable that public opinion in 
Novorossiisk would be so out of tune with the capital as to permit the erection in 2004 
of the only monument to Brezhnev in Russia.
410
 The political debate and a 
decision-making process revealing flexibility in interpretation of a superficially static 
monument shed light on the attitude to Brezhnev and the local interpretation of his role 
in the history of the Hero-City he created and patronized.  
So interlinked are the reputations of Novorossiisk and Brezhnev that exactly thirty 
years after his famous visit of 1974 the town decided to erect a statue to him. Brezhnev 
was already integrally linked with the large Malaia zemlia memorial complex, 
completed at his instigation in 1982 and studded with quotations from his memoirs. 
Since 1974 he was also linked with the cluster of monuments in the Valley of Death, 
but more recent proposals to name a street after Brezhnev had come to nothing.
411
 This 
new statue would mark a further reverberation of the 1974 event, catapulting memory of 
Brezhnev's connection with Novorossiisk and Malaia zemlia well into the twenty-first 
century. The process of decision-making around the commissioning and erection of the 
statue acted as a catalyst for renewed discussion of both Brezhnev's role in the war and 
the visit itself, setting off an after-wave of further reverberations and some revision of 
memory during the heated debate involving local and regional officials and the public. 
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The conclusion of what may be viewed in retrospect as a protracted seven-year heritage 
controversy would eventually 'fix' the collective image of Brezhnev within the identity 
of Novorossiisk, thereby formalizing the rift between the national and the local view of 
Brezhnev's links with the Hero-City. 
Monuments in Novorossiisk are normally subject to planning permission granted 
by the region.
412
 Although a previous proposal for a statue to Brezhnev by Vladimir 
Runov, a Novorossiisk member of the regional council in Krasnodar, had been rejected 
following a disagreement between the region and the town, a second proposal by 
Dmitrii Shishov was accepted.
413
  As a Communist member of the regional council in 
Krasnodar, he not only had a vested ideological interest in reviving the connection of 
Novorossiik with the longstanding General Secretary, but also the financial funds to 
back it. However, despite the support of Vladimir Siniagovskii, Mayor of Novorossiisk 
and majority United Russia party member, and another member of the area's relatively 
strong Communist Party on the Novorossiisk town council, the vote to erect the statue 
was by no means unanimous.  
The leader of the minority Democratic Union voted against the statue, suggesting 
that the decision to erect it was only to be expected 'in a country of slaves', made by 
'people who have no need of freedom'.
414
 This minority opinion reinforced a 
controversial letter from a certain Mikhail Prorok published by Novorossiiskii rabochii 
when the statue was first mooted early in 2004. Citing the oppression of dissidents and 
ethnic minorities during the Brezhnev era as a reason not to erect the statue, he claimed 
that Novorossiisk would have developed naturally without the alleged support from the 
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General Secretary.
415
 The newspaper was deluged with responses, the majority of those 
published arguing robustly for the erection of the statue on the grounds of the post-war 
aid given by Brezhnev to Novorossiisk, with only one published letter reminding 
readers of the waste of lives in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Furthermore, a writer, 
Vladimir Aleksandrovich, was particularly indignant about the number of undeserved 
awards worn by Brezhnev in his latter years: 'He had more decorations than a New Year 
tree'.
416
 
According to the press, the statue was first proposed about a year before it was 
actually erected, but the arts committee charged with its implementation was still 
making the most important decisions on its form and site three weeks before the 
envisaged dedication date.
417
 On 23
rd
 August 2004 the sculptor, Nikolai Bugaev from 
Krasnodar, presented a scale model which won the support of committee members, 
Shishov and other local businessmen funding the project, pending final approval from 
the Mayor.
418
 However, a prolonged debate failed to reach a conclusion about the best 
site for Brezhnev. It was decided not to stand him on a main road near the sea, as this 
would entail cutting down too many trees. More importantly, a site on Malaia zemlia 
itself was also excluded, not only because the relatively small statue would fade into 
insignificance beside the huge Malaia zemlia memorial on the shore, but also because of 
fears that this would reinforce 'past mistakes', when Brezhnev's role in the campaign 
had been inflated, which would reflect badly on both Brezhnev's memory and the 
identity of Novorossiisk itself.
419
 This strategic political decision no longer overtly to 
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associate Brezhnev with Malaia zemlia marked the formalization of the rift between 
opinion in Novorossiisk and the national attitude to Brezhnev.  
Local opinion was voiced by Tigran Martirosian, former chief executive of the 
commercial port and Honoured Citizen of Novorossiisk (selected for this award in 1997 
by the town council), who felt that Brezhnev's role after the war was far more important 
in the town's socio-economic development than his war service, an argument that was 
incomprehensible to the national press, who could only see Brezhnev's infamous 
connection with Malaia zemlia as the impetus for the monument. Following due 
consideration of political, historical and green issues, it was therefore decided to site the 
statue somewhere in the centre, in a place to be determined by the Mayor, possibly on a 
crossroads with connections to Lenin.
420
 Two days later, the Mayor agreed that the 
post-war argument prevailed, stating: 'The people of Novorossiisk remember, know and 
value Leonid Il'ich's contribution to the development of Novorossiisk'.
421
  With this in 
mind and possibly to put the Communists in their place, he overruled links with Lenin 
and decided on a spot even closer to the centre, on Ulitsa Novorossiiskoi respubliki.  
Brezhnev was finally lowered into position just in time for the official dedication 
of the statue on the anniversary of the liberation of Novorossiisk in 1943,  
16
th
 September. Andrei, Brezhnev's grandson, was invited to the ceremony. Fighting off 
autograph hunters from Brezhnev admirers, he declared himself 'shocked' to receive the 
invitation: 'I never would have thought that, with our current leaders, anyone would 
have the idea of erecting a monument to my grandfather.'
422
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The Brezhnev statue, Novorossiisk
423
 
 
 
The national press expressed equal surprise to be faced with a bronze statue 
depicting not the decrepit General Secretary remembered by the joke-tellers, well into 
his dotage with a chest covered in medals, but a much younger Brezhnev in civilian 
clothes, stepping out in fluid motion on his pedestal with knee bent, casually loosened 
tie, jacket slung over his shoulder. Shishov declared that he and the sculptor 'wanted to 
depict Brezhnev not as a leader, but as a person [...] much loved in Novorossiisk'.
424
 
This is not a statesman or a war hero, but a normal human being, shown strolling 
through the town. Furthermore, in contrast to the huge Malaia zemlia war memorial, or 
even the statue of Lenin in the town centre, this bronze monument is on a more realistic 
human scale, being just over two metres tall and standing on a red granite pedestal 1.8 
metres high. This statue represents the simple, very human Brezhnev who public 
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opinion perceives came to award the Gold Star as an old friend of the town,
425
 albeit, as 
pointed out by the Chair of the Novorossiisk Historical Association, rather younger than 
the statesman who had visited the town in 1974, and substantially older than the 
wartime colonel.
426
  
Brezhnev's character as recognized in Novorossiisk is implied by the working title 
of the statue: 'A man walking through the town'. Outsiders, however, had to pose the 
question 'through which town?' as they linked Brezhnev solely with his army uniform 
and military service on Malaia zemlia.
427
 The statue portrays Brezhnev's mythical 
modesty, simplicity and his respect for the town and its citizens,
428
 just as several war 
memoirs refer formulaically to Brezhnev's love for the troops and their love and respect 
for him in return.
429
 Elderly women even giggle as they recall how handsome Brezhnev 
looked in his younger days, recalling his common, populist touch,
430
 while Raisa 
Sokolova, the museum's chief archivist, has a portrait of the younger Brezhnev hanging 
on her office wall, a place where the current leader of the country would normally 
hang.
431
 It may even be suggested that people are looking for examples of Brezhnev's 
more positive characteristics as if in denial of any weakness of character evident in 
Brezhnev's later years. If Brezhnev propagated the myth of Malaia zemlia through his 
memoirs, so Novorossiisk is now propagating through this statue the image of the 
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charismatic man still loved by local collective memory: the mythical Brezhnev in his 
prime, before his physical and mental decline.  
William Tompson, Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle have posited a plausible 
periodization of the Brezhnev era which may serve to explain the apparent difference in 
recollection of Brezhnev between Novorossiisk and the rest of the country.
432
 The 
citizens of Novorossiisk saw Brezhnev at his peak, a memory of the 1974 visit fixed in 
the new statue, which took place months before his first stroke led to a steady 
deterioration in his physical and mental stamina. In contrast, it appears that the older 
generation of the rest of the country recalls the later, ailing Brezhnev: confused, highly 
dependent and open to flattery. This apparent change in character is discussed by Sergei 
Semanov in a nuanced defence of the General Secretary, contrasting the old man of the 
caricatures, with slurred speech, thick eyebrows and weighed down with medals, with 
the genuine patriot who remained 'less hysterical' than Khrushchev, less cruel than 
Stalin and less corrupt than present-day politicians, if lacking in decisiveness and 
somewhat weak-willed.
433
 
The centenary of Brezhnev's birth in 2006 provided an opportunity for a national 
reappraisal of the legacy of his lengthy term in office, with a protracted debate in 
Literaturnaia gazeta, the appearance of new biographies and the publication of a 
plethora of survey data. In an attempt to get to grips with the apparent paradoxes of the 
era, the national press contrasted the stern realities of Soviet tanks entering 
Czechoslovakia, the war in Afghanistan, domestic censorship, the repression of 
dissidents and the non-availability of beer, with leadership in space exploration and, on 
the ground, the germination of a middle class, free and improving education and health 
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services, high levels of employment and personal security, the building of new housing 
stock, development of industry and steady economic development.
434
 Some recent 
Russian works remain as critical of Brezhnev as Gorbachev and historians Roi and 
Zhores Medvedev in the past, notably Leonid Mlechin, who highlights the stagnation of 
the Brezhnev era and mocks Brezhnev's wartime role.
435
 Despite this, a more nuanced 
and empathetic view is coming into fashion, with the benefit of greater historical 
perspective and a political climate that is searching for positive aspects of the Soviet 
past.
436
 Most recently, Aleksandr Khinshtein's biography of Brezhnev defends an era of 
stability, while others argue that twenty-first century wars, widespread corruption, the 
removal of free state benefits, high levels of unemployment and homelessness make the 
Brezhnev era seem like a golden age of the past. As Khinshtein points out, there is a 
dichotomy between the current mood of nostalgia for the Brezhnev era and continuing 
criticism of its economic, political and social stagnation.
437
 Some nostalgia for the time 
when the Soviet Union was regarded as a significant world power is certainly evident in 
recent official surveys and is possibly indicative of the political conservatism of the 
Putin régime. There have even been re-interpretations of the 'stagnation' label aimed at 
Brezhnev, emphasizing rather the stability, peace and calm enjoyed in the country for 
the first time in the twentieth century.
438
 
One possible answer to this apparent paradox lies in the periodization of the era 
which is the subject of increasing nostalgia amongst the older generation, for whom it 
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represented their youth. While it is tempting to suggest that the nostalgia may be 
predominantly reserved for the early part of the era, with the criticism aimed largely at 
the latter years, the official survey data is not so discriminating.
439
 In the specific case of 
Novorossiisk, however, many residents maintain that Brezhnev's personal patronage led 
to a change in gear in the developmental progress of this town in the early 1970s.
440
 In 
contrast, the later era of national stagnation was overseen by the older Brezhnev who 
instigated the construction of a spate of what some scholars deem to be unnecessarily 
large war memorials, including the one on Malaia zemlia,
441
 and 'wrote' his memoirs, 
which still link Novorossiisk and Brezhnev in the mind of a generation.  
Otto Boele has studied the erection of the Brezhnev statue in Novorossiisk from 
the point of view of a sense of nostalgia for the Brezhnev era amongst people of a 
certain age.
442
 However, my research indicates that much more than nostalgia was 
behind the erection of the statue: the protracted town council and media debate indicates 
that the majority of those involved, both elected councillors and the public across a wide 
age-range, speak of their affection for and gratitude to Brezhnev himself rather than the 
Soviet régime he represented. This reveals a further dichotomy, whereby the people of 
Novorossiisk are now apparently sufficiently at ease with the Brezhnev connection to 
separate the politics of the era from the character of its leader, applauding his good traits 
while not seeming totally blind to his faults, and still telling the same jokes as 
elsewhere. Remembered no longer for the memoirs which put Novorossiisk on the map, 
but rather for his post-war contribution to the town, Brezhnev is now regarded in 
Novorossiisk if not with absolutely uncritical worship, certainly with empathy on a 
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human scale, like his statue. As concluded by local historian Tamara Iurina, several 
more informed respondents offered a relatively balanced retrospective view of 
Brezhnev as a man who had definitely been on Malaia zemlia, simply doing his duty 
courageously in the war, while probably not deserving four Hero of the Soviet Union 
medals. Furthermore, people consider that he was so busy leading the country in the 
1970s that he had to have professional help with his memoirs, just like many other 
leading statesmen.
443
  
 
 
3.4.2 Re-location of the Brezhnev statue 
With memory of Brezhnev formalized and stable in Novorossisk, if different from that 
in the rest of the country, the news that it had been decided to move the statue less than 
six years after its installation on Ulitsa Novorossiiskoi respubliki marked the start of a 
public debate to determine the new site and, with it, a battle for the ownership of the 
similarly re-positioned memory of Brezhnev's connection with Novorossiisk. Even if 
the issues remained local with an agreed collective memory, the significance of the 
statue and its location were still hotly debated in a decision-making process that 
provides a case-study in local politics of remembrance. 
Monuments are usually expected to stay in one place for well over a human 
lifetime, despite any potential need for reinterpretation as the political climate changes. 
Their very longevity has led Jan Assmann to see 'objectivized culture' as being even 
more permanent in society and better reinforcing social identity than orally transmitted 
memory.
444
 On the other hand, Paul Connerton, arguing from a postmodern temporal 
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perspective, points to human longevity and 'the increasingly rapid cycles' by which we 
now live, which render the lifespan of objects such as monuments increasingly 
insignificant with respect to their human counterparts.
445
 However, six years cannot be 
regarded as a long time from the point of view of a statue or the community in which it 
stands. Furthermore, Connerton has argued that, once monumentalized, the subject of a 
memorial may safely be forgotten, partly because the scale and relative instability of 
modern city space undermine it as a focal point.
446
  The latter may be true in the case of 
the modest Brezhnev monument although perhaps Connerton, with modern American 
cities rather than provincial Russia in mind, is not familiar with the enormous scale of 
many Soviet monuments. Certainly, the gigantic Malaia zemlia war memorial at 
Stanichka stands immovable and unconquerable in the face of changes to the 
promenade nearby, a testament to the stability in both space and time of Soviet 
monuments.
447
  
The small Brezhnev statue was definitely not forgotten for long, with the 2004 
debate on its siting clearly unfinished business, thereby defying Connerton's assertion 
that monuments quickly fade into the background. When it had been originally 
positioned no-one had counted on the rapidity of the Mayor's extensive urban renewal 
programme along the promenade and Ulitsa Novorossiiskoi respubliki, bulldozing 
everything in its path; nor of the subsequent erection in December 2008 just yards from 
the Brezhnev statue of an enormous column commemorating the independent 
Novorossiisk Republic of 1905 after which the road was named. Bearing in mind the 
monument to the town's founder nearer the sea at the bottom of the avenue, the road 
was becoming increasingly crowded with memorial statues with arguably conflicting 
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symbolism, such that the small 'alien' Brezhnev statue was at risk of being 'swallowed' 
in the shadow of the double-headed eagle on the new column.
448
 
Hodgkin and Radstone properly question who has the right to decide where a 
memorial should be sited possibly years after the event it commemorates, in view of 
potentially conflicting political, economic and emotional interests.
449
 In this case, in 
view of the different vested interests of various groups of citizens, it was decided to 
reassure the public by the convening of a committee of experts to advise on the best site 
for the monument's re-location. To allay potential public concern, an open consultation 
for citizens was announced, with a full-scale media debate launched on local television 
and in the press.
450
 Although the monument was built with private money, the original 
sponsors do not seem to have been consulted, although, towards the end of the 
discussions, the issue was also debated in the local Duma (town council). 
It was necessary firstly to establish if the statue should be moved at all and, if so, 
then where. There was some initial conflict between the committee of experts and 
citizens, with the former under the Mayor's remit to find a suitable alternative location 
and the vociferous latter, mainly the elderly and financially-conscious largely 
anti-Communist younger residents, questioning the sense of the move at all, citing in 
letters to Novorossiiskii rabochii the projected financial burden on the town of 500,000 
roubles for the exercise, while warning of the worst excesses of Communism.
451
 Despite 
the differences, however, most parties were united in wishing to retain the statue in 
Novorossiisk due to Brezhnev's strong connection with the Hero-City, at the same time 
rejecting calls to place him on Malaia zemlia for the very reasons discussed in 2004.  
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It became obvious through local television coverage in February 2009 that the 
committee of experts was seriously advocating a move from the centre of the town to 
the periphery, namely to a small square in front of the Hotel Brigantina on Anapa 
Shosse, the main road entering Novorossiisk from the north-west, just over a mile from 
the town centre.
452
 The justification for this proposed move stemmed paradoxically 
from the informal character of the statue itself. Whereas on its erection the statue was 
described as depicting Brezhnev's beloved simplicity and modesty, it was conveniently 
recalled in 2009 that it could also convey something more temporally and locationally 
specific to the town, based on the hotel in which Brezhnev stayed on his 1974 visit, the 
Brigantina.  
According to the local press, the statue commemorates the evening of  
6
th
 September 1974, when local social memory holds that Brezhnev gave his 
bodyguards the slip to stroll down the road towards the town centre. He apparently 
popped into a shop, 'striking the assistants dumb with surprise', and then 'bumped into 
someone or other in the street' where he exchanged a few words incognito. It is this 
simple rumour, unmentioned in the official TASS reports of Brezhnev's visit, which has 
become a 'living legend' in Novorossiisk since it appeared in the public domain in 1999, 
a generation after an alleged evening stroll whose actual occurrence seems highly 
improbable, in view of the tight security arrangements around the General Secretary's 
visit.
453
 
A whole myth of alleged details has been built up around the walk, with some 
sources claiming that an old woman engaged Brezhnev in conversation; although she 
did not recognize the General Secretary, she spoke well of him, saying that she had 
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known him during the war, thereby moving Brezhnev to tears.
454
 In view of its 
similarity with Brezhnev's documented meeting with old women in Myskhako and at 
Mar'ina roshcha, it is probable that this detail is in fact an incorrect compilation of 
circumstances. Eyewitnesses to Brezhnev's alleged walk are hard to find, just as very 
few ordinary soldiers or marines seem to have met Brezhnev on Malaia zemlia during 
the war.
455
 Here is a potent example of the robustness of perceived collective memory, 
even when faced with virtually no evidence of individual memory, perhaps just a wish 
that has developed into collective consciousness and so-called historical fact. What 
matters is the social memory that has developed, a perception of the past expressed by 
some in the town as a coherent narrative. Jeffrey Olick points out that collective 
memory is not necessarily located in the memory of any one person, such that, in this 
case, the legend is based on a collective representation of Brezhnev's positive qualities 
which underline his love for the town and its citizens.
456
 This is an example of a 
narrative trope indicating people's wish to believe the best of their rulers, whereby an 
important personage dons common dress to mingle with the people.
457
 Gillian Bennett 
and Paul Smith argue plausibly that such 'contemporary legends', while untrue by 
definition, are 'generally believed by gullible people', indicating the reinforcing nature 
of rumour on a large scale whose original source cannot be identified and which can 
therefore be neither confirmed nor disproved. According to Bennett and Smith, such 
legends 'appear to be substantiated, though they are ultimately unsubstantiated (and 
probably unsubstantiatable)?'.
458
 It appears that this urban legend which did not arise 
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until 1999 informed the representation of Brezhnev in the statue erected in 2004, 
thereby taking on a long-lasting life of its own through the statue which has fixed it in 
official memory. Thus the interpretation of the statue reinforces the local perception of 
Brezhnev, an indication of the power of memory as a social construction.  
It does not necessarily matter to the residents of Novorossiisk whether the story is 
true or not: in either case the legend depicts the Brezhnev they 'own' whose 
characteristic traits are transmitted both by the media and the statue itself, helping to fix 
the role of Brezhnev in local collective memory in an agreed episode within the town's 
past. In this respect the legend of Brezhnev's evening stroll differs from the war myth 
projected in his memoirs of Malaia zemlia, whose veracity was subject to substantial 
doubt.  
Although the committee was adamant that the Brigantina location was more 
historically justified, many people, especially the older generation, preferred Brezhnev's 
presence in the centre, where it was convenient to pop by, lay flowers and pay their 
respects. After all, they argued, Brezhnev did not only walk in the vicinity of his hotel, 
but brought the Gold Star to Heroes' Square in the centre of the town. The committee 
stuck to its guns, however, strengthening its argument with the fact that, unlike the town 
centre or the promenade, there are no significant monuments in the area where 
Novorossiisk is entered from the north-west, deeming Brezhnev to be a good attraction 
for incoming tourists.
459
 
The role of the press in the protracted debate was key in offering an opportunity to 
ordinary citizens to have their say through letters and online comments. Vladimir 
Burlakov, editor of Novorossiiskii rabochii, sees the role of Novorossiisk's most popular 
daily newspaper as a platform for public debate.
460
 Indeed, emotive letters and articles 
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on both sides of the argument were published in the paper in the spring of 2009.
461
 On 
the other hand, the Mayor's official publication, Novorossiiskie vesti, targeting the 
educated middle class,
462
 acted as a mouth-piece for the opinions of its editor, Sergei 
Novikov, key proponent of the move to the Brigantina.
463
 The town that was always 
united in its love of Brezhnev was thus divided over where to put him, in an open battle 
over the ownership of collective memory. In the end, the argument favoured by the 
committee of experts won the day, aesthetically linking the Soviet statesman with the 
concrete Soviet-era hotel. In October 2009 a postanovlenie (resolution of intent) 
appeared in Novorossiiskie vesti signalling the decision to re-locate the statue to the 
square in front of the Brigantina.
464 
 
However, a further resolution reversing this decision appeared four weeks later, 
apparently following a deluge of adverse comments from citizens. It was therefore 
assumed that the statue would, after all, remain in its original position, with the solitary 
response on the official town website exclaiming 'Thank God!'.
465
 This was still not the 
final word on the affair, however. Seven months later it became apparent that the statue 
would, after all, be moved, but not very far, staying on the same avenue where the 
majority of citizens had demanded he remain. Moreover, in a further about-turn, 
Brezhnev would be rotated through 180° to face the sea, appeasing those who still 
preferred to connect him with his role on Malaia zemlia, while officially billed as for 
architectural reasons.
466
 Following the eighteen-month decision-making process, 
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Brezhnev was finally moved to his new location two hundred metres from the original 
site in July 2010. 
 
 
The re-located Brezhnev statue
467
 
 
If the committee thought that it should have been the main decision-making body 
in the process, it was wrong, having been over-ruled by the Mayor, with backing from 
the town council.
468
 Revelations by key committee members eight months later 
demonstrated that the decision remained controversial,
469
 with one claiming that the 
Mayor had succumbed to political pressure from several older citizens who had 
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telephoned him directly.
470
 Many ordinary citizens indeed perceive the decision to have 
been made by the Mayor,
471
 while others see the discussions as reflecting communal 
will,
472
 perhaps facilitated by the public debate in Novorossiiskii rabochii, whose editor 
felt that his paper had played the key role as 'the defender of truth' in the town.
473
 The 
very fact that such a prolonged and complex debate took place underlines the fact that 
memory may be collective, but that its significance remains debatable. This analysis of 
the issues of agency in collective memory does not indicate a clear-cut case of top-down 
or bottom-up decision-making, but demonstrates that the Mayor apparently rejected the 
officially appointed committee and acted according to the wishes of those people who 
had lobbied him directly in the old Soviet way in an act of political self-defence. It 
seems that the case was swung by older citizens, more emotionally connected with the 
Brezhnev image, and more used to the old-fashioned, direct approach which 
occasionally succeeded in the past with petitions to the tsar or even Stalin.
474
 Their 
last-minute intervention prevailed over the much-vaunted democratic discussions in the 
media or the planned, more academic debate of the committee.  
The paradox of the twists and turns of the debate with its many last-minute 
decisions represents a victory of informality over the more formal approach and a 
victory of political utility over historical accuracy, following a decision-making process 
that seems to have moved one step forwards towards democracy and two steps back to 
the old Soviet ways. The statue's location was influenced not by the appointed 'trustees 
of memory',
475
 but by the generation which remembered Brezhnev's visit, who chose the 
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image of Brezhnev's link with Novorossiisk to be projected to their successors. It seems 
that the Mayor's political power for the present and the foreseeable future is built on the 
past, employing a more traditional, patriarchal type of authority and manipulating 
collective memory within a presentist paradigm.
 
Most respondents were not too concerned with the re-location and remain 
philosophical or even pleased about the outcome,
476
 although some were not happy with 
the convoluted process.
477
 Other citizens express sentiments that would seem totally out 
of place in the capital: one contributor to a newspaper accords Brezhnev god-like status 
by referring to the 'blasphemy' of moving his statue, while 'Ania' sees the re-location as 
traumatic as the exhumation and re-interment of a close friend: 'Poor Brezhnev – he 
should be left in peace after his death'.
478
 
For the moment, Brezhnev has settled into his current position. Despite the fact 
that several trees have been cut down to improve the line of sight from the sea (trees 
that have suddenly been judged 'unstable', but which in 2004 were hotly defended),  the 
whole avenue, with its new fountain on the original spot of the monument, looks 
pleasingly open and symmetrical. The tall Novorossiisk Republic column in the centre 
is flanked by the smaller monuments to the founder-father and to Brezhnev, effecting an 
implicit comparison between Nikolai Raevskii, the town's founder, and Brezhnev, its 
post-war patron. Similarly, the symbol of the state in the form of the double-headed 
eagle atop the new monument complements the smaller statesman, linking the first days 
of Communist ideology with the later days of socialism.
479
 In a re-signifying of space in 
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the town centre there is now an historical continuum along the central reservation of the 
avenue, with an arrow of time running from the town's foundation in 1838, via the 1905 
republic to the Brezhnev era, such that the street may be read as a spatial memorial 
device within the topography of the modern town, where the image of Brezhnev on a 
human scale and with a human lifespan seems totally in proportion.  
Now that the memory controversy is over and interest in it gradually wanes with 
the death of the older generation who fought with and for Brezhnev, it is possible that 
he may rest in rather too much peace as the statue fades comfortably into the memorial 
background of the town, as Connerton would propose.
480
 Although popular as a 
background for wedding photographs,
481
 it is notable that the statue is not to be found 
on the tourist trail catering for the few cruise ship passengers from England and the 
United States starting to visit the town.
482
 According to one guide, she does not want to 
mention the statue to tourists, as she connects Brezhnev with his memoirs which she 
knows are false.
483
 Visitors are therefore shown the impressive Malaia zemlia memorial 
complex, whose inscriptions are often no longer recalled to be quotations from 
Brezhnev's memoirs. The Brezhnev connection apparently remains Novorossiisk's 
private secret as far as foreigners are concerned, despite the fact that many of them 
would have heard of the former leader of the Soviet Union, demonstrating some 
continuing embarrassment on the part of some, at least, in Novorossiisk about the 
notorious Malaia zemlia memoirs. 
If 2004 led to a debate about Brezhnev's character and 2006 to a re-appraisal of 
his political legacy, the 2009 discussion focused on whether Brezhnev should remain in 
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the centre of town or on the periphery, while confirming the re-positioning of memory 
to privilege the 1974 visit over Brezhnev's wartime role in 1943. Thanks to the 
continuing impact of the visit and its perceived economic consequences on the local 
consciousness, a decade of 'reverberations' took place from 1999 to 2009, long after the 
1974 visit, itself decades after the Malaia zemlia campaign which originally saw 
Brezhnev's involvement and led to the conferment of Hero-City status on the town. 
With this background still dominating public opinion, particularly amongst the older 
generation, Brezhnev was eventually deemed too important to be relegated to the 
outskirts of the town, which gave rise to a new commemorative discourse of the 
legendary walk in a revision of collective memory, such that Novorossiisk now 
officially commemorates the charismatic private man rather than the statesman or 
soldier, in contrast to, but complementing memory of the General Secretary elsewhere 
in the country which has remained caricaturized and largely static since his death, if 
with some softening evident around the time of his centenary. In Novorossiisk, it is 
Brezhnev's perceived largesse and his more intimate side which are recalled: personal 
conversations and informal repartee. In line with the rest of the country, however, the 
Brezhnev era is loved or hated in equal measure by those who remember it, another 
facet of the town's paradoxical identification with the man, if not always with the state 
he represented.  
However, despite the fact that Novorossiisk went to great lengths to deny 
connections with Brezhnev's war service through the statue in civilian clothes, once the 
statue had been re-located the garden at its feet was decorated with four Hero stars as if 
in compensation for their absence on Brezhnev's clothing. This action is completely at 
odds with the national attitude to Brezhnev's war 'heroism'. For example, in the central 
hall of the war memorial complex opened in 1995 on Moscow's Poklonnaia gora is a list 
of all the Heroes of the Soviet Union, with special mention of those receiving the award 
 172 
 
more than once. Although Brezhnev's name is on the wall, he is not singled out as a 
multiple holder. From this point of view, Novorossiisk soon came back into line with 
the rest of the country and by 2013 the Hero stars were gone. 
 
 
Brezhnev's four 'Hero of the Soviet Union' stars restored
484
 
 
If Brezhnev's once-dominant wartime role is on the wane in the local collective 
narrative, it is still subject to political exploitation on a modest scale. Most notably, the 
Mayor of Novorossiisk distributed specially reprinted copies of Brezhnev's Malaia 
zemlia to veterans during the 2002 local election campaign,
485
 while Brezhnev's picture 
appears on metal badges issued by the Mayor since 2010 to children accompanying 
parents and grandparents to political meetings.
486
 In 2010 the young Colonel Brezhnev 
was one of a series of local Heroes of the Soviet Union on the badges, linking the 
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forthcoming sixty-fifth anniversary of Victory Day with the local elections. In a further 
series issued before the parliamentary elections, Brezhnev was depicted as the older 
statesman in a series of Soviet and Russian leaders who had visited Novorossiisk, from 
Tsar Aleksandr to Prime Minister Putin. Whereas in the first series, the image of the 
genuine Hero Tsezar' Kunikov is juxtaposed against the giant Malaia zemlia memorial, 
in the later series, it is the Soviet leader who is clearly linked with the monument 
erected at his instigation. With these badges, Brezhnev is used as a political tool to 
attract both the young and the elderly, just as Brezhnev himself employed his 
connection with Malaia zemlia for his own political ends.  
In contrast, the main political driver for the re-location of the Brezhnev statue was 
simply the Mayor's sudden plans for urban regeneration, which altered the physical and 
political landscape around the statue to the extent that its very meaning was subject to a 
process of re-examination. Following a heritage controversy which exposed differences 
of opinion towards memory of Brezhnev and his role with respect to Novorossiisk, 
Brezhnev's position nonetheless remains central both physically and metaphorically to 
the town's identity today. The statue has enabled differences between memory of the 
elderly statesman and the younger private person to be publicly resolved in 
Novorossiisk. Largely thanks to memories of 1974 fixed in the minds of older citizens 
and now crystallized in the statue, the town has collectively selected the image of 
Brezhnev to be propagated to future generations: the image of an energetic man in the 
prime of life rather than the caricature of the overseer of a period of stagnation 
embraced by much of the rest of Russia. This significant difference underlines the 
importance of personal contact and communication with the General Secretary in an era 
when attitudes were generally formed and dictated by the more remote official mass 
media, which were instrumental in building up the war cult and disseminating 
Brezhnev's memoirs. Brezhnev's 1974 visit to Novorossiisk was key in determining the 
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town's current interpretation of their own Leonid Il'ich, largely by means of the legends 
which have grown up around this charismatic and very human being. 
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3.5 The state comes to town again 
 
 
'Land for sale: Malaia zemlia' by Aleksandr Kamper
487
 
 
Aleksandr Kamper's latest creative comment on Malaia zemlia is a photograph of land 
near the beach in Myskhako, allegedly being sold as building plots for more holiday 
homes for wealthy Muscovites who may never even have heard of the campaign.
488
 In a 
statement about the abuse of the integrity of memory, Kamper has placed this 
photograph over the red letters of the title page of a book of what seems to be 
Brezhnev's memoirs,
489
 appearing to be part of what is regarded as the 'sacred' earth 
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beneath.
490
 By this artistic device the collage speaks of the sacrilege of selling this piece 
of local memory: 'Land for sale: Malaia zemlia'. Although the physical land of Malaia 
zemlia is claimed to be for sale to the highest bidder, memory of both Brezhnev and the 
campaign itself remains useful, more often than not for reasons of political expediency.  
Under President Putin the commemorative politics of the state are subject to 
renewed intensification, which, far from conflicting with local memorial interests, 
actively promotes them in Novorossiisk, resulting in a basic harmony of approach 
which fosters local war memory as in the Brezhnev era. While this may not be true in 
other towns or regions of the former Soviet Union,
491
 collective memory of the war in 
Novorossiisk is evolving as a consensus of local and national political interests, with 
some notable differences from the case at the height of the Brezhnev war cult.  
The increasing use of war symbolism as in the Mayor's badges is one indication of 
the nation-wide impact of a second war cult under Putin.
492
 Scholars argue that the 
narrative of war victory is possibly the only theme, historical or otherwise, that can 
unite Russians today: the inherent social control and consequent solidarity are arguably 
even more necessary to the political élite in Russia at the beginning of the twenty-first 
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century than in the Brezhnev era, when one official ideology united the Soviet Union.
493
 
It has been suggested that top-down nationalism is often a reaction to a period of social 
transition.
494
 This may have been a reason for the start of the war cult in Russia 
following the years of economic and political uncertainly of perestroika and the 1990s. 
More recently, however, the image of a strong and united nation is politically useful in 
the face of increasing criticism from abroad over the conflict in Ukraine. 
If Putin's war cult may be deemed a top-down response to the uncertainty of the 
Gorbachev and El'tsin leaderships or a challenging foreign policy, the cult of the more 
politically stable Brezhnev era may be attributed to the character of the General 
Secretary himself. However ridiculed the figure of the elderly statesman, the 
monuments erected nationwide and his re-introduction of Victory Day celebrations 
were popular, while the re-intensification of the latter under Putin probably contributes 
to some extent to the conservative wave of nostalgia for the Brezhnev era.
495
 It is 
notable that Putin himself also admits to 'a clear respect, even nostalgia' for the past,
496
 
stating that the fall of the Soviet Union was the 'greatest geopolitical catastrophe' of the 
twentieth century.
497
 Scholars have documented general and specific similarities 
between the policies of Putin and Brezhnev: Bacon and Sandle see a number of parallels 
with the Brezhnev years,
498
 while Khinshtein regards Putin as Brezhnev's natural and 
more successful successor.
499
 
On 29
th
 August 2011 Novorossiiskii rabochii reported that crowds thronged 
around the Brezhnev statue in Novorossiisk to watch the arrival of Prime Minister Putin 
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astride a Harley-Davidson motor-bike, a mode of transport that defines his leadership 
character as more macho and youth-oriented by far than Brezhnev's sedate procession 
through the streets by open-topped car in 1974. Hand firmly on the throttle rather than 
waving to the crowds, the black leather-clad Putin led a cavalcade of a thousand rock 
bikers rather than Brezhnev's retinue of elderly Soviet dignitaries.
500
  
From the museum ship 'Mikhail Kutuzov', once one of the most powerful cruisers 
of the Soviet navy, Putin reminded the audience of the military campaign to liberate 
occupied Novorossiisk, urging them to remember 'the heroes who fought to regain the 
town at enormous cost'. Putin recalled that the heroic landing troops who freed 
Novorossiisk had for their motto 'dvizhenie tol'ko vpered!' (moving only forwards). His 
words were seized upon as a political slogan by local and national media in the light of 
the forthcoming national elections of December 2011.
501
 Referring probably to Stalin's 
notorious 'Not one step back' Order No. 227 of July 1942 which prohibited the 
surrender of Soviet troops during the war, leading to many unnecessary deaths, its use 
indirectly confirms accusations of some scholars of a return to Stalinism under Putin.
502
 
Spectators at the rock concert were treated to an extravagant pyrotechnic display 
illuminating a reconstruction of the liberation of Novorossiisk. 'Pervyi kanal', the 
official state television channel, confirmed the spurious connection of the concert with 
the war, recalling that the anniversary of the liberation of Novorossiisk was less than 
three weeks away.
503
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President Putin did not visit Novorossiisk on the seventieth anniversary of the 
landings in February 2013, although he had been in Stalingrad the previous day, an 
indication perhaps that one Hero-City is more important than another.
504
 However, 
when Prime Minister, Putin had visited Novorossiisk just before Victory Day in 2010, 
following a television interview with an impromptu walkabout which I witnessed.
505
 In 
contrast with Brezhnev's solo evening stroll from the Hotel Brigantina, Putin's 200 
metre walk was in the presence of Regional Governor Aleksandr Tkachev and a strong 
security guard. Although apparently spontaneous, the walkabout was both 
well-managed and consummately professional, responding to demands from the crowd 
for Putin's personal appearance. The Prime Minister was clearly idolized by the waiting 
women in much the same way as a younger Brezhnev had appealed to the female 
workers of Novorossiisk in 1974, although Putin betrayed no trace of Brezhnev's 
mythical modesty.  
It is notable, however, that Putin made no mention of either the General Secretary 
or Malaia zemlia on his visits to Novorossiisk, preferring to speak about victory and 
heroism in general rather than in specific terms, thus giving the impression that 
Brezhnev has been written out of the official state narrative. In contrast, in an 
apparently concerted campaign of re-recognition of the political utility of the war myth 
in Novorossiisk on the national level, President Dmitrii Medvedev noted in his 
blog-post the day after Putin's walkabout that his own grandfather had fought on Malaia 
zemlia. Furthermore, in his online biography, Medvedev records, with a trace of 
humour, that his grandfather had, however, never met Brezhnev during his time on 
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Malaia zemlia, reinforcing common scepticism about Brezhnev's inflated wartime role. 
Thus Malaia zemlia was again on the official agenda as part of the increasing 
momentum of the new national war cult, providing wartime credentials for the 
President's family.
506
  
While investigating opinion about Brezhnev's Malaia zemlia memoirs today, 
thirty years after Brezhnev's death, I interviewed thirty-four subjects in other parts of 
Russia, with no connection to Novorossiisk. Of these, nobody under the age of forty had 
heard of Malaia zemlia at all, showing that it is not part of the war myth for the younger 
generations. Although three subjects in their early forties had not heard of Malaia 
zemlia, a convincing majority, 85% of those over forty, who would all have been over 
the age of fifteen and in full-time education or employment before Brezhnev's death, 
still connected the name of Malaia zemlia irreverently with boring lessons of Soviet 
political ideology and a wealth of Brezhnev jokes, in much the same way as illustrated 
by Medvedev's comments.
507
 It is apparent that, for them, Novorossiisk's Gold Star is 
considered to be as phoney as the awards hanging on Brezhnev's chest when he visited 
Novorossiisk in 1974.
508
  
President Putin may have avoided mentioning the Brezhnev connection, perhaps 
wishing to avoid adverse comparison between the two statesmen, but his own family's 
challenging wartime experience in Leningrad adds strength to his image of dutiful son 
and father within the war cult. Thanks to his own personal connection with the war and 
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his promotion of war memory, Putin could almost be deemed a hero in both past and 
modern terms.
509
 
If Putin is regarded as a masculine leader, it is in a different mould from the 
popular perception of Brezhnev in Novorossiisk, which was based on his actual wartime 
service as well as his promotion of the town economically. Brezhnev possessed a 
modest, common touch which resonated with the people then, deploying his war medals 
where motorcycle imagery is more likely to appeal to younger Russians today. 
However, Brezhnev had genuine links with Novorossiisk, rather than merely visiting 
the town for overtly political reasons. Similarly, popular scepticism about Brezhnev's 
war memoirs and Putin's KGB past detract from their cults of personality vis-à-vis the 
war cult. Although with vastly different leadership styles, both men enjoyed at their 
prime a wide following and a lengthy term of office in which to establish a strategic 
political use of war memory. 
Evidence may indicate a concerted campaign of re-recognition of the political 
utility of the war myth in Novorosiisk on the national level, but it is only on the local 
level that Brezhnev's connection with the war remains politically useful. At the time of 
Brezhnev's famous visit of 1974, the state in the person of the General Secretary owned 
memory of the war in general and of Malaia zemlia in particular. Under the current 
memorial climate, the war has become both an existential narrative of Russia's national 
identity and a metaphor for national unity. The current war cult demonstrates the 
régime's temporally retrograde and dogmatic influence on remembrance, confirming the 
presentist approach to collective memory as proposed by Hobsbawm.
510
 Within this 
unifying environment of state ownership of collective memory of victory is situated the 
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specific memory of the liberation of Novorossiisk in 1943. It is this uncontroversial fact 
of liberation which is now recognized nationally, rather than the seven-month campaign 
on Malaia zemlia preceding it, which remains almost exclusively as local memory  
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3.6 Conclusion  
During the Malaia zemlia campaign, one concern voiced by the troops was the isolation 
of the beach-head from the rest of the country (Bol'shaia zemlia), and the wish to re-join 
the two to form a complete whole.
511
 Despite the geographical reunion in 1943, the 
national and local attitudes to the campaign were not always aligned over the next 
seventy years. Whereas state and town were united in the significance of Malaia zemlia 
during the war cult of the Brezhnev era, a gulf in interpretation arose after Brezhnev's 
death, only for them to become largely reconciled with the re-appropriation of the local 
war myth by the state in the twenty-first century, if without reference to Brezhnev's role 
on Malaia zemlia.  
Despite substantial unity over the headlines of the war myth today, there exists a 
deeper, more complex interaction of national and local understanding with respect to 
Brezhnev and Malaia zemlia. While Putin's interpretation of the myth retains only the 
single unmired fact of the liberation of Novorossiisk from German occupation, locally it 
has developed further nuance and legend over the years thanks to the re-examination of 
popular memory of Brezhnev's significant visit to Novorossiisk in 1974 upon the 
erection of the new Brezhnev statue. The result of the re-location of public memory is 
that the nation and the town now own two complementary myths regarding Brezhnev's 
link to Novorossiisk. 
Thanks to Brezhnev's perceived economic largesse and a series of reverberations 
following his visit, the Hero-City has collectively placed Brezhnev in a politically 
convenient legendary post-war niche. Paradoxically, memory of Brezhnev remains 
integral to the war myth in Novorossiisk for the older generation in other parts of 
Russia, while the town itself has shifted memory to what it assumed would be less 
controversial civic territory. As a result of a protracted period of re-negotiation exposing 
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cultural and generational differences in attitude to a common past, a new local 
collective identity with respect to Brezhnev has been established, whereby he is 
remembered mainly as a patron of the town rather than as a war hero. In contrast, the 
following chapter examines remembrance of the genuine heroes of the Malaia zemlia 
campaign. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Respect for the dead: Ritual and monumental remembrance 
 
В молчании застыли все вокруг: 
Куранты бьют мерно в тиши, 
И гордо рвется к небу Вечный огонь. 
 
Его зажгли мы в память всех людей, 
Отдавших за Родину жизнь. 
Этот великий подвиг 
В наших живет сердцах.512 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Every hour on the hour since 1960, from the first hesitant notes on the celeste to the 
final triumphant orchestral crescendo, the strains of Dmitrii Shostakovich's 
'Novorossiisk Chimes' have rung out across Heroes' Square, where the tomb of the 
Heroes of the Soviet Union killed during the Malaia zemlia campaign has stood since 
1946, with the relatively early addition of the Eternal Flame in 1958.
513
 Commissioned 
in the name of the citizens of Novorossiisk by the Secretary of the town's Communist 
Party, Shostakovich's requiem for the fallen heroes indicates not only the inevitable 
passing of time, but also links past and present in its regular remembrance of those who 
fell on Malaia zemlia.
514
 This chapter analyses the community's respect for the military 
dead still demonstrated in Novorossiisk by means of annual rituals of remembrance and 
monumental commemoration, with consideration also given to those exceptional cases 
where such esteem is not evident. 
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Memory is a temporal concept in three ways. Firstly, as demonstrated in Chapter 
2, the substance and detail of memory is time dependent, changing with the political 
tide which may potentially imbue the war narrative with different meanings; secondly, it 
is able to recall the past in the present, almost unconsciously relating the former to the 
latter, with time itself able to expand or contract flexibly on the part of both society and 
the individual remembering the past; and thirdly, the passage of time can wipe away 
traces of the past, scattering personal memories and eroding memorials with a 
corresponding increase in entropy as time marches inexorably onwards. In establishing 
the dynamics of the transmission of memory, this chapter will demonstrate that the rich 
culture of memorial traditions in Novorossiisk merges to produce a unique perception of 
mythical time, which interacts with and occasionally dominates historical time. 
Both historical and memorial identity are often linked to a specific space,
515
 a 
concept particularly relevant to the small area of Malaia zemlia, where geographical 
identity is perhaps easier to preserve than living memory as the number of original 
witnesses decreases. With the passage of time, the role of direct oral and written 
narrative in the propagation of the war myth has been taken over by a monumental and 
ritual tradition of remembrance with its own mnemonic symbolism in a different type of 
commemoration whose collective ownership renders it simpler, more general and 
thereby more enduring. 
Victory Day celebrations remain popular across post-Soviet Russia today,
516
 
where the introduction in 2005 of the Georgievskaia lenta (St George ribbon) as a 
symbol of war memory has proved particularly successful in capturing and moulding 
the national mood. Harnessing the energy of young people to distribute ribbons in return 
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for donations to veterans' charities, the lentochka movement has been both praised and 
condemned as a top-down exercise in the intergenerational marketing of memory across 
the country and beyond, a potent symbol of the widespread propagation of the current 
war cult and its values.
517
 While Victory Day will be examined in more detail in  
Chapter 5, this chapter analyses a second mnemonic symbol linked with young people 
and in this case unique to maritime Novorossiisk: the beskozyrka, a simple sailor's cap. 
The beskozyrka is the focal point of respect for the individual within the collective in a 
more sober annual ritual of remembrance of the dead, with its origins in a provincial 
bottom-up memory movement in Brezhnev's Soviet Union.  
Although a successful tradition may serve to cement a society,
518
 any inertia 
associated with a tradition, even one strongly linked with local identity, risks leading to 
stagnation, as evidenced by the political environment of the Brezhnev era. There is the 
associated risk that the ritual may become static and boring, with over-reliance on what 
Connerton terms 'habit-memory' leading to popular apathy rather than a proactive 
commitment to remember.
519
 However, my evidence suggests that, in the context of 
widespread external change, a society may adapt an old tradition for new conditions by 
grafting new rituals or language onto the original ceremony of commemoration. It is 
perhaps not surprising that an analysis of the development of the Beskozyrka tradition 
over time reveals gradual changes in the ritual which define each successive generation 
and serve to prevent potential mnemonic stagnation. In this chapter I show that, thanks 
to national and local conditions under which collective war memory is thriving, 
increasing empathy with and respect for the courage of the troops is demonstrated such 
that this continuing legacy of the youth of 1968, far from being discarded after 
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Brezhnev's death like many other aspects of the Soviet war cult, is increasingly relevant 
to the identity of the contemporary Hero-City of Novorossiisk.  
Today's emphasis on ritual and monumental memory implies collective agreement 
on the interpretation of memory. However, the dead who are remembered remain 
individuals within the agreed collective narrative, whose personal remembrance is also 
important to their familial descendants. This dichotomy raises the question of how to 
locate the individual within collective memory: both individual victims of war and the 
individuals remembering them today, for whom collective memory may not be an 
adequate or accurate representation of their feelings or attitude to events of the past. I 
demonstrate that not all the fallen can be accommodated or respected within the war 
myth, revealing different categories of war dead. The town's relationship with the fallen 
troops may seem straightforward, but deeper analysis exposes the ongoing challenges to 
respect afforded to innocent civilians and the enemy.  
There is a tension between today's official memory and some degree of forgetting, 
either unintentional or selective. Monuments seen on a regular basis may fade into the 
habitual landscape, while there is also evidence of some official and unofficial 
embarrassment at other aspects of the war which may have been conveniently omitted 
from the popular myth of Malaia zemlia which, while representing collective memory, 
may not be able to accommodate every single sub-group in a potentially polyphonic 
memorial situation. This chapter analyses the opposition between mainstream memory 
which dictates the official mnemonic identity of Novorossiisk and is located visibly in 
and around the town centre, and some aspects of remembrance on the fringes of 
organized society, often situated on the geographical periphery. In particular, opinion 
and practice in the modern centre of Novorossiisk is compared with that in its sel'skii 
okrug (rural district), Myskhako, standing on the site of the worst of the Malaia zemlia 
battle. 
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With a continued emphasis on the examination of agency, this chapter analyses 
the mechanism for the intergenerational transmission of ritual and monumental 
memory. Contrary to what may be expected in a monolithic society, I reveal some 
evidence for what appears to be a bottom-up mechanism within the parameters of the 
Brezhnev era war cult and even some conflict with the authorities in the Putin era. I also 
demonstrate that society in Novorossiisk appears to value individualism and a distinctly 
local slant where respect for the dead of Malaia zemlia is concerned.  
 190 
 
4.2.1 Hats off to Heroes: A tribute from the young people of 
Novorossiisk 
So many fearless young sailors in 
pea-jackets and caps perished in 
the deep. So many times we saw 
dead sailors' caps floating on the 
sea.
520
 
 
The Beskozyrka ritual was invented in 1968 not by the national élite responsible for 
Victory Day celebrations, but by a small group of young Novorossiisk residents.
 
However, this Soviet group was also no doubt under the influence of the state's 
burgeoning war cult shortly after Brezhnev's appointment as General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1964. 
The change in state policy to promote war memory was anticipated in 
Novorossiisk in 1963, when the local Communist Party newspaper, Novorossiiskii 
rabochii, filled a whole page with war memories, while in 1965 the same paper was 
exceptionally published on a Sunday, devoting its whole four-page edition to the 
revived Victory Day celebrations.
521
 With a build-up of the memorial climate nationally 
and locally during the mid-1960s, the time was ripe for a new form of commemoration 
in Novorossiisk. In January 1968 a ten-line paragraph appeared in the youth section of 
Novorossiiskii rabochii, advertising Operatsiia 'Beskozyrka' (The 'Beskozyrka' 
Operation), a procession taking the 'torch of glory', lit from the Eternal Flame on 
Heroes' Square, to the site of the Malaia zemlia landings in the small hours of  
4
th
 February, in commemoration of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the start of the 
battle.
522
  
The youth group promoted by Novorossiiskii rabochii was inspired by the 
creation in 1962 of a literary club for young readers, Klub iunykh kommunarov (The 
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Young Commune Members' Club) by Komsomol'skaia Pravda, the official organ of the 
Communist youth movement, the Komsomol.
523
The Novorossiisk off-shoot of the 
readers' club, named 'Shkhuna rovesnikov' (the Schooner 'Young Contemporaries'), 
encouraged its teenage members (so-called Shkhunatiki) to form the land-based crew of 
an imaginary schooner, incorporating a system of ranks, an oath of adherence and 
passwords for meetings.
524
 The founding captain and self-proclaimed helmsman of the 
'Shkhuna rovesnikov' was the novice Novorossiiskii rabochii journalist, Konstantin 
Podyma. Gathering his crew in November 1965 through a new youth page in 
Novorossiiskii rabochii, the 19-year old invited all 'romantics' and 'fantasists' to set sail 
with him on a journey of dreams, discussion and self-discovery.
525
 Thus started the 
weekly meetings in their 'cabin' in the Novorossiiskii rabochii offices,
526
 leading to a 
series of romantic exploits deemed by a former Shkhunatik to be typical of the 
eccentricity of the club members.
527  
Although the Shkhunatiki may in retrospect consider themselves to have been 
atypical of their generation, they were probably rather the product of their times and 
cultural environment, with relatively normal family backgrounds including peasants, 
accountants, workers in the port, doctors and managers in industry.
528
 Indeed, according 
to Gleb Tsipursky's analysis, most of the readers of Komsomol'skaia Pravda in the early 
1960s represented 'conformist youth', who identified with the values propagated by the 
newspaper, including the strong sense of patriotism disseminated from above, a view 
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extrapolated by Jeffrey Brooks to the relationship between the press and the Soviet 
population in general in the early Brezhnev years.
529
 However, it is evident that this 
local club brought its own creative interpretation to the pervading examples in national 
youth publications. 
Members of the 'Shkhuna rovesnikov' apparently revelled in an atmosphere of 
literary romanticism, adopting as their hero the poet Pavel Kogan, who met his death 
outside Novorossiisk in September 1942. The young people regularly spent the night 
changing a red flag on the summit of Sakharnaia golova, the hill where he was killed in 
battle.
530 
This interest in Kogan is a local reflection of the influence of the romantic 
poetry and song which became fashionable with young people in the post-Stalin era of 
the 1950s and 1960s, when student anthems included Kogan's 'Brigantina' (1937),
 
typical of the 'bardic song' of the Thaw years. Inna Sokolova describes the popularity of 
'exotic heroes', including the sea captains featured in Kogan's work, deeming the 
'piratical ethos' in the bardic oeuvre 'a romantic symbol, an expression of an active 
perspective on life, a testimony to faith in one's own strength and the hope of success', 
producing a 'state of spiritual emancipation'.
531  
Furthermore, Ludmilla Alexeyeva 
suggests that 'Brigantina' is in fact Kogan's tribute to Nikolai Gumilev, the poet 
well-known for his Wanderlust.
532
 No doubt the perceived freedom of a sea captain was 
attractive to shore-bound teenagers with little chance of significant travel. It therefore 
comes as no surprise that, with their combination of idealistic romanticism and respect 
for the war dead, the group decided to mark the anniversary of the landings in 1968 in a 
special way, framing themselves within the pervading memorial context. Their idea was 
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to commemorate unburied troops who had died at sea by carrying a sailor's peakless 
uniform cap (the eponymous beskozyrka) four kilometres through the streets of the town 
just after midnight. The hat would then be ceremonially lowered into the sea at 
Stanichka, surrounded by wreaths of flowers.  
This ceremony is a reflection of the increasing focus on military-patriotic youth 
training in the Brezhnev era, strongly endorsed by the Komsomol organization.
 
Membership of the Komsomol was expected for school-children and students aged from 
fourteen to twenty-eight who became members of a primary cell, the bottom layer of a 
complex hierarchy of management mirroring the Communist Party organization. 
Komsomol activities centred on the war cult were highly controlled by nationalist 
sympathizers and encouraged by novels and memoirs about the war.
 
Furthermore, 
young people were taken to visit war sites and monuments as part of their moral 
upbringing (vospitanie).
533
 
Novorossiisk teenagers were possibly even more exposed to memory of the war 
than many of their peers. According to a former member of the 'Shkhuna rovesnikov', 
the young post-war generation of Novorossiisk was regaled with stories of wartime 
exploits recounted by their fathers and grandfathers.
534
 Moreover, it is claimed that the 
Shkhunatiki would routinely find grenades, shell-cases and human remains,
535
 breeding 
a feeling of involvement in war memory from childhood and a sense of identification 
with the young partisans who had fought outside Novorossiisk during the war.
536
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However, Podyma and two female Shkhunatiki categorically dismiss suggestions 
of direct Komsomol influence on the original Beskozyrka ceremony,
537 
although it is 
probable that the overwhelming state propaganda machine of their youth went largely 
unnoticed due to its ubiquitous nature. They do, however, acknowledge Party support 
from the editor of Novorossiiskii rabochii, Grigorii Pogibel', a member of the gorkom, 
the town committee of the Communist Party, who provided premises for their meetings 
and encouraged the already independent youngsters to plan the ceremony themselves, 
while nonetheless checking on the organizational details.
538
 Rather more direct input 
into the meetings is recalled, however, by Viktor Saloshenko, Second Secretary of the 
Novorossiisk Komsomol Committee at the time, who claims to have implemented all 
the organization of which he deemed the young people incapable.
539 
 
F6H claims that it took time for the authorities to come to terms with the group's 
sometimes unusual projects, although Podyma believes that the Komsomol was 
unwilling to help in the early days because of the absence of prestigious veterans from 
the first ceremony. This difficulty may reflect not only the status that the veterans would 
bring to the ceremony, but possibly points to a problem with permission for a group 
procession, which would gain credibility with the presence of veterans. Podyma alleges 
that there was some peripheral involvement from the KGB, whose border guards set up 
searchlights along the shore to light up their proceedings,
540
 a claim disputed by F6H. In 
the light of competing claims and the lack of decisive evidence from the Komsomol 
records, it is difficult to gauge with certainty the degree of influence from above. The 
Beskozyrka movement may possibly have been the product of an organized campaign 
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by the Komsomol leadership, which, under the influence of the national memorial 
climate, tapped into the enthusiasm and inventiveness of the younger generation.  
Involving only twenty-two young people and six adults at first, including two 
veterans of Malaia zemlia, the newly invented ritual of Beskozyrka faltered for a time, 
being banned by a Communist Party bureaucrat the following year, despite its patriotic 
intent and the country-wide encouragement of youth initiatives.
541
 Party concern may 
have been due to a degree of nervousness about potential crowds of young people 
gathering together following the protest events in Moscow against the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, as, although the ceremony was permitted officially in 1970, it 
was restricted to a much smaller area.
542  
Thanks to the intervention of influential 
veterans and the gorkom, local Komsomol officials were apparently finally convinced 
of the value of the ceremony and gave it their approval in 1971.
543
 By the outing of the 
third Beskozyrka the number of participants had increased dramatically to a critical 
mass of five thousand, such that by 1973 the press was already referring to it as an 
established tradition.
544 
 
The rise in popularity of the Beskozyrka ritual during the 1970s mirrored the 
development of the war cult nationwide. The early Beskozyrka tradition was apparently 
welcomed by both young and old, fusing the patriotic commemoration desired by the 
older generation with the romance of a secret society attractive to its young inventors. 
Sokolov recalls the emotion evoked by the ceremony as veterans silently remembered 
their fallen comrades, linked with their gratitude for the opportunity to pass on this 
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memory to the younger generation.
545
 In contrast, the main aspect of Beskozyrka 
apparently enjoyed by the younger generation was the night-time torch-lit procession 
and the secrecy of a complex system of passwords,
546
 an adventure in keeping with the 
romantic leanings of the Shkhunatiki, nurtured by the state emphasis on 'romantic 
militarism'.
547
 Furthermore, the system of ranks and the military parade of Beskozyrka 
reflected official war cult values, which promoted a convergence of generations that 
would ensure the ceremony's success.  
 
 
4.2.2 A changing tradition or a tradition of change? 
The juxtaposition of the concept of longstanding tradition with a relatively young state 
such as post-Soviet Russia may seem paradoxical, particularly bearing in mind the 
unsettled years of perestroika and the 1990s, when Beskozyrka struggled to survive. 
Hobsbawm contends that newly invented traditions may be more widespread during 
periods of rapid social change and modernization to which older established traditions 
may succumb.
548
 In contrast, it may be argued that the comfort of any tradition, 
however young, is particularly welcome within an environment rendered unstable by 
war, political or financial crisis. According to Edward Shils, it is the very normativeness 
of tradition which acts as 'the inertial force which holds society in a given form over 
time'.
549
 Similarly, Connerton sees the importance of ritual mainly in its invariance over 
time.
550
 Halbwachs confirms that rituals tend to remain constant over time, even when 
society as a whole is in the process of change, as, especially in these circumstances, 
                                                     
545
 Sokolov, My s Maloi zemli, 1979, pp. 367-8. 
546
 Podyma, 'Beskozyrka', 2008, pp. 11-34. 
547
 Brunstedt, 'Building a Pan-Soviet Past', 2011, p. 163. This was exemplified by the publication from 
1964 to 1990 of a series of biographies of romantic figures in history, 'Plamennye revoliutsionery' (Fiery 
Revolutionaries). See Jones, 'The Fire Burns On?', 2015. 
548
 Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', 2008. 
549
 Shils, Tradition, 1981, p. 25. 
550
 Connerton, How Societies Remember, 1989, p. 23. 
 197 
 
people tend to cling to tradition for the perceived security it offers, a position endorsed 
by Hobsbawm.
551 
 
On the other hand, any inertia associated with a tradition, even one strongly linked 
with local identity, risks leading to stagnation. There is the related risk that the ritual 
may become static and boring, with over-reliance on habit-memory leading to popular 
apathy rather than a proactive commitment to remember. However, my evidence 
suggests that, in the context of widespread external change, a society may adapt an old 
tradition for new conditions by grafting new rituals or language onto the original 
ceremony of commemoration. It is perhaps not surprising that an analysis of the 
development of the Beskozyrka tradition over more than four decades reveals gradual 
changes in the ritual. The organizers of Beskozyrka have adopted a process of 
re-invention and rejuvenation, enabling each generation to place its own stamp on the 
ritual, while serving to prevent mnemonic stagnation and promote local identity. I 
demonstrate that the series of changes in Beskozyrka has been established not merely as 
the passive response typical of a comfortably apathetic society, but in a proactive 
attempt to attract young people and propagate war memory across the generations. 
Furthermore, in view of the scale and frequency of these innovations, it may even be 
argued that the concept of change in the Beskozyrka ritual has become an invented 
tradition in its own right. 
Minor changes to the ceremony included a variation in the route in the 1970s to 
take in the monument to the Unknown Sailor, the ribbons of his beskozyrka flowing 
prominently behind his head. 
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Monument to the Unknown Sailor, Novorossiisk (1961)
552
 
 
 
With even younger children and their parents in mind, the time was brought forward 
firstly to the afternoon and then the evening of 3
rd
 February, better facilitating 
cross-generational transmission. Raisa Sokolova describes the addition of a solemn oath 
to the proceedings in 1978, the tenth anniversary of the tradition and the week during 
which Brezhnev's memoirs were published.
553
 Repeating the oath made by Major 
Tsezar' Kunikov's troops prior to battle, the young people swore to become a living 
memorial to those who had given their lives. The original marine infantry had sworn to 
die for their country: 
We will give up our own will, strength and blood, drop by drop, 
for the life and happiness of the people, for you, our beloved 
Motherland!
554
 
Furthermore, their historic success was reinforced in a dispatch from the War Council: 
                                                     
552
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Your fathers, mothers, wives and children will be proud of your 
defence, courage and heroism. We know that this small area of 
land will become great and will bring about the liberation of our 
fathers, mothers, wives and children groaning under the fascist 
yoke.
555
 
The heroes of Malaia zemlia were thus situated in a mythical historical continuum, 
charged with ensuring the freedom of their children, the generation responsible for the 
invention of the Beskozrka tradition. In contrast, the oath made by the Beskozyrka 
carriers in 1980 principally reflected the prevailing ideology of the Brezhnev era, as 
participants vowed to strive to work hard to fulfil Communist ideals, including the 
stringent economic demands of the tenth five-year plan.
556
 It is perhaps not surprising 
that, in a ceremony with links to the General Secretary's wartime service, political 
ideology further complicated simple memory. Despite an ostensible wish to 
commemorate the past, this pragmatic consideration of the political environment 
confirms that, towards the end of the Brezhnev era, national concerns barely connected 
with war memory had taken over the local myth of Malaia zemlia.  
In the early years after the fall of the Soviet Union interest in Beskozyrka waned 
in line with national trends after Gorbachev had dismantled the Brezhnev era war 
cult.
557
 Newspaper reports of the ritual are scarce and several of my respondents 
mentioned that Beskozyrka in its original form barely survived,
558
 with one member of 
the 'Shkhuna rovesnikov' blaming the decline on the end of the Komsomol 
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organization,
559
 which had apparently continued to endorse the ceremony since 1971. 
However, a retired headmistress recalls that one hundred children from each of the local 
schools were invited during the 1990s to the town's theatre for a different type of 
commemoration involving about 5,000 annually,
560
 reinforcing the claim that the town's 
head of culture and other founding members of the ceremony kept the ritual alive.
561
 
This is plausible, since, following the town council's decision to take over responsibility 
for the ritual, it was back to full strength in 1998 for its thirtieth anniversary.
562
  
For forty-five years the fact that two landings had actually taken place in 1943 
was rarely recalled in collective memory, which privileged the successful Malaia zemlia 
campaign over the failed landings at Iuzhnaia Ozereika. In recent years two torches 
have been lit and two hats carried to the beaches: the first to Malaia zemlia in the usual 
fashion, and the second transported by tank to the more distant Iuzhnaia Ozereika, 
where the ritual has evolved slightly differently, with its own committed following.
563
  
The twenty-first century has seen a partial return under President Putin to more 
conservative Soviet values, a renewed emphasis on vospitanie and the development of a 
new war cult. Once again, politicians promote a common interest in social coherence 
and continuity with the Soviet past, presenting the people with an image of a strong and 
united nation. As will be shown in Chapter 5, it seems that the involvement of the 
younger generation is central to current policy for the propagation of war memory, 
utilizing many of the strategies of the Brezhnev era.  
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Beskozyrka at the Eternal Flame on Heroes' Square
564
 
 
 
My observations indicate that the majority of Russians of all ages welcomes the 
associated ceremonies and ritual reminiscent of the Brezhnev era, particularly Victory 
Day in May.
565
 However the notoriously cold weather in February provides a 
ready-made excuse for inhabitants of Novorossiisk to stay indoors and not attend 
Beskozyrka. Some respondents search for further reasons for non-attendance, 
explaining how they would like to join in the procession, but would find it difficult to 
get there in the rush-hour traffic; moreover, they claim that their children are tired after 
school.
566
 Possibly with this in mind, the organizers introduced in 2010 a newly 
invented off-shoot of Beskozyrka, Svecha v okne, the 'candle in the window' movement, 
whereby those staying at home are encouraged to show their solidarity with the 
marchers outside by lighting a candle to place in the window as they pass by. Heavily 
promoted by the town council on posters and in newspaper advertisements, this modern 
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idea is reminiscent of other ceremonies of remembrance world-wide.
567
 This new 
supplementary invented tradition is particularly popular amongst women not wishing to 
venture outdoors,
568
 and involves far more people than ever before, even if they do not 
demonstrate the commitment of those taking part in the cold. Like the addendum of the 
St George ribbon to Victory Day, this is an innovation grafted onto an older, established 
tradition, having the effect of enriching, rejuvenating and refreshing the ritual, rendering 
it more attractive to the younger generation and their parents. Furthermore, a new 
daytime Beskozyrka especially for children was introduced in 2013, attracting a further 
audience of 4,700 young people,
569
 a cohort of citizens not able to deploy excuses when 
taken to the ceremony by their teachers, as their families respond to a complex mixture 
of social expectation and freedom to attend. 
The highlight of 2011 was a reconstruction of the landings at Malaia zemlia, 
repeated annually since then. Such events have become very popular globally, including 
in Russia, where the annual reconstruction of the Battle of Borodino attracts large 
crowds. War memory in twenty-first century Russia increasingly refers to less 
controversial ubiquitous heroism rather than to the more specific examples still being 
cited in the 1990s. In contrast, there is considerable local geographical detail in the 
reconstructions, which bring to life the generalisms of the national war myth with some 
local historical accuracy.
570
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Re-enactment of the landings (1) 
571
 
 
 
A re-enactment on the actual battle site can be a very powerful means of 
propagating collective memory, while still representing a relatively passive experience 
for the large audience. In contrast, the more intimate group in Iuzhnaia Ozereika 
witnessed a different spectacle in 2011. In a seemingly spontaneous gesture, the 
beskozyrka bearer, young marine Ivan Ognev, attracted gasps of admiration from 
spectators as he strode into the sea up to his shoulders to deposit the hat on the waves. 
An exchange of messages in an online forum established that he had gone into the water 
of his own accord, in a surge of empathy with the original landing troops, and with no 
orders from above, effectively bringing the myth to life.
572
 In the light of this personal 
tribute in braving the winter waves, it appears that the romanticism of the young 
founders of Beskozyrka lives on, at least in Iuzhnaia Ozereika,
573
 where there remains 
some scope on the fringe for the individual in organized remembrance today.  
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The beskozyrka bearer lays the hat and wreath in the sea
574
 
 
 
However, this originally spontaneous part of the ceremony has now been incorporated 
into the main ritual at Malaia zemlia, an indication perhaps of the increasingly 
centralized control of Beskozyrka, both administratively in the organization by the town 
council, and physically in the ranks of Cossacks holding the spectators at bay. Such 
top-down intervention has prompted some negative comments in online discussions 
about over-organization and the desecration of genuine memory for the sake of political 
utility.
575
  
What started out as a series of sometimes minor innovations and refinements to 
the invented tradition of Beskozyrka has become a tradition of invented change in its 
own right. Even in 2012, more changes were still being promised by the press:  
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From year to year the movement [...] does not change, but on 
each occasion the programme acquires new memorial 
components. This year will be no exception.
576
 
Despite the innovations, there is comfort in the continuity of symbolism in the 
Beskozyrka tradition. With candles, caps and ribbons, its interpretation and essence 
remain constant, although the consistency of symbolism permits only one interpretation 
of the past, in accord with the conventions of the war myth, albeit widely endorsed by 
the local population. My observations and interviews indicate that Beskozyrka still 
appeals to the same members of society: teachers, cadets and veterans, although the first 
actors would hardly recognize the scale of today's operation and the veterans are 
becoming fewer. With the participation of schools, the interest of parents is guaranteed, 
with some young families new to Novorossiisk learning about Beskozyrka and coming 
to appreciate local history thanks to their children, as in the case of the original 
inventors.
577
 
In contrast, responsibility for the Beskozyrka ritual, founded by and traditionally 
associated with the young people of Novorossiisk, was taken over in 1999 by the 
regional youth committee in Krasnodar, this time involving a committee for youth 
rather than the younger generation themselves, who thereby appear to have lost their 
ownership of the ceremony. The following year, Beskozyrka became known as a 
pan-Russian operation, its name today emphasizing its roots: Vserossiiskaia 
molodezhnaia patrioticheskaia aktsiia 'Beskozyrka' (The Pan-Russian Patriotic Youth 
Movement 'Beskozyrka').
578
 Despite the implicit geographical expansion, attendees are 
largely local, with the financial burden of the ceremony falling on the town of 
Novorossiisk, whose Mayor now takes responsibility for its implementation, possibly 
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reflecting some local rivalry over the ownership of memory between the Hero-City of 
Novorossiisk and the regional centre of Krasnodar. The 2011 advertising pamphlet, 
published by the region, confirms the continued emphasis on youth participation, 
although there is no mention of its young founders and their vision, indicating perhaps 
that the authorities are anxious to take all the credit.  
Despite this omission, Podyma, a prolific inventor of tradition both in 
Novorossiisk and Moscow, has numerous publications on Beskozyrka and other less 
well-known memorial rituals to his credit.
579
 For over forty years he consistently 
propagated the myth of Malaia zemlia, building up a legend around the 'Shkhuna 
rovesnikov', which, he claims, spread from Novorossiisk to other 'outposts' around the 
Soviet Union.
580
 At the same time he nurtured his own personality cult as its 'romantic' 
founder and only true guardian of memory.
581
 In Novorossiisk Podyma's name has 
become just as recognized as those of the real heroes of Malaia zemlia. While children 
learn about the history of Kunikov and his landing troops,
582
 older interviewees are 
equally likely to speak about the propagation of memory through Podyma's Beskozyrka 
ritual,
583
 which has also been assimilated into the local history of the town, albeit a 
generation younger than the war itself. 
The mnemonic vicious circle may have been broken through the tradition of 
change, but Soviet society's traditional values are increasingly being projected through 
ritual onto the younger Russian generation, subject today to domination and 
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determination by the élite who now organize Beskozyrka, rather than the young 
romantic idealists of 1968.  
 
 
4.2.3 The time and tide of memory 
Confiding her personal thoughts during remembrance ceremonies, a respondent reflects: 
'I think behind my eyes: I try to imagine it, from films and books, how awful it was: 
explosions, how they lived. It must have been very hard.'
584
 This statement 
demonstrates that, even though today's remembrance rituals represent a highly 
organized communal experience, they nonetheless offer the opportunity for an 
individual, if silent, response. This is a good example of trans-temporal empathy 
promoted by a successful memorial ritual, whereby each person's imagination may be 
converted into a time-machine capable of linking two distant moments in time by the 
act of memory. The return to the past through anamnestic recall raises the question of 
the complex temporality of memory with respect to historical time - time which is often 
perceived as linear and unidirectional, but which may also be perceived as cyclical 
thanks to the annual rhythm of anniversaries.
585
 Furthermore, during the Beskoyrka 
reconstructions a reversal of time is apparent on the very same space where the landings 
took place, reducing the perceived relative time gap between past and present with a 
resultant increase in identification between present-day participants and the original 
troops. In this manner, Wolfe argues that 'the past becomes something experienced, 
rather than understood or examined'.
586
  
Monuments tend to preserve the past in the present in much the same way as 
ritualistic tradition, where cyclical temporal movement gives the impression of static 
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time around the monumental focus of rituals. However, Mikhail Yampolsky argues 
persuasively for a special flow of time around a monument rather than time merely 
standing still: 
A monument creates around itself a kind of special temporal 
expanse in which time moves differently than in other places, a 
sort of mystical protective zone that surrounds the monument 
and is apparently connected with the experience of temporal 
metamorphosis.
587
 
In the case of Novorossiisk, those taking part in the Beskozyrka ritual act as 
time-travellers, approaching the Malaia zemlia monument from the present, crossing the 
timeless space around it, to arrive in the past via the Brezhnev era as they reach the 
monument itself. Thus the monument in the shape of the prow of a motor launch, 
erected in 1982, seems transformed back into the original craft it represents, while its 
Socialist Realist sculpted depictions of the original 1943 landing troops are transformed 
into the ranks of the modern soldiers reconstructing the landings. This blurring of time 
zones evident even today is reminiscent of Socialist Realism, which recycled heroic 
historical precedents as a fore-taste of the implied reality in the future, thus merging 
present time with past and promised future.
588
 The static monument and the memory it 
channels may have outlived the heroes, but still transmit the timeless testimony of 
non-contestable patriotic heroism appreciated by all stake-holders in the Beskozyrka 
ritual. 
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Re-enactment of the landings (2)
589
 
 
 
According to Sokolov, the beskozyrka floating on the water is carried by the same 
waves as in 1943, themselves depicted as insensitive carriers of memory of those who 
lost their lives: 'They will never return, no, these lads will never return to shore. Only 
the senseless waves beat on the shore, remembering the past ...'.
590
 Thus the sea itself is 
deemed to be an agent in the apparent closing of the temporal gap between 1943 and 
today. Not only the waves recall the night, apparently. A classmate of Konstantin 
Podyma feels that nature as a whole sees the need to reproduce the conditions of 1943 
in tribute to the troops.
591
 An aspect of the war myth expressed by respondents of all 
ages includes the legendary icy wind and stormy weather every year on the night of 
3
rd
 - 4
th
 February.
592
 Podyma himself stated on one of his recent visits to Novorossiisk: 
'It is appointed by nature that it is always foul weather on 3
rd
 February in Novorossiisk, 
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with wind, rain, and bitter cold which penetrates to the bones.'
593
 In a masterpiece of 
understatement, Novorossiiskii rabochii proclaims: 'On this day, tradition is religiously 
observed not only by citizens, but also by the weather. A warm wind never blows on  
3
rd
 February.'
594
 Women, particularly, refer to wearing layers of clothes for the 
ceremony,
595
 while some men endorse the sentiment expressed by a Novorossiiskii 
rabochii journalist: 'The harsh weather reminded descendants of the conditions 
experienced by Kunikov's troops landing in the icy waves of the Black Sea.'
596
 Podyma, 
describing in 1975 the first Beskozyrka seven years previously, emphasized the 
similarities: 'The February night was freezing and windy. Exactly the same as many 
years ago ...'. Even the password on that night reflected the prevalent winter wind in 
Novorossiisk: Nord ost (north-easterly).
597
 In 2012, myth became reality, as hardy 
citizens turned out in unprecedented temperatures:
598
 
There is never good weather on 3
rd
 February. Never! But this 
year the temperature plunged even below yesterday's -15C, with 
wind too, a change from the usual more tolerable -3C.
599
 
A cyclical, quasi-biological ritualistic chronology may promote an illusion of 
timelessness and permanence, linking past and present time while offering both 
continuity and stability.
600
 It is as if traditional time stands still, while historical time 
marches on regardless. However, thanks to the continuing tradition of innovations 
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associated with the Beskozyrka tradition, serving to give the impression of a renewed 
ceremony every year, the circular ritualistic time with its associated danger of 
stagnation is not so marked. 
Over the years since the war, the addenda to the myth of Malaia zemlia, with their 
own ritualistic chronology, have been incorporated in tandem with the original, 
producing a uniquely complex local memorial time running alongside the national. The 
annual cycle of anniversaries is quite demanding: the town library and museum keep a 
special calendar so that nobody and nothing is forgotten.
601
 The erection of wartime 
monuments hinged on the most well-known anniversaries, many of them having been 
completed in a significant year after the war. Similarly, books dealing with local history 
or traditions tend to be published in key years. The Beskozyrka tradition, which was 
started on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the landings, has its own anniversary, too. One 
recent book, for instance, links the thirty-fifth anniversary of the landings with the tenth 
anniversary of Beskozyrka itself, giving almost equal importance to both, indicating that 
the mythical time of ritualistic tradition has virtually converged with linear historical 
time.
602
 A newspaper article in 2007 completely misunderstands the dates, though, 
confusing the commemoration with the actual historical event, and stating that 2007 
would see the thirty-ninth anniversary of the landings, rather than the thirty-ninth
 
anniversary of Beskozyrka.
603
 It is tempting to infer that the journalist was a relatively 
young person, for whom the fixed temporal horizon of 1968 seemed just as far away as 
1943, such that real time and mythical time have actually converged. Certainly, it 
provides further evidence that, for some at least, the act of commemoration has become 
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more significant than the distant event it commemorates, while also suggesting that 
memory of the Malaia zemlia campaign in Novorossiisk is indeed incomplete without 
the Beskozyrka tradition. 
Jan Assmann considers memorial rituals themselves to be suspended from the 
onward movement of linear time, forming 'islands of time', or 'memorial spaces'. 
Assmann's reading is supported by Eviatar Zerubavel's observation that what is 
historically worthy of commemoration appears amplified in time with respect to the 
mundane, suggesting that time appears to slow down at key points in the calendar. From 
a similar perspective, Christine Boyer visualizes days of remembrance as 'blank' spaces 
in the calendar.
604
 My research indicates that time is experienced differently by locals 
for Beskozyrka and on Victory Day. The latter is always a holiday from work, loved by 
all and celebrated by families together, both a 'blank' and a red-letter day. On the other 
hand, Beskozyrka breaks the established socio-temporal order, eating into free time on a 
long February evening, when many families would prefer to be at home.
605
 They would 
much rather be strolling the streets on 9
th
 May than 3
rd
 February, suggesting that 
Beskozyrka does not have the same impact as an 'island' on the memorial calendar as 
Victory Day.
606
 But since 2010, even the private time of those not taking part in the 
procession outside has been invaded by ritualistic time thanks to the 'candle in the 
window' movement, which also demands extra 'memorial space' as the Beskozyrka 
ritual expands into people's homes.  
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There is no doubting the spatial and temporal expansion of Beskozyrka. What 
started out as a small-scale evening event now takes up the whole of the day and 
evening on 3
rd
 February, and most of the previous day, as increasing numbers of 
delegates from other towns are invited to take part in an ever-longer programme of 
events in a growing statement of local identity. Furthermore, schools devote the whole 
month of February to patriotism, the new top topic of the Russian curriculum, almost 
seamlessly linking history of the landings on 3
rd
 February with Defender of the 
Fatherland Day (Den' zashchitnika Otechestva) on 23
rd
 February.
607
 Similarly, the 
colonization of time by wartime memorial dates impinges on other existing 
anniversaries in Novorossiisk. The anniversary of the 1943 liberation falls on  
16
th
 September, just days later than the anniversary of the town's foundation on  
12
th
 September (1838). A joint poster advertizes a full week of celebrations and 
processions, merging the original foundation of the town with its post-war re-foundation 
thanks to the liberation. Here, the more recent memory predominates, with the  
St George ribbon and other military symbolism covering all advertising material for 
both anniversaries. 
Under many circumstances, a tradition may gradually die out within a few 
generations due to inertia, reflecting the natural tendency of memory to decrease over 
time. In the case of Beskozyrka this has not happened, due partly to the programme of 
innovations and also to the dominant war cult of the Putin era. Since the war cult of the 
Brezhnev era the national tide has gone out and come back in again, and now, national 
and local memory seem to be synchronized. It was noticeable when I attended Victory 
Day in Novorossiisk in 2010 that the local procession was in line temporally with, if 
spatially distant from, the national celebrations on Red Square, through a projection of 
national events on an enormous screen. Commemorative time, reinforced by political 
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and popular will, seems to have the power to expand flexibly, to colonize adjacent days 
and even weeks. It is probable, though, that, with the death of the last veterans, time 
may eventually run in a more linear fashion, when historical rather than mythical time 
rules memory of the Great Patriotic War, and Malaia zemlia finally becomes distant 
local history in Novorossiisk. 
 
 
4.2.4 The turning of the tide 
In the Russian Orthodox tradition, the exact site of burial is a vital focus for socially 
prescribed mourning.
608
 In the case of soldiers lost at sea, with no obvious monument or 
grave for the individual bereaved family to visit, the simple sailor's cap floating on the 
waves provides the only focal point for tributes of flowers and the expression of 
emotion, much as the eternal flame for the Unknown Soldier provides a focus for 
memorial tribute in Moscow. 
The original Beskozyrka ceremony also served to fill a ceremonial vacuum in the 
Soviet Union. Celebrations in February are not uncommon in other societies to alleviate 
the tedium and hardship of the long winter before the days lengthen and the signs of 
spring appear. In a blend of Christian and pagan tradition, many countries hold a 
carnival week at the beginning of February before the onset of the rigours of Lent, 
although the traditional Russian carnival Maslenitsa was banned in Soviet times. 
Beskozyrka is neither joyous nor food-orientated, but does involve those elements of 
flame and liturgy more often associated with church ritual. Similarly, the sailor's hat is 
borne in procession and laid on the waves in an act resembling an offering to the 
memory of the landing troops. Reinforcing this interpretation, one respondent throws 
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sweets and biscuits into the sea behind the hat and the wreaths, as her own small 
sacrifice to the dead.
609
  
Secular collective memory and organized religion have much in common, with 
'sacralized' war memory perhaps becoming a surrogate religion or faith system in 
Novorossiisk. Candles are very often lit in a Russian Orthodox church in an act of 
memory and are carried by President Putin in official services of remembrance. The 
quasi-religious symbolism of the liturgy and ritual of Beskozyrka is evident in the 
symbols of light and fire, the imagery of sacrifice and martyrdom. According to 
journalist Evgenii Rozhanskii, each small flame in the 'living sea' of candles in the 
Beskozyrka procession represents 'the soul of a dead soldier'. With implicit religious 
symbolism, the new 'candle in the window' movement now effectively brings the sacred 
memorial ritual into the secular home, using the symbolism of the candle to shed light 
on memory. The placing of the candle on a windowsill, visible from the outside, also 
breaches any remaining barriers between the collective and the private with respect to 
memory.
610
 
Although few Soviet soldiers in the war were overt Christians, the Orthodox 
Church today is very close to the state, a situation accepted by veterans and encouraged 
by Putin, who ensures that priests pray for the war dead.
611
 The joint influence of state 
and Church should aid in principle both the retention of collective memory and the 
inculcation of conservative moral values. However, some of my respondents did not 
feel the necessity for the presence of a priest at Beskozyrka,
612
 viewing it as a purely 
secular occasion, despite the claim by local priest Father Georgii Fedorenko that 95% of 
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the population of Novorossiisk are Orthodox believers. Father Georgii considers his 
presence at Beskozyrka to be vital. He has been invited by the Mayor to attend in an 
official capacity for the last eight years, demonstrating the increasing importance of the 
Church in Russia both socially and politically. While wearing his own military medals, 
Father Georgii's role remains largely symbolic, as he is not usually invited to speak, in 
contrast to his input on other memorial occasions, such as re-interments, requiems and 
Victory Day.
613
  
Russian tradition holds the earth of graves as sacred, with implications for the 
sanctity of war memory in Novorossiisk through the soil.
614
 Anointed through the 
spilling of heroes' blood, Malaia zemlia has thus acquired the status of holy land. This 
was recognized by Georgii Sokolov: 'Malaia zemlia [...] is a sacred place for Black Sea 
troops', with even a sniper's rifle acquiring religious significance for a new generation of 
soldiers.
615
 This sentiment was embedded in the war myth upon the award of Hero-City 
status to the town in 1973: 'You live on sacred earth, where the blood of defenders of 
the Fatherland has poured onto every stone', which was captured in the popular song 
'Malaia zemlia, sviashchennaia zemlia' (Malaia zemlia, sacred land) of the same year.
616
 
Respondents confirmed that Malaia zemlia is regarded as 'sacred ground',
617
 land 
'soaked in blood',
618
 while the communal grave on Heroes' Square is regarded as 'the 
most sacred place in Novorossiisk'.
619
 Taking the sanctity of the land to an extreme 
degree, F5G declared that she would never swim in the sea locally, as it too covers 
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sacred ground.
620
 Religious superstition is also evident in flowers placed on one large 
stone as if on an altar located on the memorial wasteland adjacent to the Malaia zemlia 
memorial where the Beskozyrka procession ends. Reminiscent of a shrine, this stone is 
deemed by one respondent to be the site of the miraculous oozing of the blood of heroes 
from the earth on which they fell, as if in recognition of their martyrdom.
621
 
There is no doubt that religion does play a part in memory today, but, according to 
my evidence, that part is largely in the personal sphere, for example when individuals 
pay their respects to the fallen by their gravesides on Den' pamiati i skorby (Day of 
Remembrance and Sorrow) on 22
nd
 June, the more solemn anniversary of the start of the 
war in the Soviet Union in 1941, when a priest is usually present.
622
 There is a marked 
difference in tone of private commemoration concentrating on the pain of loss with the 
larger, official ceremonies which employ generalized expressions of martyrdom, sacred 
duty, love of the Motherland and patriotism.
623
 
Issues of personal mourning may no longer be applicable so long after the war, 
but individuals must still make a choice whether or not to attend a traditional ritual, 
even if subject to group pressure. The evidence in Novorossiisk demonstrates a strong 
commitment by attendees to the Beskozyrka ceremony in the face of often daunting 
weather conditions which serve only to strengthen the bond between those remembering 
and those remembered. Most participants in the Beskozyrka tradition are not simply 
passive spectators, but are able to justify their presence, usually accepting some 
physical discomfort as an aid to their interpretation of the ritual. This may not always be 
true for those simply watching a reconstruction, but it remains the case for those making 
the longer journey to the beach at Iuzhnaia Ozereika outside Novorossiisk. Here, the 
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genuinely involved younger participants are compared favourably with the original 
Shkhunatiki by Galina Krympokha, an Honoured Citizen of Novorossiisk, who is 
credited with keeping the 'Shkhuna rovesnikov' and its crew afloat over the long years 
since its inception: 'There are no indifferent eyes there'.
624
  
It is possible that the current wave of nostalgia for the Soviet Union plays a role in 
the popularity amongst older people of rituals of remembrance dating back to the 
Brezhnev era. In contrast, there is evidence that some young adults may have 
experienced enough of the Beskozyrka tradition following years of enforced 
participation as school-children.
625
 However, the tradition is re-fuelled with fresh blood 
as newcomers to the area seem keen to attend the ceremony,
626
 while locals bring 
friends from further afield to experience it at first hand,
627
 attracted by the unique 
maritime connotations of the ritual.
628
  
It is clear that there remains a place today for traditional ritualistic ceremony in 
this modern, youth-oriented society, despite the fact that an established tradition may be 
regarded as a sign of conservatism in a society, as it simply maintains the status quo. In 
Novorossiisk my evidence suggests that the combination of the new state-sponsored 
war cult of the Putin era, with the influence of the more reactionary, provincial older 
generations, is sufficient to counteract the sometimes anti-traditional attitude of young 
people. 
Although currently larger than ever, the numbers attending Beskozyrka remain 
substantially smaller than those celebrating Victory Day in Novorossiisk, mainly due to 
the different nature of the remembrance involved. As a celebration of national victory in 
1945, Victory Day is less solemn than Beskozyrka, although a requiem for the dead is 
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held early on Victory Day, before the start of the main celebrations. Citizens feel that 
Victory Day is a different type of event: national, happier and more celebratory, while 
Beskozyrka demands a more thoughtful approach to memory, which, according to some 
respondents, comes directly from the romantic soul of the young people of 
Novorossiisk.
629
  
The continuing sense of identification with Beskozyrka of the younger generation, 
with the gratitude and participation of many of their elders, maintains a sense of social 
cohesion that may easily have died out with other traditions during the 1990s. 
Furthermore, its original, specifically local interpretation endures, despite and also 
thanks to a series of changes, usually regarded as elements of creative enrichment of the 
ceremony and recently taking their inspiration from commemorative norms world-wide 
rather than a small local youth club. Shils may regard originality as the enemy of 
tradition,
630
 but, in Novorossiisk, it has helped to avoid any dilution of meaning and has 
guaranteed the longstanding popularity of Beskozyrka, which is now at an all-time high, 
with no sign of ritual fatigue. Official council figures state that 15,000 participants in 
2011 remembered the heroes of 1943,
631
 while figures for 2013 suggest that a record 
23,500 attended the ceremony (10% of the total population of the town), an indication 
of the growing popularity of the tradition.
632
 Although Beskozyrka remains a ceremony 
reinforcing local identity, Podyma has claimed that visitors from 270 other towns have 
taken part over the years.
633
 In 2011, for example, delegates were invited from other 
hero-cities to take part in a series of events and a ritual on a much larger scale, while 
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coverage on the national television news confirmed the status and identity of 
Novorossiisk nationwide.
634
 With the national focus in 2013 on the seventieth 
anniversary of victory in Stalingrad,
635
 however, the only visiting delegation to 
Novorossiisk was from the regional capital, Krasnodar. The considerable local and 
national media hype serves to convince many younger respondents that Beskozyrka is 
famous world-wide, such that they express naïve surprise that it remains unknown in 
Western Europe.
636
  
For today's ritual, it is the town council which bears the brunt of, and takes the 
credit for, the organization of Beskozyrka. This indicates a new uncompromising 
recognition of the significance of the ceremony on the part of the town. It is in this 
respect that responsibility for the propagation of memory has changed most 
significantly, with the original transmission of Beskozyrka by the younger generation 
now centralized and controlled by the local authorities, and the only remaining spark of 
individuality and spontaneity on the periphery now formally incorporated into the 
official mainstream narrative at Malaia zemlia.  
Young people in Novorossiisk appear today to be less able or willing to use their 
own initiative in the field of memory than in the Brezhnev era. What started as a rare 
example of a bottom-up ritual in the Soviet Union, albeit under the not insignificant 
influence of the Brezhnev era war cult and possibly the Komsomol leadership, has 
become more like the top-down type of invented tradition described by Hobsbawm, 
with its stress on the propagation of social values through collective memory. As Russia 
experiences a second cult of war memory under Putin, the Soviet emphasis on 
patriotism and moral education of the young are once again in evidence, affording 
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national and local conditions under which this unique remembrance ritual is thriving 
and where increasing empathy with the landing troops is demonstrated. It is notable also 
that, although started under Brezhnev, this ceremony has no connection with the former 
General Secretary, focusing instead on the individuals who died, and thus serves to 
deflect attention from his memoirs. There may be a growing audience of schoolchildren 
to ensure its future propagation, but, nonetheless, the tradition would not last unless 
enjoying popular approval from the public as a whole, with the support of local and 
regional authorities. The proactive maintenance of this tradition with its regular 
re-invention helps to define the mnemonic identity of the Hero-City of Novorossiisk 
and ensures that the myth of Malaia zemlia remains at the heart of the local community.  
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4.3.1 The place of the dead within collective memory: Trees, trenches 
and topography 
 
Мы были большими, как время. 
Мы были живыми, как время. 
Теперь — 
мы в легендах прославленных дней. 
Теперь — 
мы в поэмах и прозе. 
Теперь — 
мы в граните и бронзе 
Теперь — 
мы в безмолвье могильных камней.637 
 
Ritualistic commemoration is only one means of keeping war memory alive. Respect 
for the dead is demonstrated in other ways, more often individual rather than collective 
and less organized rather than planned, traditional remembrance. However, with natural 
lapses of memory and the death of living witnesses, each successive generation 
becomes further removed temporally, if not spatially, from the events of 1943, leading 
to the dissipation of memory with the passage of time. In this respect, memory behaves 
in a similar fashion to the thermodynamic concept of entropy. 
Entropy may be described as the probability of a closed system existing in a 
particular state, or simply its degree of disorder.
638
 Thus highly organized solids possess 
a low entropy, while more randomly organized fluids are higher in entropy. Entropy 
increases naturally with time,
639
 as organization of a system inevitably decreases, unless 
energy is expended in counteracting the resultant disorder. I shall therefore invoke the 
concept of 'societal entropy' as a useful tool for analysing the effects of the relentless 
                                                     
637
 'We were as big as time./We were as alive as time./Now we are found in legends of those renowned 
days./Now we are found in epic poems and prose./Now we are found in granite and bronze./Now we are 
found in the silence of gravestones.' Robert Rozhdestvenskii, 'Pesnia pavshikh v boiu' (1971), Robert 
Rozhdestvenskii: Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh, Vol. 2, Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 
1985, p. 496. 
638
 More scientifically, entropy, S, is equated to klnW, where k is the Boltzmann constant, and W the 
number of possible molecular arrangements (R. D. Harrison, ed., Revised Nuffield Advanced Science 
Book of Data, Harlow: Longman, 1984, p. 148). 
639
 This is one implication of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, see, for example, Graham Hill and 
John Holman, Chemistry in Context, Walton-on-Thames: Thomas Nelson, 1989, p. 395. 
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flow of physical time since the war in Novorossiisk. Without man-made intervention, 
the passage of time and natural increase in entropy would lead eventually to the 
complete atomization of memory resulting in collective forgetting. When external 
agencies intervene in the natural process, however, time can appear to stand still, and 
even go into reverse, as order is re-imposed on the natural process of decay. This 
process of reorganization demands the input of considerable energy: from the state in 
the form of a dominant war cult; from a community with the collective will to retain 
memory of the past through ritualistic and monumental remembrance; and even from 
exceptionally motivated individuals. It has been shown that energy is expended 
annually by the community in maintaining and even enriching the Beskozyrka tradition, 
rather than letting the tradition die out. Similarly, most local monuments are maintained 
rather than being allowed to fall into disrepair. It will therefore be argued that war 
memory in Novorossiisk exhibits an unnaturally low entropy status, a reflection of the 
collective will to promote and maintain respect for the dead.  
The modern town of Novorossiisk is a geographically limited memorial site, its 
topography a dynamic testament to the priorities of the community. The mnemonic 
identity of the Hero-City of Novorossiisk was largely established during the Brezhnev 
era when many monuments were erected and new streets named. An equilateral triangle 
inscribed across the bay delineates maritime memory, linking an existing World War I 
naval monument to the 'Defence Line' arch (1978), marking the Soviet front just outside 
Novorossiisk in the north-east, to the Malaia zemlia monument opposite, a stylistic 
motor launch which replicates the abstract triangular shape in concrete.
640
 
 
                                                     
640
 Information and plans thanks to the head of the regional planning department for monuments in 
Novorossiisk (01/04/2011). 
 224 
 
 
The Malaia zemlia memorial (1982)
641
 
 
  The functional town landscape must tread a fine balance between the need to 
remember and the need to forget.
642
 Thus the two hundred war monuments and 
forty-two streets named after war heroes present a real risk to memory inflation and 
consequent devaluation, with the possibility that they may gradually fade into the 
cityscape and be taken for granted.
643
 With the Brezhnev memorial statue a notable 
exception, monuments, once placed in their permanent position, normally remain there 
as a testament to collective memory, even if human memory starts to fail. However, the 
natural increase in entropy with time also dictates the gradual decay of stone and 
concrete. Shelley's poem 'Ozymandias' (1817) expresses this inexorable process, 
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 Photograph by author (10/05/2010). 
642
 Connerton identifies an inherent failure of war memorials, contending that, once erected, their 
presence assists communities to discontinue their duty of remembrance. (Connerton, How Modernity 
Forgets, 2009, p. 29.) 
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 Prialkina, 'Novorossiitsy chtiat i pomniat', 2005, p. 151; also the constantly updated collection of 
newspaper articles in the Novorossiisk Gor'kii Library: Ikh imenami nazvany ulitsy. See also Yampolsky, 
'In the Shadow of Monuments', 1995, pp. 93-4; and Nina Tumarkin, 'Story of a War Memorial', in World 
War 2 and the Soviet People, ed. John Garrard and Carol Garrard, New York: St Martin's, 1993, pp. 
125-146, p. 126. 
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depicting a monument subsumed by entropy, the decaying remains serving only to 
emphasize the dominance of time over the memory of a once-powerful ruler.
644
 In 
contrast, monuments that are well maintained can demonstrate both the desire of a 
community to retain memory and, transcending time, the importance to the community 
of the event or people commemorated.  
Towns often rely on old buildings as an everyday reminder of their history. This is 
not the case in Novorossiisk, however, where the joint bombardment of Soviet and 
occupying forces destroyed 96.5% of pre-war buildings.
645
 In the period of post-war 
reconstruction it was decided by the state to retain unaltered the shelled former palace 
of culture adjacent to the cement works as a monument to the damage endured by the 
town, rather like Dom Pavlova in Stalingrad.
646
 In a similar fashion, on the other side of 
the main road stands the rusty skeleton of a railway coach bearing the marks of 
hundreds of bullets. These two monuments have been left deliberately unreconstructed, 
symbols of the accelerated increase in entropy caused by the violence of war.  
There was a danger in the 1990s of many newer monuments falling into 
permanent disrepair, but this is certainly not the case in today's Novorossiisk, where 
most show signs not of decay, but rather of well-planned upkeep. Although the state 
controls the maintenance of some major Brezhnev-era memorials, the upkeep of most is 
devolved to the regional department for the preservation of monuments, and thence to 
local agencies. The Mayor, possibly with his shrinking budget in mind, holds public 
competitions to renovate monuments, while encouraging local firms and schools to 
sponsor the maintenance of their chosen memorial.
647
 For example, although originally 
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 P. B. Shelley, Percy Bysshe Shelley: The major works, ed. Zachary Leader and Michael O'Neill, 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 198. 
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 See footnote 153. 
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 Information from Galina Surmak. See also A. Gorognichenko, 'Zdanie-pamiatnik', NR, 13/09/1973, p. 
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 The annual Novorossiisk budget for the maintenance of monuments in 2010 was 1.25 million roubles, 
see 'Raskhody gorodskogo biudzheta', NR, 29/06/2010. The state's Ministry of Culture provided 1.4 
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under state control, and then taken over by the region, the upkeep of the concrete motor 
torpedo boat erected in 1968 and standing astride the promenade is in the de facto hands 
of a well-known Novorossiisk company.
648
  
 
 
Motor torpedo boat monument (1968)
649
 
 
More parochially, in Myskhako, the village just outside Novorossiisk, the budget is 
stretched by the local authority's encouragement of volunteers to spend weekends in 
April sprucing up the monuments in this vestige of Communism, the subbotnik day, 
dedicated to the refreshing of collective memory in time for the Victory Day 
celebrations.
650
  
                                                                                                                                                           
million roubles in 2011, but this was insufficient: Evgeniia Simanovich, 'Pamiatniki – v pochinku', NR, 
31/08/2011, ˂http://www.novorab.ru/ArticleSection/Details/3753 ˃ [accessed 05/09/2011]. See also 'V 
Novorossiiske prodolzhaetsia konkurs na luchshee soderzhanie pamiatnikov i monumentov', MNL, 
11/08/2009, ˂http://nrnews.ru/news/?id=37149˃ [accessed 04/09/2011]; and Simanovich, 'Pamiatniki – v 
pochinku', 31/08/2011.  
648
 According to records in the museum archives, the state was in control of this monument in 1974, with 
responsibility transferred to the region the following year, and back to the state in 1995 for renovations in 
1996. A plaque on the monument indicates that the firm 'OOO Delo' sponsored the renovations in 2005. 
649
 Photograph by author (02/04/2011). 
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 Interviews with the manager of the veterans' council, Myskhako (08/05/2010) and the Myskhako town 
councillor (23/03/2011).  
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Monuments demonstrate very low entropy both temporally and materially, while 
the present is fluid and ever-changing, always fading into the more entropic future. 
Unlike rituals, which may and do change, monuments and their associated space and 
time are generally more resistant to change. The monument's temporal stagnation 
neglects, however, the ravages that may be wrought by time itself, with its increase in 
entropy effecting a degradation as in the case of Ozymandias, which could well serve to 
diminish and alter its significance in the future. Moreover, a monument may reign in its 
own time-zone and space, but time moves on around it, during which its surroundings 
may change, potentially undermining the monument's meaning. 
In order to preserve the Malalia zemlia memorial in its own space-time zone, the 
conservation area around it has been left totally uncultivated,
651
 the ground still 
retaining the lines of the trenches established by the landing troops in the first days of 
the campaign.
652
 The whole area was curtained off from nearby buildings by a line of 
225 poplars, representing the number of days the land was defended. Time may have 
stood still in the protected area, but it moved rather too quickly on the perimeter. The 
expected lifespan of the trees was curtailed by the adverse climate in a triumph of 
entropic decay over man-made order. Likened by Novorossiiskii rabochii to the fallen 
landing troops, the dead trees were replaced by young ash trees in 2010, prized for their 
robustness in extremes of weather, and sourced, ironically, from Berlin.
653
 Continuing 
the simile, the head of the council's environmental department observed that the landing 
troops also wore green, and that the red autumnal leaves of the ashes recall the spilled 
blood of the brave troops.
654
 Today, the thin ranks of young trees stand guard over the 
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 According to documents held in the office of the museum archivist, the state is responsible for the 
monument's upkeep, while local authority architects are responsible for the area around it. 
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 See Rozhanskii, 'Zashchitnikam tvoim, podvigu tvoemu, Novorossiisk', 05/02/2014. 
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 Viktoriia Nikolaenko, 'Nemetskie iaseni budut derzhat' oboronu na Maloi zemle', NR, 05/11/2010. 
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 This observation is reminiscent of the widespread belief, particularly amongst older female 
interviewees (F5J, F5K, F6F and F8C), that the poppies flourishing on the rough ground around the 
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sacred site of Malaia zemlia, screening it from the quotidian, thanks to the new 
generation of local councillors who are actively endorsing the renewed national cult of 
war memory. 
If the Malaia zemlia complex is deliberately kept apart from the encroachment of 
new buildings, the spatial impact of the Valley of Death complex in Myskhako has been 
diminished by the intrusive presence of an avenue of large, dark trees and a complex of 
new houses.
655
 The organized row of tall concrete columns charting the events of the 
days of April 1943 at the height of the battle still dominates the small area, however, to 
the detriment of the main 'Explosion' monument, representing the mythical 1.2 tonnes of 
enemy metal that rained down on each of the Soviet troops on Malaia zemlia. 
 
 
The 'Explosion' monument (1974)
656
 
                                                                                                                                                           
monument are symbolic of the spilled blood of the landing troops. This may be compared with the 
symbolism attached to poppies as vehicles of memory in Great Britain. 
655
 Dedicated by Brezhnev during his 1974 visit. 
656
 Photograph by author (10/05/2010). 
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This sculpture vividly depicts the chaos of war, its shards of metal fused together 
randomly in a solid representation of a high-entropy situation, where death is just 
around the corner.  
In contrast, the Socialist Realist concrete of most of the other main war 
monuments in the town is the product of low-entropy, organized memory. This is the 
case of the monument marking the boundary of Malaia zemlia and occupied 
Novorossiisk. This example demonstrates further the mainly local significance of the 
town's monuments, as it depicts the Malozemelets Viktor Kaida, recognizable to many 
in Novorossiisk as he settled here after the war.
657
 
 
 
'Sailor with the grenade' monument (1972)
658
 
 
However, even seventy years after the war, the memorial landscape of 
Novorossiisk is not entirely static, with a new generation of statues and memorials for 
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 Kaida, Atakuet morskaia pekhota, 1980. Designed by two local veterans, the monument was erected in 
1972, eight years before Kaida wrote his memoirs. 
658
 Photograph by author (10/05/2010). 
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the town centre being publicly discussed.
659
 In contrast, on the periphery, some 
monuments have been allowed to fall into disrepair. When one of the first simple 
memorials high on the slopes of Mount Koldun started to disintegrate, artist Aleksandr 
Kamper designed a new monument, erected with his own resources in 2008.
660
 His 
successful attempt to take on the ravages of time and increasing entropy met with 
defeat, however, when the department for the preservation of monuments became 
involved and ordered him to remove the new monument on the grounds that it was not 
in keeping with the overall plan. Kamper retaliated by accusing the local authorities of 
being guilty of 'designer' rather than 'genuine' memory.
661
 After a second battle of 
Malaia zemlia, on this occasion a battle for the ownership of collective memory, during 
which Kamper won the support of the local press and its readers, his monument was 
eventually officially recognized in 2009.
662
 Kamper's supporters believe that the 
officials should be grateful for his help, deeming them reluctant to spend limited 
resources on the proper maintenance of outlying memorials, while concentrating largely 
on the more high profile, central monuments.
663
 In this case, overwhelming popular 
support from below succeeded in overcoming the top-down organization of monuments, 
which normally carries more weight than any bottom-up individualization of memory. 
It is fair to say that the town is doing (almost) everything in its power to maintain 
monumental memory of Malaia zemlia. Spontaneity with regard to ritualistic tradition 
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 For example, according to F5I, M6F and M7B, consultation is taking place about the popular demand 
from older residents for the erection of a monument to the khamsa, the small fish, which, according to the 
local war myth, kept the partisan population from starvation during the occupation. A new monument to 
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 Interviews with Aleksandr Kamper (09/05/2010 and 29/03/2011); confirmed by F5J, F5K, F7B and 
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 Matvei Prokopenko, 'Initsiativa nakazuema?', Nash Novorossiisk, 25/09/2008, 
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 Particularly F3K and F7B. 
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may be viewed as 'romantic', perceived to be at the heart of the bottom-up invention of 
the Beskozyrka ritual, but, where recent ceremonies and monuments are concerned, the 
organization of memory is paramount to the local authorities. Bottom-up 
individualization exists on the periphery, but is discouraged by top-down bureaucracy. 
Veterans may be succumbing to the effects of ageing, but monuments, in this respect, 
are more permanent than living memory, thanks to careful preservation which reverses 
the natural increase of entropy with time. If this maintenance should be halted, when 
there is perhaps no longer the political will or financial resources available, then chaos 
would set in, and monuments and memory crumble.  
 
 
4.3.2 People on the periphery 
Not only monuments but also dead bodies increase in entropy with decay. In the light of 
the distribution of the fallen on Malaia zemlia, the ongoing task of collecting together 
their scattered remains in order to pay due respect according to traditional values also 
involves an organizational decrease in entropy. Although thirty-seven communal graves 
have been established in Novorossiisk since 1943, the town still appears anxious to 
provide a fitting place of rest for all the fallen.
664
  In 2010 all the war dead from the 
town cemetery on Myskhakskoe Shosse were transferred to a new burial place across 
the road with a view over Malaia zemlia.
665
 New marble plaques list the names of over 
2,500 war dead of several nationalities, gathered together in this probably now final 
resting place.
666
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 Evgenii Aleksandrov, 'Bratskaia mogila', NR, 24/09/2010. 
665
 'Otkryt dlia poseshcheniia monument na Myskhakskom shosse', NV, 11/05/2010, p. 2. 
666
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president of Kabardino-Balkaria. 
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Not all lie in such salubrious circumstances, however. F7C has spent her 
retirement years collecting money to ensure the decent burial of the fallen. This 
altruistic 'Mother Teresa' of Novorossiisk, according to her friends, raised the money for 
the construction of new crosses on the site of a dozen vandalized graves in Myskhako, 
testimony that not all show the same respect for memory of the dead.
667
 Following her 
intervention, Maritime Academy cadets have taken on responsibility for the upkeep of 
the graves. Similarly, Aleksandr Kamper discovered two metal plaques in a Myskhako 
school yard, discarded from a nearby monument. Having found temporary, wooden 
boards in their place, with the names of the deceased written in marker pen, he 
successfully campaigned for the restoration of the original plaques.
668
 The battle against 
entropy is apparently not yet over in the outlying areas. 
Any high entropy, disorganized pattern of death is disturbing in the Russian 
tradition, where it is culturally important to bury a soldier near to home in order to 
complete the grieving process and enable remembrance to be conducted with both 
humanity and respect.
669
 Relatives still come to Novorossiisk in search of information 
about their ancestors, for example M6H, who travelled to Myskhako from the Urals in 
2010 in search of the final resting place of his father. Thanks to the meticulous records 
of the Veterans' Council, he was shown the communal grave where his father lay and 
was able for the first time to mourn his death as a result of his pilgrimage.  
According to local historian Tamara Iurina, it is impossible to quantify the 
number of dead in the campaign, with estimates ranging up to 30,000.
670
 What is 
                                                     
667
 Interviews with F6D and F7B. 
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 Matvei Prokorenko, 'Plity – na lom?', NN, 08/10/2008. 
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 Karen Petrone, The Great War in Russian Memory, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2011, 
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 Interview with Professor Tamara Iurina (05/05/2010). 
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undeniable, however, is that bodies continue to be exhumed, in a process lauded by the 
press, which sees the execution of search work a patriotic duty:
671
  
On the slopes of Mount Koldun and Sakharnaia golova outside 
Novorossiisk, and the Anonymous Heights around Iuzhnaia 
Ozereika, our soldiers' bones lie bleaching... It is said that the 
war will not be considered finally over until the last fallen 
soldier is buried.
672
  
Recently, over forty bodies were found on the shore in a hitherto unknown communal 
grave dating from the first days of the Malaia zemlia campaign.
673
 Sometimes bodies 
are found during excavations prior to building or reconstruction work; for example five 
skeletons were exhumed in 2009 under the auspices of the Novorossiiskii tsentr 
poiskovykh rabot (Novorossiisk Centre for Search Work) during the laying of 
foundations for a new school sports hall.
674
 Most exhumations, however, follow the 
location of bodies on Mount Koldun, which is constantly, if not entirely systematically, 
being searched by small groups of amateurs licensed by the Ministry of Defence. Teams 
must be fully trained and accredited in the appropriate methodology and are financed 
jointly by the state, the region and the local authorities, with some voluntary 
contributions.
675
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 Evgenii Lapin, 'Novorossiisk pomnit', NR, 18/09/2013, 
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M4D, an amateur archaeologist for over thirty years, is leader of the local branch 
of the regional search organization 'Nabat', which has several teenage members.
676
 He 
spends his weekends on Koldun with a metal detector, searching for the bodies of dead 
soldiers in order to have them reinterred in a respectful and organized way.
677
 
Unexploded grenades and shells are frequently unearthed and destroyed by experts; 
indeed, in 2010 M4D was decorated with the Za razminirovanie medal, awarded to 
those whose search work has led to the destruction of more than 3,000 explosive 
devices.
678
 According to M4D, his sons often accompany him into the forests of 
Koldun, which he sees as an opportunity to pass on memory, expertise and a love of 
local history. He regards this activity not only as aiding the propagation and 
organization of memory, however. In common with the inventors of Beskozyrka, M4D 
finds the whole adventure 'romantic', thanks to the combination of fresh air and nature 
during a night in the open 'by a campfire, under the starry sky'.
679
 It is this element of 
romanticism which has become synonymous with genuine and creative war memory 
from below in Novorossiisk, often to be found on the fringes of society and where 
young people are involved. 
Recently exhumed Soviet bodies are reinterred every year in September, the 
anniversary of the liberation of Novorossiisk, in a tradition dating from 1998. Sixty-two 
were buried in the cemetery on Kabakhakha Hill overlooking Novorossiisk in 2012, 
with a further twenty-five in 2013, while thirty-five bodies discovered on Koldun were 
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 Krasnodarskaia kraevaia obshchestvennaia poiskovaia organizatsiia 'Nabat'. The word means a funeral 
bell. Such search organizations were formed originally in the 1960s, see Wolfe 'Past as Present, Myth, or 
History?', 2006, p. 267. 
677
 M4D by personal email (12/04/2011). 
678
 Official statistics show that 83 hand-grenades and 655 mortars were dug up in the area as recently as 
2004: E. V. Romanov, 'Krovotochashchie rany voiny', in Novorossiisk: Pamiat' i Pravda o Velikoi 
Otechestvennoi voine, 2005, pp. 158-161, p. 160. F4C and F5G mentioned recent press reports of 
children losing limbs to unexploded devices. The Head of the Novorossiisk Historical Association 
confirmed the occasional discovery of 500kg unexploded bombs in outlying suburbs (26/03/2011). 
679
 M4D by personal email (12/04/2011). 
 235 
 
interred in 2010 in the communal grave in the centre of Myskhako.
680
 This gradual but 
substantial decrease in entropy brings together the scattered remains of decaying bodies, 
so that they may finally be identified, if possible. The details and personal possessions 
of newly discovered soldiers are passed to the town museum's archivist, who works 
meticulously on the identification process.
681
 The names are then entered into a memory 
capsule inside a red heart 'beating' at the apex of the triangular Malaia zemlia 
monument, the pinnacle of centralized memory in Novorossiisk, both spatially and 
organizationally. In 1982, when the monument was originally dedicated, 5,000 names of 
the fallen were listed in the capsule. Every year, on 8
th
 May, new names are added in 
what is called Aktsiia pamiat' (the Memory Movement). Reflecting the amount of 
search and identification work carried out recently on the site of Malaia zemlia and the 
slopes of Mount Koldun, a significant 991 new names were added in May 2012, with a 
further twenty-three on 16
th
 September, the thirtieth anniversary of the erection of the 
monument, making a total of over 14,000 identified dead troops afforded the official 
and central respect the town deems due to them.
682
  
Following lobbying by groups of amateur searchers, the state has recently 
committed to recognizing the fact that thousands of bodies across Russia still remain 
where they fell in the war. The remains of the first 'unknown soldier' were laid in the 
Aleksandrovskii Garden alongside the Kremlin wall on 3
rd
 December 1966, at the start 
of the Brezhnev era war cult. In 2014 the same day was officially named the Day of the 
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Unknown Soldier, one further memorial date in the increasing calendar of special days 
of the Putin era war cult.
683
  
 
 
4.3.3 The forgotten few 
The complementary work of the official agencies (the regional monuments planning 
department, the town council and the museum) and enthusiastic amateur search workers 
should ensure, in theory, that each individual soldier may eventually be recognized by 
collective memory. However, some of the bodies discovered on Koldun are inevitably 
those of the enemy. Experienced searchers recognize that German soldiers were usually 
buried more carefully than the Soviets, and often wore crucifixes.
684
 Search 
organizations try to involve families in the repatriation and burial of their dead. A 
coachload of German relatives visited Novorossiisk in the 1990s,
685
 and a video 
documentary was made more recently by a further German family travelling to 
Myskhako to reclaim their ancestor.
686
 If not repatriated, remains of Wehrmacht soldiers 
are passed on for re-interment to the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfürsorge, the 
German war graves commission.
687
 Since 2008, soldiers from the Kuban' front have 
been buried in a new German war cemetery in Apsheronsk, the only one in the south of 
Russia,
688
 as there is no German cemetery in Novorossiisk, due apparently to continuing 
prejudice against the occupiers.
689
 Although the searchers themselves claim to care 
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equally for bodies from both sides, they accept that it would be hard for most locals to 
treat German soldiers with the empathy shown to the Soviets.
690
 It seems that the myth 
of Malaia zemlia is not yet ready to accommodate a German war cemetery in the 
town:
691
 German trees may be welcome in Novorossiisk, but German bodies offer only 
awkward and unwanted memories of the 'fascist enemy' still popularly depicted with 
hatred.
692
  
One focus of revulsion for the enemy is a twenty metre obelisk at Volch'i Vorota, 
an isolated spot six miles to the northwest of Novorossiisk, which commemorates the 
many nameless civilians who were taken there by the Gestapo and shot during the 
occupation of Novorossiisk in an action superficially similar to Holocaust events in 
Ukraine. Indeed, the very name of the monument, 'Nepokorennym' (To The 
Unvanquished), is reminiscent of the film 'Nepokorennye' (The Unvanquished) about 
the execution of Kiev's Jews at Babii Iar in 1941.
693
 
This monument was erected on the twentieth anniversary of the liberation of 
Novorossiisk in September 1963, one of the first to appear outside the town centre. It 
was one of two large monuments inaugurated in the same week, marking for the first 
time the places where hundreds met their death. The main memorial was the stele at 
Stanichka, standing next to the beach where the landings took place and where the large 
Malaia zemlia complex would be constructed in 1982. In contrast to the highly visible 
monument on the shore, however, it may be concluded that the outlying memorial 
obelisk did not attract much public attention, as it is not mentioned in the leading article 
of Novorossiiskii rabochii's anniversary edition, where other town-centre monuments do 
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feature.
694
 The difference may be due purely to the location, but also possibly to the fact 
that the stele commemorates the deaths of service personnel, whereas the obelisk to The 
Unvanquished is a memorial to civilians. A short article a few days later refers to the 
thousand 'Soviet patriots' who were 'victims of a mass execution [by firing squad]'.
695
 
Similarly, the official entry in the Novorossiisk museum archives refers to a new 
monument 'erected on the place where the German fascist occupiers carried out a mass 
execution of residents of the town of Novorossiisk'. According to the plaque on the 
monument, it commemorates the 'residents of Novorossiisk and the landing troops of 
the Soviet Army who were tortured and shot on this spot in 1943 by the fascist 
occupiers', with no mention of the Jewish population of the town being specifically 
targeted by the enemy. In both cases the wording about the victims is as generalized as 
on the Holocaust memorial at Babii Iar, which refers only to the death of 'citizens of 
Kiev', a euphemism used to signify the city's Jewish population.
696
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Monument to The Unvanquished (1963)
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I first heard of the monument's existence after twelve years of annual visits to 
Novorossiisk. This silence may reflect its geographical position well outside the town, 
but also the fact that it is not commonly visited, situated also on the periphery of 
collective memory. A certain reticence about both the presence of the monument itself 
and the nature of the dead remains, evidence of some discomfort and possibly even of 
ongoing anti-Semitism in the town. Only four out of 124 respondents (3.2% of my 
sample) voluntarily mentioned the existence of this monument.
698
 The Jewish woman 
who first alerted me to its presence maintained that all those executed were Jews,
699
 
while an historian was adamant that the victims were simply representative of all those 
civilians who stayed in the town during the German occupation, mainly ethnic 
minorities, including Jews, Greeks, Czechs and Tatars.
700
 Another historian, however, 
agreed that most were Jews, although usually given the blanket term of 'Communists' in 
a half-hearted denial of a Holocaust event in Novorossiisk.
701
  
Scholars agree that memory of the war with respect to Jews in the Soviet Union is 
a troubled area. The lack of certainty about 'The Unvanquished' is a reflection of 
widespread silence about the Holocaust in the country for decades after the war. Even 
during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras public debate about Jewish citizens was often 
couched in generalisms, with the use of euphemisms and 'coded' references. Substantial 
official anti-Semitism and suppression of information about the Holocaust led to the 
virtual elimination of specific reference to Jewishness, and many films, plays and 
poems about the fate of Jews in the war were banned or heavily censored.
702
 Indeed, 
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only two years after the erection of the Novorossiisk monument, Elie Wiesel observed 
amongst the Jewish community in the Soviet Union a constant fear of informers, finding 
Jewishness 'somewhere between a dirty word and a state secret'.
703
 During the same 
period that saw the patriotic foundation of the Beskozyrka movement to commemorate 
the fallen landing troops of Malaia zemlia, a different type of right-wing, anti-Semitic 
Russian nationalism was evident in the country,
704
 probably partly responsible for the 
suppression of full details of a Holocaust event outside Novorossiisk. The continuing 
lack of explicit reference to Jews cannot be explained merely by the relatively small 
numbers of murdered Jews in comparison with overall Soviet deaths in the war. While it 
is possible that the Soviet population genuinely considered ethnicity to be irrelevant 
within an ideology which embraced internationalism, information about the fate of the 
Jews in the war was suppressed to the extent that it is only in the last two decades that 
knowledge of the Holocaust in the Soviet Union has become widely disseminated.
705
 In 
Novorossiisk lessons on the mass execution of Soviet Jews are now delivered in schools 
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by the local Jewish community,
706
 but do not feature specifically in the mainstream 
school curriculum.
707
 
If the monument to The Unvanquished outside Novorossiisk in fact recalls a 
Holocaust event, it is not, however, included in The Black Book of such mass 
executions in the Soviet Union, nor is there any reference to it in Iurina's recent history 
of the battle for Novorossiisk, or the new historical guide to the town.
708
 According to 
the head of the regional planning department in charge of the maintenance of 
monuments in Novorossiisk, a war commission reported in Novorossiiskii rabochii in 
January 1945 referred to the deaths on this spot of 425 Red Army soldiers and some 
sixty civilian women and children in 1942 and 1943. However, the Novorossiisk library 
today refers to the deaths of seven thousand 'peaceful citizens and prisoners of war', 
while the research website of the 'Babi Yars' organization has claimed that 1,000 of the 
pre-war population of 1,595 Jews in the town were shot here.
709
 Although the latter two 
claims are not incompatible, the death of 1,000 Jews out of a total of 1,595 represents a 
substantial proportion (63%) of the Jewish population of Novorossiisk, a statistically 
significant figure hidden in the library's overall number of 7,000 citizens out of an 
overall pre-war population of over 109,000 (which represents only 6% of the total 
number).
710
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If the background of the victims remains uncertain, so too does the date of the 
mass execution. The Babi Yars organization has stated that the Jewish population in 
Novorossiisk was massacred on either 22
nd
 September or 16
th
 October 1942,
711
 shortly 
after the German occupation commenced on 10
th
 September 1942, whereas witness 
testimony suggests that any remaining civilians in the town were either shot as partisans 
or fled the city during the period October 1942 to August 1943,
712
 which would accord 
with the date (1943) on the monument's plaque. It is likely, therefore, that, although the 
monument is stated to commemorate the deaths of all citizens plus some landing troops 
over a protracted period, it actually stands on the site of one mass execution of mainly 
Jewish civilians carried out in the early days of the occupation, while the mass grave 
was used for further non-Jewish victims during 1943. 
According to one newspaper article, which as recently as 2005 makes no specific 
reference to Jews, the thousands who were summarily executed were mainly women 
and children, as most of the men had already left to join the army or had been 
dispatched to German forced labour camps.
713
 In this respect, the monument to The 
Unvanquished belies the popular myth of Malaia zemlia, while the narrative of the 
events it recalls is similarly marginalized. Most monuments in Novorossiisk support the 
popular war myth, which extols individual and collective military heroism and 
martyrdom, rather than recalling the ignominious defeat and subsequent mass death of 
civilians. This indicates a myth composed of a comfortable, straightforward narrative 
around a usable past, from which any potentially embarrassing facts have been omitted, 
just as incidences of industrial unrest or corruption are often side-lined in Britain's war 
                                                     
711
 'Krasnodarskii krai', Bab'i Iary Rossii.  
712
 'Nepokorennye', NR, 14/09/2013, p. 9. Novorossiiskii rabochii covers this issue in a balanced manner 
in this recent article, providing testimony from two 'eye-witnesses' of the occupation: one a member of a 
Jewish family who recalls the German orders to the Jewish population to gather together prior to their 
execution, and one with connections to the partisan movement. 
713
 Evgenii Rozhanskii, 'Nepokorennye', Vol'naia Kuban', 22/01/2005, p. 6. 
 244 
 
myth.
714
 Indeed, two of the few interviewees who suggested that Novorossiisk did not 
really deserve its Hero-City status gave the reason that no civilians were present or 
suffered during the fighting, in contrast with the first tranches of 'genuine' 
Hero-Cities.
715
 
The Jewish community is unable to commemorate its dead either individually or 
communally in the central and concrete fashion enjoyed by other ethnic minorities. For 
example, the Greek residents of Novorossiisk openly commemorate their own hero, the 
wartime pilot Vladimir Kokkinaki, whose bust stands in the middle of the town.  
 
 
 
Monument to Vladimir Kokkinaki (1975)
716
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According to respondents of Greek nationality, on Victory Day Greeks gather around 
the monument to lay tributes of remembrance, singing and dancing in the shade of the 
trees,
717
 while a plaque of remembrance on the wall of the side-chapel of the Uspenskii 
sobor, the main Russian Orthodox church, lists two hundred names of those of Greek 
ethnicity who died in the war.
718
 
Remembrance and respect for the dead of the Jewish community, in contrast, 
exists on the periphery of official memory, evidence of prejudice and discomfort still to 
be found in certain hidden and sensitive areas of Novorossiisk's past, despite attempts 
by the Jewish community to incorporate itself into mainstream war memory through an 
exhibition in the central Veterans' Council and to present itself as part of the town's rich 
ethnic heritage in the main children's library.
719
 It is probable that the Jewish 
significance of the monument to The Unvanquished is implicitly acknowledged by 
many, including possible anti-Semites. It was desecrated in 2003, according to a Jewish 
information website, which openly accuses the town in general and Novorossiiskii 
rabochii in particular of racial intolerance, although other monuments with no minority 
ethnic connotations have been similarly vandalized.
720
 Unlike the mainstream Soviet 
troops buried in Novorossiisk, the names of the civilian Unvanquished are not 
remembered, in contrast with the locally well-known name of the Jewish soldier and 
poet Pavel Kogan, who was certainly admired by the post-war younger generation, 
although his ethnicity was not overtly mentioned by the Shkhunatiki.
721
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Whereas the press now reports some executions during the occupation,
722
 evident 
embarrassment about the monument's significance was shown by the regional officer in 
charge of monuments, who, when questioned, refused to discuss with me the event 
commemorated by the memorial. This type of reaction is confirmed by Stephen Lovell, 
who deems the topic of occupation awkward in view of 'current political concerns' 
which may imply allegations of collaboration with the enemy within occupied territory 
in the betrayal of Jewish civilians,
723
 certainly not a part of the original war myth, but an 
area coming under increasing popular and academic scrutiny, particularly in western 
areas of the former Soviet Union, notably Ukraine and the Baltic states.
724
  
Collaboration during the occupation of Novorossiisk was acknowledged by local 
historian M5E, while academic F3H confirmed that this is a research topic in local 
universities. My evidence suggests that collaboration with the enemy is suspected 
amongst some interviewees, if largely unspoken. Three respondents indicated that 
occupied cities in Ukraine became 'stigmatized' due to an enemy presence which 
induced collaboration,
725
 while Novorossiisk was viewed as above 'contamination' 
thanks to the 'sacred' presence of the troops on Malaia zemlia,
726
 which placed the town 
above suspicion and on a par with Leningrad and Stalingrad. Only after several 
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meetings did one respondent trust me sufficiently to voice the rumour that the Kuban' 
Cossacks had assisted enemy forces to enter and occupy Novorossiisk, in view of the 
fact that the town was defeated apparently without much opposition.
727
 The implication 
of Cossacks in the occupation is, however, at odds with the official current stance 
whereby Cossack forces are invited to take part in ceremonies of remembrance, for 
example Beskozyrka and Victory Day, in an apparent political positioning of the 
identity of the town around its Cossack heritage as well as its maritime status, in what 
may represent a vying for position with Krasnodar, the regional capital and historically 
the base of the Kuban' Cossacks.
728
 This conservative and potentially nationalistic 
re-alignment of the identity of the town has, however, provoked questions about the 
integrity of their inclusion in official ceremonies as they are not 'natives' of 
Novorossiisk, evidence of ongoing suspicion of Cossacks amongst some residents.
729
 
On the whole, however, the memory message in Novorossiisk demonstrates 
considerable consensus, with a common attitude to history underlined by a common 
geographical identity with respect to the war.
730
 This memory exhibits the low societal 
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entropy status typical of considerable organization and centralization, reflecting the 
energy expended to promote and maintain rituals and monuments by both state and 
society. Despite the overall control of the authorities, however, it is clear that there is 
still room on the fringe for the personalization of memory, whether it concerns the 
family of a German soldier or the distant son of a Soviet battle victim. It is also the case 
that memory seems more personal in Myskhako, on the periphery of the control of the 
Novorossiisk authorities, but at the very centre of the worst of the battle. This close-knit 
community appears to care deeply and genuinely about the honour due to its war dead, 
seeing them as people rather than mere statistics. Away from the centre of Novorossiisk, 
the villagers retain a close connection with the earth, demonstrating a greater respect for 
old Russian burial traditions than huge Soviet monuments. Dissent, when it exists, 
serves only to promote the values of dignity and humanity in death and remembrance, 
which sometimes risk being forgotten in the official narrative. Official and unofficial 
interests often complement each other constructively, with a common mnemonic aim; 
on occasion, however, the tension between so-called 'designer' and 'genuine' memory is 
evident in the ongoing local debate over who is the true guardian of memory.   
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4.4 Conclusion   
My research reveals Novorossiisk as typical of contemporary Russian society from the 
point of view of nationwide commemorative events: Novorossiisk boasts as many if not 
more monuments than other occupied towns, rendering the town's history difficult to 
forget. However, remembrance here shows some idiosyncratic features, notably the key 
monuments specific to the town and the commemorative Beskozyrka ritual, all proving 
that remembrance was capable of taking on a distinctly local form, even under the 
centralized and authoritarian conditions prevalent in the Soviet Union. It is largely the 
unique Beskozyrka ceremony, in addition to the legendary Brezhnev connection, which 
distinguishes Novorossiisk from other Hero-Cities of the former Soviet Union.  
Led by the Mayor and the media, the population as a whole takes part in Victory 
Day celebrations and many support the Beskozyrka tradition, which continues to 
complement the nationally propagated war myth. The positive stance of the local 
authorities on the regular rejuvenation of the local ritual and the maintenance of most 
central monuments provides evidence of their political utility in promoting the town's 
mnemonic identity. The battle against the entropic decay of monuments by the ravages 
of time appears to be won for the moment. The top-down emphasis on organization with 
respect to both ceremonies and monuments produces a low entropy state for memory 
with little room for individualization or bottom-up initiative such as that perceived in 
the foundation of the Beskozyrka movement. On the other hand, and paradoxically 
despite the increase in centralization of war memory with time, Novorossiisk still 
professes an admiration for the tradition of romanticism and spontaneity associated with 
war memory from below.  
It is also apparent that, amidst remembrance on a large scale, there is scope for 
small groups of enthusiastic and committed searchers on the periphery to make a 
difference on an individual scale, to guarantee the place of the dead both physically and 
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metaphorically, demonstrating that there is still a place for grassroots action in the 
memory field. It is here on the geographical fringe, however, that my evidence suggests 
that any dissent and questioning of the official memory message is more likely to occur.  
Respect for the Soviet military war dead is widespread in Novorossiisk, despite 
isolated instances of vandalism. When it comes to memorialization of non-mainstream 
groups, notably enemy troops and civilians, my evidence indicates that they are largely 
ignored both officially and in the popular consciousness.  In these cases, respect is only 
shown by their immediate families in the case of German soldiers, or by the Jewish 
community, in the case of The Unvanquished, where historical silence is evidence of a 
long-term and ongoing struggle to come to terms with some aspects of the past that do 
not conform to the official war myth. 
 My research has also revealed a unique perception of mythical time in 
Novorossiisk, which expands and contracts flexibly while occasionally dominating 
historical time. This is a key factor in the establishment of cross-generational empathy 
and identity, a subject pursued in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
The mnemonic socialization of the young through formal and informal 
education 
Помните! 
Через века, 
       через года,— 
помните! 
О тех, 
кто уже не придет 
       никогда,— 
помните!731  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
A group of cynical young searchers for war artefacts outside modern Saint Petersburg is 
suddenly transported back through time to besieged wartime Leningrad. Their 
experience of the fear and hardship of soldiers in the trenches builds up 
cross-generational empathy and even love, which changes their moral perspective on 
the war. This is the fictional story-line of the film 'My iz budushchego' (We are from the 
Future), 2008, drawn to my attention by some younger interviewees who claimed that it 
had influenced young people in Novorossiisk.
732
 The film addresses the fact that some 
of the younger generation in Russia are becoming more diffident about the war with 
increasing temporal distance from historical events. At the same time numbers of 
veterans and participants in the war are decreasing inexorably, rendering direct 
transmission of memory to the young less viable. Rather than letting memory of the war 
fade into history, however, the town of Novorossiisk appears to be promoting 
mnemonic social cohesion within the framework of a new state war cult through a series 
                                                     
731
 'Remember!/Across the centuries, across the years, - / remember! /About those who will never 
return, - /remember!' From Rozhdestvenskii's 'Rekviem' (1960): Robert Rozhdestvenskii: Sobranie 
sochinenii v trekh tomakh, Vol. 1, Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literature, 1985, pp. 205-218. 
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 M2F, M3B, M3C, M3D, F4C, F4J, F4H and M4D. Andrei Maliukov, 'My iz budushchego', Russia: 
2008, the first of a trilogy of films. 
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of educational measures designed to effect the successful transmission of the agreed 
local war myth from generation to generation.  
This chapter assesses the effectiveness of the inter-generational propagation of the 
war myth in Novorossiisk by an analysis of the various mechanisms deployed by 
different social groups within the community of remembrance to educate the younger 
generation individually and collectively. It is difficult to imagine the propagation of 
social memory without interaction between members of the community. Different 
'frames of remembrance' and 'spheres of influence' around a young citizen exist through 
agencies such as the state, the family and mainstream educational establishments.
733
 
Each individual is influenced by the various overlapping social circles of which they are 
a member, for example in the case of young people the school, youth club, local library 
or their own immediate and extended family, whilst they are also influenced more 
remotely by national and local mass media. A spectrum of different agencies of 
influence, from the individual to the state, may thus be invoked, incorporating a 
multitude of voices often reinforcing each other, but possibly varying in their attitude to 
memory. No one of these agencies may offer a totally correct reading of memory, but, 
when put together, they establish a largely coherent overall narrative.  
The education of the young in memory matters takes place both formally and 
informally: in educational institutions, within the family and in the wider social circle. 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the most effective means of propagation to the 
younger generation, those who will in the future potentially bear responsibility for 
further transmission of the war myth. The formative influence of older generations on 
the young in the propagation of historical memory through conservative and conserving 
                                                     
733
 Irwin-Zarecka, Frames of Remembrance, 1994; Ashplant, et al., 'The Politics of War Memory and 
Commemoration, 2000; and Peter Carrier, 'Political and Ethical Contexts of Collective Memories of the 
Second World War', in Recalling the Past - (Re)constructing the Past: Collective and individual memory 
of World War II in Russia and Germany, ed. Withold Bonner and Arja Rosenholm, Iyvaskyla, Finland: 
Gummerus, 2008, pp. 245-255.  
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institutions, such as the family or museums, is well documented in scholarship, where 
the normative transmission of systems of beliefs and practices is recognized as the root 
of social cohesion.
734
 I have observed that this is reinforced in Novorossiisk by a 
tendency for what I term 'reverse propagation', where the young transmit back the 
memory message to their elders, a spontaneous phenomenon which serves to 
consolidate and maintain the myth. In contrast, more modern influences such as the 
mass media and films may undermine the consistency of transmission, while a 
rejuvenation of the message has been noted in ritualistic tradition.  
Successful cross-generational transmission of memory depends on effective 
communication between generations, the opposite of any possible generation gap in 
society which may cause inter-generational tension and lack of understanding. In 
contrast to Western society, the post-war Soviet Union vaunted the absence of a 
generation gap, actively encouraging 'meetings of generations' (vstrechi pokolenii) 
whereby the moral education (vospitanie) of young people was formally effected by 
their elders, often citing examples of wartime heroism and patriotism.
735
 This chapter 
examines the renewed deployment of veterans today in the vospitanie of the young,  
alongside continuing moral education by family members and teachers, where 
individual and collective memory of the war is propagated at the confluence of 
generations.  
The very act of transmission of the war myth serves also to reinforce the identity 
of all citizens of Novorossiisk with respect to the Malaia zemlia campaign, linking them 
in a quasi-familial mnemonic chain to the landing troops. My analysis of the relative 
influence of the various agencies promoting remembrance permits the construction of a 
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 See Durkheim, Moral Education, 1925; Marc Bloch, 'Mémoire collective, tradition et coutume: A 
propos d'un livre récent', Revue de synthèse historique, 40, 1925, pp. 73-83; Halbwachs, On Collective 
Memory, 1992; and Shils, Tradition, 1981.  
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hierarchical model of social interaction demonstrating the complexity of the memorial 
influences on society in general and young people in particular.  
Evidence for the cross-generational transmission of memory through official 
education was captured by an examination of school syllabuses and targeted interviews 
with the Deputy Mayor in charge of education and schools; four headteachers; the 
Deputy Principals of the Maritime Academy and the Novorossiisk branch of the 
Moscow Institute for Economics and the Humanities; five lecturers in higher education, 
including three history specialists; ten schoolteachers; and four librarians. The 
mechanism of unofficial education was evaluated by an analysis of all my research 
interviews, with particular reference to the responses of veterans and young people.  
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5.2 Genes and generations: Informal transmission of memory in the 
family 
Images and symbolic constructs of 
the past are imprinted, almost in 
the manner of genetic information, 
on our sensibility.
736
 
 
 
In 2017 a 200-tonne memory capsule currently resting on the sea bed will be opened in 
Novorossiisk. Dreamt up and organized fifty years previously by the 'Shkhuna 
rovesnikov', it contains 'letters to the future' written by 118 adults and children to their 
descendants.
737
 Among the memorial articles offered by the public and sealed in the 
capsule are several war medals, evidence that the propagation of war memory to future 
generations was deemed important by residents as early as 1967. It seems that these 
descendants concur: journalist Evgenii Lapin writes in 2013 of the 'return to a duty of 
memory' as 'the most important task of patriotic education'.
738
  
Generations are thus mutually linked in two directions in the transmission of the 
war myth: looking backwards to their antecedents and forwards to their descendants in a 
mnemonic chain. Although the Shkhunatiki were only one generation removed from 
their parents who fought in the war, young people today are temporally more distant 
from the war experienced by their great-grandparents. With veterans becoming fewer, 
artefacts such as war medals, which bridge mnemonic distance, are increasingly 
significant in the propagation of memory if the past is to become closer in the 
imagination of the younger generation. While examining the mechanism and 
effectiveness of the familial transmission of memory, this section analyses whether the 
family as an integral part of society, where physical proximity is often most marked, 
values and even needs its ancestors in order to retain its mnemonic identity. Information 
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 George Steiner, In Bluebeard's Castle: Some notes towards the re-definition of culture, London: Faber 
and Faber, 1971, p. 13. 
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 Saloshenko, Obiazan skazat', 1998, p. 16; and Sokolova, Beskozyrka, c. 2005, p. 10. 
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 Evgenii Lapin, 'Novorossiisk pomnit', 18/09/2013. 
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about the mechanism of familial propagation of memory was obtained from two 
perspectives: from discussions with younger respondents and with older generations, 
some of them war veterans. Personal interviews with twenty-two young adults aged 
eighteen to twenty-nine revealed that a substantial 59% of subjects had discussed the 
wartime role of their grandparents and great-grandparents with them, indicative of oral 
transmission of memory through meaningful conversations.
739
  
This type of propagation appears to be responsible for what I term the 'genetic' 
construction of memory through the family, a method of propagation typical of 
traditional pre-Soviet folkloric transmission, whereby older family members act as links 
in a memory chain which connects today's citizens genetically with the landing troops. 
Already in the nineteenth century the Russian poet Mikhail Lermontov had referred to 
Russian soldiers at the Battle of Borodino as 'a mighty, spirited tribe',
740
 underlining in 
the language of Romanticism the positive military traits possessed by the soldiers which 
were passed down to their descendants. Two hundred years after Borodino Vladimir 
Putin held his 2012 election address, perhaps not by chance, on 23
rd
 February, Defender 
of the Fatherland Day, when Russian military courage is celebrated. Putin utilized this 
occasion to proclaim: 
We are a victorious nation. This is in our genes, in our genetic 
code and it is transmitted from generation to generation.
741
 
In contrast, Serguei Oushakine points to a link with the past through a more negative 
continuity, whereby generations are united in sadness through rituals of loss, 
symptomatic of a 'patriotism of despair'.
742
 This claim refers largely to victims of more 
recent wars and is an aspect of genetic inheritance not observed in the Hero-City of 
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 Serguei Oushakine, The Patriotism of Despair: Nation, War and Loss in Russia, Ithaca, NY and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2009, p. 6. 
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Novorossiisk, where Beskozyrka and commemorative requiems highlight gratitude 
today for victorious and justified death during the Great Patriotic War, rather than 
despair over the 'devalued military sacrifice' perceived in the wars in Afghanistan and 
Chechnia during the unstable final decades of the twentieth century. 
In Novorossiisk the genetic belief system stresses continuity with the past - not 
with the Soviet Union in general, but rather through a local, familial connection which 
is also evident in the feeling of empathy with the landing troops demonstrated 
particularly at Beskozyrka.
743
 My research indicates that the propagation of memory is 
linked to the transmission of a belief and behaviour system as if through cultural DNA, 
due partly to the strong sense of tradition in the town and partly to the educational 
mnemonic environment cultivated by the state, schools and the local authority as well as 
within the family unit. Many of my interviewees were able to point to their individual 
ancestors who had fought locally and subsequently settled in Novorossiisk, while 
respondents at both ends of the age spectrum claimed that they had inherited the hardy 
and heroic character of their forebears.
744
 Moreover, social memory in general is 
deemed by some to be transmissible through the blood-line in a similar fashion,
745
 with 
one town councillor regarding collective memory as 'our blood, our duty, future and 
past together'.
746
 It is this perceived duty of memory which seems to motivate the older 
generations to educate younger family members in the tradition of commemorative 
practices. Extrapolating from the individual to the community in general, the 
headmistress of School No. 6 observed that the heroism typical of wartime is 
transmitted through ritual, as if 'caught' by the younger generation in the form of 
improved behaviour: 'geroicheskoe iavlenie diktuet povedenie' (an heroic event dictates 
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 'The harsh weather reminded their descendants of the conditions in which Kunikov's troops landed in 
the icy waves of the Black Sea.' Rozhanskii, 'Zashchitnikam tvoim, podvigu tvoemu, 05/02/2014. 
744
 Notably M1A and F8C. 
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 See also Hodgkin and Radstone, Contested Pasts, 2003, p. 153. 
746
 M5D. 
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behaviour).
747
 One local historian commented on this phenomenon, claiming that 'it is 
as if they drink it in their mothers' milk',
748
 while a former soldier believes that the 
town's inhabitants 'were born' from Malaia zemlia,
749
 suggesting that the courageous 
qualities of the heroes are as desirable in a family as in a tribe or race. Indeed, a young 
teacher sees war memory as part of the town's 'living organism', whereby knowledge 
about Malaia zemlia is 'naturally' assimilated.
750
 Claims of a passive, informal 
assimilation of both heroic qualities and memory itself, much as first language 
acquisition, must, however, be questioned, due to the many more formal measures taken 
to ensure the mnemonic socialization of the young. Whatever the mechanism of 
transmission, the resulting sense of familial memory and cross-generational 
identification nurtured in the young is epitomized in the memorial slogan ubiquitously 
found on school walls in Novorossiisk: 'Pobeda deda moia pobeda' (My grandfather's 
victory is my victory). 
One manifestation of the inter-generational transmission of values is the 
post-wedding ritual, where myth is effectively propagated as generations come together 
at local war memorials to lay flowers as a token of respect to the war dead.
751
 Although 
in many cases the original meaning of this tradition has been lost, for the first post-war 
generation such visits in homage to the heroes were extremely important.
752
 Most of 
those mainly female respondents who volunteered relevant information interpreted this 
pan-Russian tradition as a mark of gratitude and indebtedness to ancestors who had 
given their own lives so that their children and grandchildren would be able to live in 
                                                     
747
 Interview 27/10/2010. 
748
 M5E. 
749
 M4B. 
750
 F3A. 
751
 See Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead, 1994, p. 144. 
752
 F4E and Prialkina, 'Novorossiitsy chtiat i pomniat', 2005.  
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freedom and happiness.
753
 The sites most frequently visited are the main Malaia zemlia 
memorial complex and the smaller Valley of Death complex in Myskhako, where it is 
apparently usual for the bridegroom to pose at the base of a map of the Malaia zemlia 
campaign, while the bride climbs to the top for the photographs,
754
 in a pose suggesting 
the supremacy of the woman in the new family. Evdokiia Prialkina also refers to visits 
to the Well of Life monument in Myskhako, linking the only water source on Malaia 
zemlia with the successful future of young married couples. Justifying the local 
meaning behind the tradition using a further genetic trope, she claims that the 
characteristic of faithfulness is transmitted from the landing troops to the younger 
generation: 'It is as though the Malozemel'tsy, through their heroic lives, bequeath their 
faithfulness to young people in their life together.'
755
 
 
It is thus implied that the mutual 
loyalty of a married couple guarantees the continuity of life through the floral tributes to 
the war dead. Furthermore the Soviet post-war expression of lament at the death of 
millions of young soldiers, 'Skol'ko ne rodilos' detei pogibshikh soldat' (How many 
soldiers' children were never born!),
756
 implicitly places a duty on a new family to 
replace both those who died and their unborn children. The war myth and the 
celebration of married life are thus linked with the necessity and ability, through water 
from the Well of Life, to procreate and propagate a new family. Here, in a symbolic 
exchange,
757
 the newly-weds leave flowers in thanks for the gift of life, both theirs and 
those of their yet unborn children, who may also inherit the heroic character of the war 
dead, in what seems to be almost a fertility ritual. From my discussions, however, the 
subtleness of interpretation of this tradition by the older generations is lost on the 
young, who seem to act out of custom alone, with no overt reference to the war except 
                                                     
753
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the use of monuments as a backdrop for wedding photographs,
758
 providing memory of 
a different kind for the new family unit. 
In modern Novorossiisk there is evidence that the conservative values of the 
post-war years still exist, as many adults praise the return in the twenty-first century of 
aspects of vospitanie and patriotic education familiar from their own youth in the 
Komsomol or Young Pioneer organizations.
759
 Any potential generation gap is partly 
narrowed by this nostalgia for what parents and grandparents deem idealistic aspects of 
the Soviet past. However, despite the general strength of family bonds and the varied 
mechanisms by which the young are exposed to war memory in Novorossiisk, my 
research indicates that there are some families who do not pass on the memory tradition 
from one generation to another. One elderly man, a child during the war, blamed the 
family if a child is disaffected, seeing it as their clear duty to transmit memory,
760
 
although young parents born at the time of change may have different values and little 
regard for memory.
761
 Some children may live in small family units or atomized 
families who do not spend much time together, such that they are not exposed to an 
upbringing which includes discussions within the family about the war.
762
 This situation 
is seen as abnormal by some of my respondents: families are accused of being 'illiterate' 
or 'bad parents', incapable of joining in the collective social movement for memory 
transfer,
763
 while others are considered 'nepravil'nye liudi' (not proper people).
764
 This is 
an indication that an educated, well brought up young person is expected by society to 
think in a socially correct way about the war, due to the 'proper' promotion of socially 
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accepted traditional values within the family. Any deviation that may threaten social 
cohesion invites condemnation. 
A sense of connection with the past may be imbued with the mediation of family 
archives, letters, photographs and other artefacts, which render memory more vivid and 
tangible, engaging younger generations more than a dry narration. Although some older 
respondents narrated their histories to me without any material props, others employed 
old photographs to mediate their account. According to my observations, visual aids 
may act as aides-mémoire, partly dictating the rote repetition of narratives. I observed 
this with two older women who recounted their own memories of the war to me 
identically on two occasions, both times clutching photographs of themselves as young 
women.
765
  
Harald Welzer's study of intergenerational family narrations finds that they can be 
gradually re-shaped over time due to re-evaluation and the need for a new meaning as 
any changes in the political environment affect the perceptions of both the teller and the 
listening descendants.
766
 Similarly, Raphael Samuel and Paul Thompson argue that 
mythical elements in both public and private collective memory form a continuing 
historical presence, being continually reshaped for the utility of an individual.
767
 
Retrospective re-positioning of one's own life story may enable the deployment of some 
historical perspective, as in the case of memoir literature. Kirschenbaum finds alongside 
this a common renegotiation of the narrator's identity in order to maintain the 
compatibility of individual and collective memory.
768
 Although it is not possible to 
confirm that this is happening in individual cases in Novorossiisk, it is known that, 
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whereas during the war soldiers would declare that they were fighting for Stalin,
769
 later 
memoirs declared that they were fighting for Communism,
770
 while accounts today hold 
that the war was fought for the people (narod).
771
 Welzer finds that oral narratives 
become simpler over time, with any problems and ambiguity removed, and plots 
rearranged to form an idealized linear account, much as in the case of the war myth in 
general and as is evident in local memoir literature.
772
 Consistency of narrative was 
demonstrated in one woman's story of her childhood in the war, related to me in 
identical terms on three different occasions, providing evidence of the rehearsed version 
of the past which she wished to propagate.
773
 
While there are clear parallels between collective memory and that of individuals, 
it is important to note the significance of group collective memory for the individual 
within the dominant influence of the state war cult, despite the variety of wartime 
experiences of my interviewees, who included military personnel, deportees and child 
internees.
774
 Jerome Bruner and Carol Fleischer Feldman propose that groups develop 
shared stories to define their identity and in order that members may find a common 
significance in their own memorial narratives which make use of a shared culture.
775
 It 
has been noted by scholars that individuals accommodated their own memories within 
Soviet ideology, while retaining their individual histories despite an overriding state 
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narrative,
776
 leading sometimes to a difference between the memory of individuals and 
the state-propagated myth.
777
 
This concurs with my findings of the subjective situation of some personal 
narratives within the collective, evidence of a complex interrelationship of private 
memory and public ideology, past and present. However, my interviewees' generally 
rather diffident and self-deprecating accounts do not conform with Welzer's claim of a 
'cumulative heroization' of the protagonist over time,
778
 particularly those events related 
by deported Crimean Tatars.
779
 Most of my older interviewees tended to place a positive 
spin on the end of their war stories, which always ended with the highlight of their 
career, that is where they were when the war ended on Victory Day 1945, or how they 
returned to Novorossiisk to build a new life after the war.
780
 This could, however, be a 
biased result, as my sample in this age range was limited and it is possible that survivors 
who felt less positive about their war experiences may not choose to relate them to a 
stranger. One interesting and full account showed the influence of others' war memoirs 
which had probably caused the narrator to re-formulate her own history. She claimed to 
have been present at events depicted by others of which it was unlikely that she had any 
direct memory,
781
 indicating possibly some distortion or self-delusion possibly causing 
unconscious changes in narrations of memory over time. 
Individual memories narrated today may not always be totally reliable, but do 
represent a personal mnemonic construction within collective social memory, 
sometimes indicative of subjective tension between memory and history. It is 
impossible to measure in retrospect the accuracy of an individual's memory with regard 
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to historical fact, but Schudson, Connerton and Schacter all emphasize the probability 
of increasing distortion and (sometimes selective) forgetting with time. If detail is lost 
over time, it is also possible that the voiced memory of any pain or humiliation in the 
past is suppressed, whether consciously or unconsciously blocked by the narrator, and 
giving rise to a more positive spin on the past than events actually merit.
782
   
My research indicates that those who took part in the war are largely happy to talk 
about their memories today, however stereotyped.
783
 However, psychological scars may 
understandably prevent discussion of some topics within the family, either on the part of 
the older family member or a younger descendant. One teenager indicated to me that 
she felt uncomfortable discussing her great-grandmother's wartime experiences with 
her, as she had been raped by occupying forces.
784
 The great-granddaughter's obvious 
embarrassment was matched by that of a further student at the Moscow Institute for 
Economics and the Humanities in Novorossiisk, whose distress at her family's 
experiences during the war prompted her refusal to take part in a class on local 
history.
785
 Apart from these individual cases of discomfort, no intergenerational tension 
or narratives counter to the accepted war myth were offered, such as found in Canada 
by Graham Carr.
786
 All my interviews with young and old alike pointed rather to 
cohesion, consensus and empathy across generations. 
In a traditional society, memory often passes from grandparents to children, 
whose parents are usually busy working. The older generation takes responsibility for 
memorial practices and informal education, such that propagation of memory tends to 
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skip the middle generation.
787
 Correspondingly, most of my younger interviewees 
mentioned the significant role of grandparents rather than parents in the transmission of 
memory, even if those grandparents were themselves not war veterans.
788
 This indicates 
that there is possibly more opportunity and desire for grandparents to discuss the war 
with children than for busy parents, especially in a more modern society with working 
mothers and sometimes a single parent.
789
 The ritual of oral narration may promote 
historical understanding and empathy in younger family members, binding generations 
together through memory. In contrast, younger generations may find the narratives of 
personal memories of the war by their grandparents and great-grandparents repetitive 
and performances rendered more irritating due to the natural forgetting of old people. 
However, with the mediation of mnemonic artefacts, family narratives are more 
subjective and personal, often possessing a sense of intimacy that cannot be reproduced 
in a more formal, collective environment. From the high percentage of veterans 
claiming to recount war memory to their grandchildren or others of a much younger 
generation, however, it appears that it may in fact prove easier to talk about the war to a 
young generation decades after the event than it was to talk to one's own children soon 
after the event.
790
  
Although they were not specifically asked, some middle-aged interviewees could 
also recall how they had heard from their own parents and grandparents about the war: 
some recounted to me long and personal stories of their relations' wartime experiences 
in Novorossiisk gleaned from direct personal transmission.
791
 20% of subjects between 
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the ages of thirty and sixty-nine volunteered the fact that that their father or grandfather 
had fought in the war,
792
 while 14% offered the information that their parents or 
grandparents had talked to them about Malaia zemlia.
793
 The sense of personal family 
history remains strong for some families, thanks mainly to direct communication of 
memory transmitted by older generations.  
As those with direct memory of the war die, current and future generations will be 
recipients only of indirect post-memory, when family influence may well diminish in 
favour of institutional collective memory. For the moment, though, several of my 
interviewees, both men and women, related how they personally propagate the story of 
Malaia zemlia to younger family members, often with their own subjective 
interpretation. Some parents and grandparents see it as natural to pass on memory about 
local history in the same way as their own parents. F6F 'studies' the story of Malaia 
zemlia with her grandson using the same dated children's book that she used to read to 
her children.
794
 M3E, like F4G, takes advantage of the Beskozyrka ritual for 
conversations with his son about the war, while some employ Victory Day for this 
purpose.
795
 M4D uses the opportunity of weekends searching on Mount Koldun to 
discuss war memory with his teenage son. For the younger parents, the monuments and 
street names in the town provide a vehicle for the transmission of memory. M3E and 
F3C, for example, respond to their children's requests to read to them the information on 
monuments to heroes; for incomer F3C, this activity also teaches her about local history 
at the same time. F3E is similarly prompted by questions about streets named after 
heroes, while others more proactively take their children to museums,
796
 or for a tour of 
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the historical sites.
797
 Many questions are prompted by school lessons, and provide the 
opportunity for family reinforcement. Families also contribute to school lessons by 
providing personal information for class discussion and websites. Many young parents 
claimed a sense of responsibility to pass on memory of Malaia zemlia to younger 
generations.
798
 For example F4I felt a duty to answer relevant questions: 'If the children 
say "let's remember", then parents must do so too.' However, not all have the time and 
one man admitted that his children were simply not interested in family history.
799
  
From my evidence, it is impossible to deduce whether men or women are 
dominant in the intergenerational transmission of memory in the family, although 
women were largely more open in offering information to a woman interviewer. This 
concurs broadly with Artemi Romanov's findings about the perceived communication 
satisfaction gained by Russian grandparents in talking with their grandchildren: 
grandmothers tend to disclose more personal information, while grandfathers are more 
willing to talk about their opinion on historical events.
800
 From my research it seems, 
however, that men may be more proactive in finding opportunities for discussion and 
interested in talking about the war in general, while women are more responsive to 
questioning and are more involved with school homework projects, while grandparents 
of both genders play an important role.  
'Reverse propagation', the more unusual but naturally-occurring means of 
inter-generational transmission of the war myth from younger to older family members, 
is opposite to the traditional mechanism of transmission from older to younger 
generations found in a society with little population mobility. This mechanism of 
intergenerational familial transmission is illustrated by a conversation documented by a 
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journalist during the 2014 Beskozyrka ceremony, when an eight-year old boy was 
overheard telling his mother what he had been taught about the Malaia zemlia landings 
at school.
801
 Four relative newcomers to Novorossiisk confirmed to me that they had 
learned about local war history from their children, who had in turn been taught about it 
at school.
802
 These examples also provide evidence that the history of Malaia zemlia is 
not widely known to people outside Novorossiisk, even though many older Russians 
recollect the name from Brezhnev's memoirs.  
Conversations at home about the war may also be triggered by the amplification 
of military material in the mass media around Victory Day, reflected notably in the local 
press which concentrates particularly on articles about individual veterans and their 
memories. According to Barbie Zelizer, the press is often an unrecognized agent of the 
propagation of memory, determining both the form and the content of its 
transmission.
803
 In Novorossiisk, however, it is also a site of memory construction in its 
own right. The local press encourages investigative journalism in the 'exposure of truth' 
about the history of the war, while continuing to carry social interest stories about 
veterans and their past.
804
  
War documentaries and fictional films old and modern invade the home in the 
Victory Day period, shown on both state and other television channels.
805
 This diet of 
war material is inescapable for three days, with the war classics probably welcomed by 
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older citizens, if considered over-intrusive by one younger resident.
806
 Based on 
published television schedules, all such films shown in 2013 were of Russian or Soviet 
provenance;
 807
 indeed F5D cited a television documentary about the fear in Russia that 
American war films such as 'Saving Private Ryan' are too influential on young people 
who may fail to understand the role of the Soviet Union in the war.
808
 Olga Kucherenko 
claims that most young people acquire their knowledge of history informally through 
film,
809
 which may serve to influence or even distort their understanding. In contrast, 
my research in Novorossiisk indicates rather the greater influence of formal education 
about local and national history. However, within the informal family circle, it is 
possible that younger viewers experience the 'prosthetic memory' described by Alison 
Landsberg, which offers a mechanism 'at the interface between a person and a historical 
narrative about the past' for the acquisition of powerful memories which were not 
actually experienced. According to Landsberg, films about history may evoke private 
feelings from a collective experience in the past such that the distinction between 
history and memory is blurred, whilst at the same time introducing an ethical dimension 
that may be absent from personal narrations or collective rituals of remembrance.
810
  
Discussions about the war are not necessarily uniform across all families in 
Novorossiisk and children may have different degrees of exposure to direct narratives 
from an older generation. Furthermore, the family is not the only agent of propagation 
of the war myth, although some respondents pointed to the primacy of the family by 
virtue of direct and personal transmission,
811
 with emotional triggers guiding 
interpretation. The familial mechanism, where present, is always supplemented and 
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complemented by experiences from other sources, including formal school lessons and 
extra-curricular experiences. Indeed, many family conversations may not happen 
without some prompting from the mass media or other external agencies. Despite the 
pervading influence of the war cult, many interviewees, both men and women, contend 
that the family plays the largest role in the propagation of memory, arguing for a link 
between a child's upbringing and the transmission of war memory, an indication of the 
importance of memory from below. One young woman, whose grandfather fought in 
the war, considered on the other hand that the family's role should be even more 
important than it is.
812
 In general, however, respondents apparently wish to uphold and 
transmit the memory and values of previous generations, viewing this as an indication 
of the patriotism of the family which values its military ancestors and its own current 
mnemonic identity.  
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5.3 The educational role of veterans 
To you from failing hands we throw 
The torch; be yours to hold it high.
813
 
 
 
Veterans are not only valued within the confines of the family circle, but have become 
increasingly esteemed within Russian society as a whole, which recognizes the role they 
play in the propagation of war memory to the young. A special guest at the central 
Veterans' Council in May 2010 was Prime Minister Putin, who took tea with a group of 
veterans on his visit to Novorossiisk,
814
 just as Brezhnev had socialized with former  
18
th
 Army combatants during his visit in 1974.
815
 Such public acknowledgment of the 
value of war veterans would not have been possible, however, in the early post-war 
years when veterans' organizations were prohibited. The special status of the returning 
Soviet war heroes, with their privileged access to employment and education, turned out 
to be a temporary measure, as most benefits were cancelled by 1948 and disabled 
veterans widely ignored.
816
  
The situation in Novorossiisk was an exception to the rule, however, probably 
thanks to a longstanding tradition in the town of attention to the welfare of veterans 
from earlier conflicts, particularly the Civil War, when Novorossiisk had witnessed the 
exodus of many White supporters.
817
 From 1931 veterans in Novorossiisk received 
significant benefits in kind, for example free entry to museums and 50% remission on 
theatre and cinema tickets, and by 1934 they had special access to health services, free 
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travel on trams and free entry to communal baths.
818
 In 1936 a fund was established 
locally to support veterans, in line with the national wish to retain memory of Civil War 
heroes. 
The onset of the Great Patriotic War in 1941 saw many of these same veterans 
leave Novorossiisk for the front, only to return after the war with several other serving 
officers, men and women. Formal meetings of veterans were few, but, with a planned 
exhibition in the Novorossiisk museum on the fifteenth anniversary of the Malaia 
zemlia campaign in 1958, an official organization for veterans of the Great Patriotic 
War was established to collect and organize exhibits. Crucially, at this time the veterans 
collectively and individually started publicly to recount their memories to young people 
under the auspices of the local Komsomol, although the reception of these often 
repetitive stories by children may not always have been positive. 
819
 
The duty of veterans as 'authorized witnesses' to educate the younger generation 
in war memory was also reflected in the stated motives for the publication of war 
memoirs during the war cult of the Brezhnev era. In exchange for their political loyalty 
the state implemented a new national policy for war veterans, such that, from 1965, 
veterans increasingly enjoyed privileged access to health services, housing, transport 
and sanatoria in line with the growing war cult in what Natalia Danilova terms a 
'reciprocal contract'.
 820
  
Mark Edele suggests that clashes with Communist Party organizations often took 
place nationwide, thanks to the transfer of power from Party organs to local veterans' 
clubs.
821
 However, in Novorossiisk collaboration with the Komsomol continued to 
develop, involving significant educational work by the Veterans' Council with young 
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people in the Pioneers organization.
822
 Grassroots lobbying of Brezhnev by the public 
forced the government to acknowledge the preferred status of veterans by increasing 
their benefits, consolidating the mutually beneficial implicit social contract between the 
state and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. By 1978 they were entitled to interest-free 
loans for the construction of houses and an annual holiday, with 50% reduction on 
long-distance travel to state sanatoria. Alongside material benefits, they were also 
granted the right to gather together, an important and necessary privilege granted to 
those from whom the state needed absolute loyalty and reflecting the political interests 
of the final years of Brezhnev's cult of war memory.
823
  
The status of veterans came under closer state scrutiny with the onset of the war in 
Afghanistan in 1979, resulting in veterans of the Great Patriotic War enjoying greater 
recognition and privileges than those of this later, less successful conflict.
824
 The 
Novorossiisk Veterans' Council moved to new premises in Novorossiisk in 1981, where 
the central Council is still housed, and the first women joined the group in 1982, 
reflecting an increasing national recognition of the role of women in the war.
825
 During 
this period serious social care for the elderly started to be included in the group's work, 
known as the Zabota (Care and attention) programme, entailing a constant dialogue 
with the local authorities.
826
 This work continued through the changes of the early 
1990s, despite economic problems and reforms, as the El'tsin government realized that 
the support of the older generation was necessary.
827
 The preferred status of Great 
Patriotic War veterans was confirmed in the law 'On Veterans' in 1995, until the de 
facto failure of the reciprocal contract with the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s, 
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when many benefits were cancelled and the status of veterans devalued with the 
rouble.
828
 The need of many veterans became so urgent in Novorossiisk that the local 
group appointed a lawyer to give free consultations on their rights.
829
 Only in 2004, 
when many previously tangible benefits such as free transport and accommodation were 
replaced with a regular financial award in Putin's controversial national 'monetization of 
benefits', did veterans claw back some of their financial security.  
Today the reciprocity embedded in the implicit contract between veterans and the 
state is even more evident than in the Brezhnev era. The new war cult under Putin has 
led to a re-mobilization of the few remaining veterans to appear in ceremonies of 
remembrance and to educate the young, such that it now appears that their public 
identity is linked predominantly with the war. Veterans are therefore in a position of key 
responsibility for the transmission of memory through the vospitanie of children, 
looking Janus-like in two directions: backwards to the past and forwards towards the 
younger generation. In a mutually beneficial role, they have become national treasures 
as probably the most important emotional ingredient of the war cult, to be wheeled out, 
bedecked with medals accrued over the years, by national and local politicians on every 
occasion connected with the Great Patriotic War, to the extent that I propose that there 
is now a veritable cult of veterans.
830
 In return, veterans have at last obtained the state 
and public acknowledgment they demanded during the final years of the twentieth 
century with a whole range of privileges amongst other less tangible marks of respect 
which provide evidence of their new, special position within society. However, it is 
their current status in comparison with the poorer treatment of veterans of more recent 
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conflicts that reflects the importance attached to this particular group in their twilight 
years. 
Victory Day celebrations are particularly significant, when every Great Patriotic 
War veteran receives an annual congratulatory letter from the President. Since 2013 
citizens have been encouraged to pick up a post-card in a post-office to send their 
thanks to a local veteran.
831
 In Novorossiisk the Mayor issues invitations to all local 
veterans to attend theatre performances and concerts, dinners and the main Victory Day 
procession, where they are placed in seats of honour. Gifts are showered on veterans at 
this time. To celebrate the sixty-fifth anniversary of Victory Day in 2010 the Mayor of 
Novorossiisk gave every veteran in the town a collection of items full of symbolism to 
recall their war years, including a triangular 'letter from the front', writing paper and a 
pencil, a bar of soap, a pouch of rough tobacco with a box of matches, a canteen and a 
bottle of wine.
832
 This recent special treatment is evident in a campaign of banners and 
posters on buses, kiosks and walls put in place across the town by the local council: 
'Dear veteran, your victory is eternal', 'Memory of your exploits will live forever' and 
'Thank you for the victory, liberators of the town'. Improvements in their circumstances 
are also acknowledged by some veterans themselves,
833
 and are linked by some 
interviewees to the fact that there are now very few remaining veterans and that the 
country is finally economically able to honour and care for them properly in their old 
age.
834
  
Care and attention to war veterans in not only evident on Victory Day, however. 
Those veterans in Novorossiisk who in 2005 were still judged locally to be 'living in 
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hard times [... needing] basic attention, help and support',
835
 now receive substantially 
more than ever before, most privileges being granted to mark significant anniversaries 
after the end of the war. In addition to the free medicine and health services normally 
found across the country, veterans of the Great Patriotic War in Novorossiisk are 
offered subsidized accommodation in new blocks of flats built by the local authority 
under orders from Putin prior to the sixtieth anniversary,
836
 and specially designed for 
those with disabilities, with a designated social worker for each building.
837
 In 2010, for 
the sixty-fifth anniversary, the Novorossiisk town council supplemented golden signs 
marking the graves of veterans with new red plaques on the walls of the homes of living 
veterans. This gesture of respect was welcomed by some respondents who for the first 
time were able to recognize and offer congratulations and help if necessary to their 
elderly neighbours,
838
 while those with cars were encouraged by posters throughout the 
town to 'pick up a veteran'. Sealing the social contract, most schools in Novorossiisk 
look after their sponsored veterans: teachers and children give support throughout the 
year by cleaning or shopping,
839
 and special gifts are offered on Victory Day, for 
example a new refrigerator full of food.
840
 
However the most important year-round work with veterans in the community is 
provided by the chain of Veterans' Councils in the region. According to a regional 
representative from Krasnodar,
841
 there were eight remaining Heroes of the Soviet 
Union living in the region in 2013, while about six thousand veterans of the Great 
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Patriotic War still live in Novorossiisk.
842
 In 2006 the responsibility for veterans' 
welfare was devolved to local authorities, although veterans of the Great Patriotic War 
still receive their pensions from the federal government.
843
 Although many veterans still 
cling to the belief that the state has a 'moral duty' to compensate them for their valuable 
war service,
844
 the ongoing social obligation to veterans in return for their role in the 
propagation of war memory is largely met by committed locals rather than any state 
mechanism. Funded partly by the region and partly by the town council,
845
 the smaller 
area councils in and outside the town look after their local community veterans, who 
form what Jay Winter terms 'fictive kinship groups' or 'families of remembrance',
846
 
which promote common mnemonic interests whilst also comprising a mutually 
supportive social group.  
In the outlying village of Myskhako the Head of the Veterans' Council has worked 
there on a part-time basis for fourteen years, if for very little pay.
847
 Her office is 
located in the main town council building, which also houses the post-office, 
guaranteeing a stream of visitors who often stop by for a cup of tea and a chat.
848
 The 
central position of the office is convenient for collaborative work with staff responsible 
for youth affairs and the local Mayor himself in adjacent offices. The veterans are all 
known personally to the Veterans' Council. Indeed, the organization is so mutually 
supportive that it is difficult to distinguish between the veterans themselves and those 
slightly younger elderly people who help organize the series of activities throughout the 
year. Encouraged by the local Mayor and councillor, the Veterans' Council contributes 
substantially to the morale of members through commemorative activities.  
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Over the period running up to Victory Day vintage war films are shown in the 
palace of culture in Myskhako, to which veterans have free entry.
849
 The library, 
similarly located in the palace of culture, also welcomes veterans, who not only still 
read the occasional war memoir,
850
 but often attend anniversary parties organized by the 
Veterans' Council and librarians jointly. For example, children presented flowers to a 
certain veteran at a ceremony held in her honour,
851
 with a presentation showing images 
of her both today and as a young person in the war, stressing her current identity as that 
of a war veteran. Another Novorossiisk veteran stated that she appreciates flowers given 
to her by children as an indication of their vospitanie.
852
 In return for this attention from 
the state, region and town, many veterans are conscious of their continuing implicit duty 
to educate (vospityvat') children in a revived tradition harking back to the Soviet Union 
of the post-war years.
853
  
However, the most important sign of loyalty to the state in exchange for the 
receipt of benefits is the public appearance of veterans at ceremonies of remembrance, 
especially Victory Day, a cultural indicator of the influence of the current war cult. 
From my observations, most veterans appear to welcome the recent increase in pomp of 
the Victory Day celebrations, while some particularly appreciate the participation of 
young people,
854
 who, since 2005, have been encouraged by the state to distribute  
St George ribbons prior to and on Victory Day.
855
 Flying from car bumpers, wing 
mirrors and aerials, these symbols of war memory are superficially reminiscent of 
British poppies, being offered in exchange for contributions to veterans' welfare. While 
the official St George ribbon website proclaims it an instrument of remembrance, 
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respect and thanks to veterans, their distribution, through the support of the political 
youth organization Molodaia gvardiia (The Young Guard) and the educational 
movement Studencheskaia obshchina (The Students' Society), bears little resemblance 
to the charitable activities of the Royal British Legion, although both British and 
Russian movements direct the funds collected to veterans of all wars.
 856
 
 
 
Prime Minister Putin wearing the St George ribbon in Novorossiisk in 2010
857
 
 
The lentochka (ribbon) movement has already gained the status of a tradition in 
Novorossiisk. Based upon the much older award made to military personnel in the reign 
of Catherine the Great and named after the patron saint of Russia, it is an example of a 
newly invented tradition built on a past system that resonates particularly well in the 
current memory climate, as evidenced by its universal acceptance within a very short 
period of time. An innovation grafted onto an older, established tradition, it has the 
effect of enriching, rejuvenating and refreshing the Victory Day celebrations, thereby 
rendering them more attractive to a newly mobilized younger generation. In this way, it 
                                                     
856
 'Georgievskaia lentochka', 9may.ru, ˂http://gl.9may.ru˃ [accessed 26/06/2012]. The symbol was 
appropriated as a sign of war victory and Russian nationalism during the Russian invasion of Crimea and 
mainland Ukraine in 2014. 
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has a similar supplementary function to the 'candle in the window' movement, which 
has also become an invented tradition in its own right.  
This symbol has been recycled for current mnemonic and political use, promoting 
shared ownership of memory and capable of stimulating a spectrum of nuances as each 
generation reads something slightly different into the ribbon. F5D, a headmistress, 
recognizes it as a longstanding symbol that has recently been resurrected, supported by 
F7C, who feels that it retains its association with the pre-revolutionary Cross of  
St George, with its implications of heroic exploits and love of the fatherland. The  
St George ribbon poster, distributed widely in the region in 2010, contains an overt 
reference to the great USSR at its centre, but the ribbon itself demonstrates military 
continuity from pre-revolutionary, through Soviet to post-Soviet times. Stephen Norris 
also finds that the ribbon resonates well with veterans, who remember its use on Stalin's 
Order of Glory awarded to rank and file soldiers. Despite this, he argues persuasively 
that it successfully fills the national need for a symbol of war memory not tainted with 
Stalin.
858
 The lentochka tradition appeared to be popular in Novorossiisk in 2010, when 
it was hard to see anybody without one. In addition to its fund-raising function, it is 
seen by many as an aid to memory in its own right. For example, F8D, a war veteran, 
regards it as the declaration of a national wish to remember. A Novorossiisk newspaper 
journalist sees in the orange and black stripes a memory of the flame and smoke of 
war,
859
 while M7B recalls it as the ribbon worn on a Soviet sailor's cap, the legendary 
beskozyrka, whose symbolism needs no further explanation in this maritime town. It is 
not surprising that the ribbon that offers something for everyone should be so 
popular:
860
 in an overt connection with the resistance to the occupation of the Soviet 
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 Indeed, Katherine Verdery argues that a political symbol is particularly potent 'not because everyone 
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Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies, Columbia University Press: New York, 1999, p. 29. 
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Union in 1941, it was even appropriated by pro-Russian fighters in Ukraine in 2014, not 
only as a symbol of memory and (Russian and Soviet) victory, but also of continued 
resistance to a government which some perceive to be illegitimate. In marked contrast, 
F3F reads into the lentochka something particularly relevant to the domestic political 
climate: the gift of democracy from the Russian state to the people who crave it. 
In the hands of energetic young people, the St George ribbon enables the 
transmission of memory from young people to the now passive oldest citizens, as the 
propagation of memory undergoes a process of reverse propagation. On Victory Day the 
memory message, with its new symbolism, defies the traditional propagation 
mechanism from older to younger generations, ensuring an evident solidarity between 
generations. 
Through its attraction to young people, the lentochka movement introduces a new, 
rejuvenating element into the already successful Victory Day celebrations. My 
observations in 2010 indicated that young university students in bright red 'uniform' 
tee-shirts bearing the slogan 'Ia pomniu! Ia gorzhus'!' (I remember! I am proud!) 
seemed to control the Mayor's invited Victory Day audience, marshalling veterans as 
they handed to each a lentochka and an anniversary baseball cap. Victory Day, in this 
respect, has been appropriated by the new younger generation, not necessarily at their 
instigation, but apparently without coercion and with their tacit agreement, as evidenced 
by the enthusiasm with which they perform their duties. The Deputy Director of the 
Maritime Academy admitted that this may be exceptional behaviour, as his students do 
not always want to attend ceremonies of remembrance, deploying barely relevant 
excuses about lack of time. With their strong link to the military, however, students of 
the Maritime Academy seem bound by an inescapable social duty to be official 
representatives of their generation at Victory Day and other mnemonic rituals. 
 282 
 
If the official Victory Day ceremony in the centre of Novorossiisk is orchestrated 
by the local authority and largely in harmony with events on Red Square, less formality 
was observed on the town periphery in Myskhako in 2010. Veterans were gathered 
together in a brown military tent at a soldatskii prival (military field kitchen), feeding 
their nostalgia with war-time rations, mainly kasha (buckwheat porridge) washed down 
with quantities of vodka, all served by Cossacks. The old people gathered together in 
groups around the tables to sing war songs, pausing only at the interruptions of modern 
ring-tones as family members called to congratulate their own veteran. Such was the 
camaraderie among this community of remembrance that the pensioners seemed deaf to 
the official entertainment by children, local dancers and singers, in an example of 
overwhelming bottom-up ownership of a remembrance celebration by the oldest 
citizens. Eventually, the official speeches over, all participants came together on the 
same inter-generational wavelength as the vodka flowed, the officials retired and the 
unofficial dancing started. Apparently these veterans are not only enjoying their official 
recognition, but are happy to have taken full ownership of their new privileged social 
status in their twilight years. 
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5.4 Formal education of the younger generation  
Детям своим 
     расскажите о них, 
чтоб 
запомнили! 
Детям 
    детей 
расскажите о них, 
чтобы тоже 
запомнили! '861 
 
 
On 1
st
 February 2013, the seventieth anniversary of the Malaia zemlia landings and the 
liberation of Stalingrad, Novorossiisk schoolchildren from five schools, university 
students and Cossack cadet soldiers took part in a Skype conference with counterparts 
in Volgograd. Organized and scripted in advance by the Mayor's office, this 'tele-bridge' 
also linked Novorossiisk veterans with those of the Battle of Stalingrad in an explicit 
comparison of the two Hero-Cities: 'Malaia zemlia - Mamaev kurgan'.
862
 With a 
spectrum of age-ranges taking part, the event contrived to link themes appealing to the 
old using the modern technology attractive to the young, thereby effectively closing any 
virtual generation gap. The conference, 'The Patriotic Education of the Young on the 
Basis of an Heroic Past', claimed to instil patriotic values amongst young people, 
including a respect for the past and loyalty to their country, by its new approach to 
military-patriotic education and citizenship.  
One of the ambiguities facing traditionalists wishing to propagate memory is the 
fact that history inevitably looks backwards to the past, whereas the tendency for the 
younger generation is to look forwards to the future. If not carefully nurtured in 
memorial tradition, the young may rebel against their elders, promoting a dismissal of 
the past with its inherent values. In contrast, successful propagation of memory may 
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 'Tell your children about them [the war heroes]./so that they remember!/Tell your children's children 
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lead to a mnemonic vicious circle and consequent stagnation, leading eventually to 
unquestioning acceptance, which seems to be largely the case today in a younger 
generation inculcated with vospitanie. Older generations may tend to select the content, 
transmitting a simplified, positive message in order to promote cultural consensus and 
maintain the continuity of the war myth, although its interpretation may change slightly 
from generation to generation.  
Under the current war cult the state has driven a nationwide campaign to involve 
young people in patriotic activities, just as in the youth clubs, Pioneer and Komsomol 
organizations of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.
863
 The renewed emphasis on moral 
education of the young has become almost synonymous to many respondents with the 
belief system of collective memory: in Novorossiisk well brought up young people are 
expected to pay respect to the dead in accordance with tradition. A vospitannyi young 
person today is deemed to be almost a clone of his or her Soviet counterpart, with the 
qualities of patriotism, respect, modesty and good moral behaviour both recalled and 
judged positively by older generations. According to one historian, it is exactly these 
aspects of vospitanie that won the war, ideologically embedded through a unique type 
of patriotism expected of Communists.
864
 There was a period during the 1990s when 
vospitanie and patriotism were not seen as so important, however, according to several 
respondents who criticized the mass failure to remember the history of the war and 
retain memory of the dead.
865
 The noticeable return to a more conservative style of 
education under Putin is exemplified by the re-introduction of school uniforms 
throughout Russia from September 2014.
866
 Today, once again, it is vospitanie which is 
viewed as both instilling patriotism and as a necessary foundation for the propagation of 
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memory.
867
 Vospitanie is seen to be bred mainly by families and schools,
868
 while some 
recognize the role of social rituals and the local authorities.
869
 If this is the case, then it 
is at the confluence of school and family that memory is most effectively transmitted. 
Moral education of the young is inculcated in schools thanks to the new emphasis on 
patriotism, a topic now included in the school curriculum, dictated by the state,
870 
to the 
endorsement of many parents and grandparents.
871
 Documentary evidence from schools 
indicates that a new syllabus for 'Patriotic Work' was introduced in Russian schools in 
2010, following a state decision to prioritize citizenship in the school curriculum. This 
decision was implemented by the regional authorities, each school being responsible for 
designing its own new courses. These include some material in common with other 
educational establishments across the country and some location-specific content. 
Furthermore, every school and the Maritime Academy have designated senior members 
of staff who are responsible for the design and implementation of the syllabus and for 
the vospitanie of the students. 
A formal argument for the introduction of Patriotic Work into the curriculum 
forms the preface to the new syllabus for School No. 6 and the Bekar School. It points 
to governmental concern at the loss of 'spiritual values' and growing 'social diffidence' 
during the period of economic and political changes from the end of the 1990s, which, 
the document recognizes, apparently reduced the sense of patriotism and respect for 
Russian culture and led to a decrease in vospitanie of the younger generation.
872
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Endorsing the government's educational findings, Merridale observes in the twenty-first 
century an increasing degree of collective amnesia in Russian society, where the young 
often lack an engagement with the past,
 
despite a stated desire to look back promoted by 
the new war cult.
873
 Furthermore, there may be a potential conflict between the need to 
remember of survivors and their descendants, as the event remembered becomes 
increasingly alienated in time and space from those remembering.
874
 Making no 
apologies for the ideological content of the new curriculum, the Bekar syllabus 
specifically bemoans the increase amongst young people of diffidence, self-centred 
individualism, cynicism, aggressiveness and lack of respect towards veterans, largely 
attributed to 'media propaganda [...] falsifying national history' and the propagation of 
non-Russian traditional values, with a commensurate decrease in the motivation of 
young people to join the armed services.
875
 
The aim of the new syllabus is to introduce 'a renewed emphasis on patriotic 
upbringing [vospitanie] as one of the most important educational tasks'. At the top of 
the list of themes is the 'desire to observe memory of dead troops', closely followed by 
the encouragement of 'respect for elderly people'; love for the town of Novorossiisk 
within the Russian Republic; 'pride in the Russian army' and its veterans, linked with a 
'wish to serve one's Fatherland'; and the 'development of a sense of patriotism' based on 
'the cultural and patriotic values of the glorious [...] military traditions of the Russian 
people', encouraging the participation in regional and town commemorative events. The 
transfer of historical knowledge and collective memory to the younger generation at 
school also takes place through a variety of other mechanisms: history lessons; a series 
of 'lessons in courage' (uroki muzhestva), dedicated form periods (klassnye chasy); local 
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 For a study of the fragmentation and collapse of the intergenerational chain of memory, see 
Hervieu-Leger, Religion as a Chain of Memory, 2000. 
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 For a discussion of disaffection within the armed services, see Anna Colin Lebedev, Le Coeur 
Politique des Mères: Analyse du mouvement des mères de soldats en Russie, Paris: EHESS, 2013. 
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studies (kraevedenie or Kubanovedenie); and visits to libraries and museums, both in 
the school and the town.  
History remains central to the school curriculum from an early age, often taught 
by specialists. The teaching of modern history in schools and universities has evolved 
over the decades since 1945, the subject of historical revisionism at the mercy of the 
political ideology of the state.
876
 During Stalin's rule history lessons revolved around 
Leninist dogma and rote learning. Little was written about the war in the post-war years: 
archives were closed to researchers and questioning of the official version of the past 
was not encouraged.
877
 A subjective and dogmatic Stalinist version of the history of the 
war, full of distortions and omissions, finally appeared in 1963 with the publication of 
the multi-volume The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. It depicted the 
devastating German invasion of first few months of the war in 1941 in a less disastrous 
light, while also inflating the role of Stalin and the Communist Party at the expense of 
that of the military leaders and the Allies.
878
 Party members became officially endorsed 
role models for young people in a string of selected exploits, reinforcing the impression 
of state-sponsored mythology rather than analytical history. For example, the work 
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refers to a Komsomol member at Stalingrad who died whilst blowing up nine tanks,
879
 
an exploit similar to that of young Viktor Chalenko on Malaia zemlia.
880
  
Some attempted revisionism and a cautious attempt at historical accuracy in 
Khrushchev's thaw of the early 1960s was followed by the intellectual conservatism and 
neo-Stalinism of the Brezhnev era. Aleksandr Nekrich's work, 1941, 22 iiunia (22 June 
1941: Soviet historians and the German invasion) (1965), was officially condemned and 
the author expelled from the Communist Party in 1967.
 
An increase in censorship 
during the 1970s led to further clamp-downs on revisionist historians who had gone too 
far in the pursuit of historical accuracy.
881
  
No wonder that oral memory was considered by some to be more accurate than 
that propagated by the state, a situation which is the opposite of that generally accepted 
in the West, but which is still observed in Russia.
882
 In general public collective 
memory had been so shaped by the narratives provided by their leaders that memory of 
the war depended largely on mythology rather than historical accuracy until the 
Gorbachev years. An increase in interest in history in the mass media of the late 1980s, 
when previously taboo topics were gradually opened up to historical glasnost', led to a 
plethora of revelations from 1988 to 1991.
883
 Gorbachev himself appeared to encourage 
such openness about history: 
We have studied it, admitting miscalculations and mistakes, and 
learning lessons even from the difficult and tragic periods of our 
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history. For us it is not acceptable to smooth out history. It 
already exists. And it is only a matter of showing it correctly. It 
is a matter of our honesty, responsibility and scientific 
approach.
884
 
This official attitude resulted in the evolution of a more questioning society after 
the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. It remained short-lived, however. Igor Dolutskii's 
particularly influential anti-Stalinist, anti-Communist school history textbook 
Otechestvennaia istoriia XX vek (History of the Fatherland in the Twentieth Century) 
was published in 1994, only to be removed from the Ministry of Education's list of 
approved books in 2003 following criticism of its less than positive treatment of the 
Great Patriotic War. Overseeing a return to state officialdom in history, Putin himself 
intervened in the discussions, demanding that school textbooks should help imbue 
patriotism amongst the young in the interests of social solidarity. After Dolutskii's 
extreme anti-Soviet work, more positive assessments were demanded in a textbook 
competition administered by the Ministry of Education, resulting in the publication of a 
new national favourite, Nikita Zagladin's Istoriia Otechestva. XX vek (Twentieth 
Century History of the Fatherland), 2007. Although Zagladin's previous work on global 
history (Istoriia Rossi i mira v XX veke) had continued the theme of anti-Stalinism of 
the 1990s, his new prize-winning text failed to condemn the Soviet Union outright for 
its weaknesses during the war, choosing rather to recognize its successes in a more 
balanced and analytical style, more acceptable to a society looking for a sense of pride 
in their recent history.
 885
 This is the authorized history text-book used for senior classes 
in Novorossiisk schools, which reinforces the lack of strategic importance of 
Novorossiisk in the context of the whole war by mentioning it only once, in a list of 
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towns liberated in September 1943, as part of a chapter on the Great Patriotic War 
covering forty-three pages.
886
 
This uncontroversial textbook contrasts with another history book by A. V. Veka, 
which, according to one bookshop assistant, is popular in the town.
 887
 This work, 
although making no mention at all of Novorossiisk, includes decidedly negative 
comments about Stalin, for example his absence from the centre of power in the first 
days of the war and his notorious 'Not one step back' order.
888
 In complete contrast to 
the hype of Victory Day in Russia today, Veka attributes war victory to the Soviet 
people rather than to Stalin or his generals. Similarly treated are the controversial 
punishment battalions (shtrafnye batal'ony) to which 'cowards and traitors' were 
dispatched, despite what the author deems the equally incompetent actions of their 
leaders.
889
 This is an aspect of the war which some of my respondents wished to see 
fully exposed and dissected in the media, in order to 'learn the truth' about the past.
890
 
The current vogue for national introspection appears to be in complete contrast to 
Stalin's fear of historical accuracy. 
A whole spectrum of publications exists today, ranging from this example to the 
most conservative texts lauding the country's successes throughout and thus aiding the 
triumphal nationalism disseminated by Putin in his construction of a victorious 
continuity from the past through to the present. Exposés of the past may surface in some 
more liberal publications, but these are read largely by adults who grew up in the 1990s 
rather than schoolchildren today. Historical revisionism during the Putin era has led to 
some overgeneralization of events of the war in schools, such that children are 
socialized politically not to question in detail the accepted message of a victorious 
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nation. It may be politically useful to disseminate a more generalized history when a 
detailed narrative risks detracting from the accepted war myth. Novorossiiskii rabochii 
bemoans the lack of specific information in modern school text-books, appreciating that 
it is only because the town is a Hero-City that memory is so strong and schools are able 
constructively to supplement the official books with local background.
891
 In 
Novorossiisk the myth of Malaia zemlia is so positive that it bears more detailed 
scrutiny than many other local war myths in school lessons.
892
  
Here there is little evidence of the degree of historical amnesia observed in the 
capital, where both James Wertsch and Catherine Merridale note the lack of 
engagement with the past of the younger generation.
893
 While my observations show 
evidence for the continuation of traditional, local memory in provincial Novorossiisk, 
Merridale observes in the larger cities a clear generation gap, with older people 
recalling, albeit at some temporal distance, the 'dismal days of fake heroes and bogus 
achievements' while the younger generation demonstrates almost no understanding or 
memory of the situation in which their parents were raised.
894
 Merridale argues robustly 
that a lack of knowledge of the past imbues a failure to read any warning signs of a 
potential new dictatorship, a situation of collective amnesia which may suit the 
country's ruling élite. This insight suggests that a return to the domination of top-down 
manipulation of memory may flourish in the face of public apathy, linked to uncertainty 
about the constantly changing interpretations of the past.
895  From my findings in 
Novorossiisk, however, the state war cult is thriving not in the face of public apathy, but 
fuelled rather by a local self-interest in the promotion of the war myth, which boosts the 
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status of the town regionally and nationally and inculcates a sense of pride which is 
passed on to the younger generation. 
This pride is propagated also by school lessons in courage, which foster, by their 
very name, a positive genetic concept of military prowess. They concentrate on local 
patriotism in the Great Patriotic War through films, seminars, essays and competitions. 
These lessons are mainly held during periods of the academic year when memory events 
take place locally, for example during January in the approach to Beskozyrka, leading 
up to Victory Day in May, and around the anniversary of the town's liberation in 
September. Starting in a narrow context, where the youngest pupils learn to 'love their 
small Motherland', the syllabus aims to develop military-patriotic consciousness 
through an appreciation of local war history. Thus children of all ages are taken on 
guided tours of the town's monuments; watch educational films on the history of 
Novorossiisk;
896
 learn about the heroes of Malaia zemlia; read books about the war; 
build up exhibitions of memorabilia and literature;
897
 meet with former pupils now 
serving in the armed forces or as military cadets in the Maritime Academy and veterans 
of the war in Afghanistan; and take part in class competitions.
898
  
There are no official text-books in Novorossiisk for these lessons in courage, in 
contrast to the situation in the Hero-Cities of Moscow and Volgograd.
899
 Although 
material suitable for the whole age spectrum is suggested in recommended lesson plans, 
the choice and delivery is largely left to the discretion of the individual form teacher. 
There is inevitably some repetition of material from year to year with the inherent risk 
of boredom amongst the older pupils,
900
 although one teacher at School No. 28 was 
                                                     
896
 For example: 'In memory of the heroic landings', 'Novorossiisk: history and modernity', 'The Strategy 
for Victory', 'Georgii Zhukov: Military leader'. 
897
 Often collected from home (F4B). 
898
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poetry). 
899
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900
 F4F. 
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praised by the town's official online news-site for getting the pupils to use 'innovative 
technology' through the compilation of their own PowerPoint presentations.
901
 This 
proactive approach appears, however, to be the exception rather than the rule in the face 
of the usual more didactic material. 
A more personal approach is realised through the visit of local veterans to schools 
in a renewal of the Brezhnev era system, when veterans would go into the classrooms 
on special mnemonic occasions.
902
 Only veterans of the Great Patriotic War are 
involved in such 'Meetings of Generations',
903
 which are often also held in local 
libraries, sometimes with specific aims formulated by the local authority's youth 
department as in the Skype conference with Volgograd.
904
 This practice allows a 
confluence of living generations that should, in theory, be more effective at propagating 
memory than films or books, although the age of the veterans today means that their 
presence is largely symbolic. There is evidence that veterans still welcome the 
experience of transmitting memory to the younger generation;
905
 they may even find it 
easier to talk to unknown young people than to their own families.
906
 However, offering 
the same clichéd stories as in previous years, they may find it hard to make themselves 
heard or understood across what in reality is an almost insurmountable generation gap. 
While appreciating the importance of such meetings,
907
 teachers realise that veterans' 
narratives can fail to resonate with some pupils, often less than conscientious boys,
908
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 'Vneklassnoe meropriiatie "V pamiati i serdtse navsegda"', MNL, 04/02/2011, 
˂http://www.nrnews.ru/news/?id=42580˃ [accessed 09/02/2011].  
902
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Wolfe, 'Past as Present, Myth, or History?', 2006, p. 266. 
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 Councillor M4F. 
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905
 M7D. 
906
 Observed by the Headmistress of School No. 6. 
907
 Headmistress of the Bekar School. 
908
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who may be more attracted to war films depicting young men closer in age to 
themselves.  
My evidence suggests that aspects of the patriotism syllabus that may be more 
effective include those where the young people have some control of the situation and 
are able to make their own choices. This applies across the age range; for example, one 
eight-year old child became absorbed in a project on Malaia zemlia about which he had 
written three whole pages,
909
 while a teenage pupil wrote a longer essay on his 
computer about Brezhnev's memoirs,
910
 demonstrating a notable exception to his peers 
in his interest. 
Students at the Maritime Academy and the Moscow Institute for Economics and 
the Humanities also follow courses on local history which remain largely popular, 
according to senior academics,
911
 such that some modules on Malaia zemlia are also 
broadcast on local television.
912
 Unlike the school curriculum, local war history is set in 
the context of the whole of the Second World War in Maritime Academy courses on 
twentieth-century history, whereas the History department of the Institute for 
Economics and the Humanities specializes in local history: its faculty head Professor 
Tamara Iurina is the local expert on the military history of Malaia zemlia. Dr V. V. 
Denisov, Head of the Faculty of History and Philosophy at the Maritime Academy, 
finds that about 50% of student cadets choose to write essays or dissertations on Malaia 
zemlia, several of whom go on to write doctoral theses on related subjects.
913
 Not all 
students are equally motivated, however: apparently a minority demonstrates no real 
interest in local history, although Dr Denisov contends that it is the duty of the faculty 
                                                     
909
 According to his grandmother, F6F. 
910
 M1A. 
911
 Deputy Director of the Moscow Institute for Economics and the Humanities and Head of the Faculty 
of History and Philosophy at the Maritime Academy. 
912
 For example, Iurina, 'Teleurok grazhdanstvennosti', 2008. 
913
 Some recent doctoral topics are listed in Iurina, 'Novorossiiskoe protivostoianie 1942-1943 gg.', 2003, 
p. 234. 
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to counteract any indifference. This is done partly by an emphasis on personal links, 
despite the fact that this area of history is becoming increasingly abstract, as family 
members who participated in the war have died and students are no longer able to 
discuss at first hand their roles in the war. The Maritime Academy has a policy of 
inviting cadets to do family research,
914
 and to bring family photographs into the 
academy, where a substantial display of over fifty enlarged photographs was mounted in 
the entrance hall in 2010 to mark the sixty-fifth anniversary of Victory Day.
915
  
My evidence suggests that the linking of influences from both family and 
educational institution is particularly effective in the transmission of memory. The onus 
is on the young people in both schools and the Maritime Academy to collect 
photographs, memoirs, letters or other artefacts, such that they have nominal 
responsibility for the propagation of memory, if actually required to do so by their 
teachers. The act of collection of such mnemonic material also prompts discussions in 
the home about the past, serving to revive family history at the instigation of the 
younger generation, another example of reverse propagation. The information collected 
by schoolchildren is either displayed for all to see, uploaded onto internet websites 
collating such data, or used as material for classroom presentation.
916
 By means of 
computer technology, old family photographs and other information may be refreshed 
and brought to a wider audience, especially those parents of older classes invited into 
school to observe some lessons in courage.
917
  
In 2003 Merridale observed a stark division between academic history and 
popular history.
918
 In today's schools and universities in Novorossisk, however, there 
seems to be a greater merging of the two, as personal family stories are integrated into 
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 Galina Krympokha, Archivist. 
915
 Dr V. V. Denisov, Dr Sergei Panchenko, Deputy Director of the Maritime Academy, and personal 
observation. 
916
 F4B, F7A and F8D. 
917
 Bekar School syllabus for Patriotic Work. 
918
 Merridale, 'Redesigning History in Contemporary Russia ', 2003, p. 27. 
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class history lessons. Thus the aim of the syllabus 'to strengthen the role of the family in 
patriotic education' is apparently achieved through children taking home ideas from 
school and then returning with more information gathered from discussions within the 
family which may be shared with their peers to stimulate further collaborative study. 
This personal approach permits the incorporation of the individual family's history into 
collective memory, enabling the construction of a unique bank of material in each 
school in the region.
919
 Information about family participants in the war may also be 
deposited in a growing number of nationally available online 'books of memory', whose 
creation is probably prompted both by a fear of forgetting and the political environment 
of the war cult, while offering a site where more specific memory may be held in a 
largely uncensored environment.
920
 Having captured huge numbers of testimonies, this 
memory bank constructed from below and eminently accessible, through the medium of 
modern computer technology attractive to the younger generation, may be seen by 
young people as more truthful, if more complex and multi-voiced, than one-dimensional 
official state memory. Similarly, students often have internet access to information from 
other countries,
921
 leaving them with the difficult unfiltered decision of what 
information to trust. 
Digital school archives complement the collections in school museums which 
focus on specifically local material.
922
 Unlike English school archives, which often 
maintain a list of alumni who fell in the war, they largely contain artefacts collected in 
the immediate area. For example, the museum in School No. 27 in Myskhako was 
opened in 2007 thanks to the parent of a pupil who wished to have a space for his finds 
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 Headmistress of School No. 6. She says that information is deposited at the website 
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while conducting searches in the vicinity,
923
 whereas the museum in the Maritime 
Academy was created by Shkhunatik Galina Krympokha as a repository for records of 
the 'Shkhuna rovesnikov'.
924
 Furthermore, a new museum is planned in Myskhako, 
evidence of the increasing numbers of visitors to the village who are interested in its 
war history.
925
  
Schools also have their own small libraries, but the nineteen public libraries in 
and around Novorossiisk work closely with teachers, especially with regard to the 
delivery of lessons in courage.
926
 Teachers walk their classes to the closest library for 
special occasions to make use of the better facilities and resources.
927
 For example, the 
patriotism syllabus for the Bekar School refers to library presentations such as 'The 
Young Heroes of Novorossiisk' and 'The Streets of Novorossiisk are named after 
them'.
928
 The latter topic is seen as significant by librarians, as, through their children, it 
teaches newcomers to the town about the heroes of the past through the geography of 
the present in a further example of reverse propagation.
929
 Librarians sometimes go into 
schools to deliver lessons on the war,
930
 and schools similarly send children to the 
libraries to do research on local history,
931
 although one young respondent claimed 
never to have set foot inside a library during his school years.
932
 The role of libraries in 
the propagation of war memory was welcomed by parents,
933
 one of whom appreciated 
the gift by the children's library to seven-year olds of different books on local war 
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924
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history that they could exchange with their class-mates.
934
 This type of education is 
important, according to librarians, because a survey conducted by the Novorossiisk 
Historical Association indicates that today's young people tend not to read many 
books,
935
 relying mainly on films, television and the internet for information.
936
  In 
response, the Novorossiisk central library has created a small cinema and a large 
audio-visual room,
937
 while the community library in Myskhako has a computer with a 
big screen, gifted by the Councillor for Myskhako, which is suitable for group 
presentations on war history.
938
 An historical club for young people also holds meetings 
in the central library.
939
  
Furthermore, one large room in the central library is devoted to kraevedenie (local 
area studies).
940
 Rooted in the region, this subject has become increasingly important in 
the twenty-first century, probably viewed as a more humanistic antidote to the new 
post-Soviet history texts, which may have been deemed either too general or too 
negative in their revelations. Librarians collate photograph albums and newspaper 
articles about the Novorossiisk area to cater for the research interests of students and the 
delivery of school lessons on the locality, also part of the patriotism syllabus, 
reinforcing the identification of the Malaia zemlia campaign with this relatively small 
geographical area.  
There may be no alternative for young people but to remember, based on the 
substantial content of the patriotic syllabus in schools and the equivalent emphasis on 
local history in the institutions of higher education. However, the patriotic education of 
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935
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 Librarians F5J and F5K. 
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 F3J, F4J and M5E. 
940
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young people is not restricted to the classroom: perhaps the most noticeable role of 
schoolchildren and students in the town is their attendance at ceremonies of 
remembrance under the auspices of their educational establishments. Schoolchildren are 
expected by both the state and the local authorities to attend the ritual at Heroes' Square 
early on 9
th
 May.
941
 At the Eternal Flame the headmistress of School No. 6 reads Robert 
Rozhdestvenskii's poem 'Requiem' before the playing of Shostakovich's 'Novorossiisk 
Chimes' and the official minute's silence, after which the generations are united in their 
respect for the dead as children and veterans lay flowers together.
942
 Families also take 
children of all ages to the Victory Day commemorations,
943
 just as in the Brezhnev 
era,
944
 although, from my observations, lone teenagers were more common in the centre 
of Novorossiisk than in rural Myskhako, while younger children were present with their 
parents in both places, a probable reflection of the greater buzz and more dynamic 
activities in the centre of town. Genuinely attractive to teenagers and young adults is the 
Victory Day procession through the town centre with its increasing quantities of 
military hardware, in a provincial replication of the impressive column of tanks and 
rockets that thunders over Moscow's Red Square, leading to a sense of nationalistic 
pride.
945
  
The most obvious participation of schoolchildren in rituals, however, is their 
standing on guard duty at war memorials (vakhta pamiati), a nationwide tradition dating 
from the Soviet era.
946
 While most monuments have their guard on Victory Day only, 
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 Teacher F5A and Headmistress F7A. 
942
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the Eternal Flame has a constant daytime guard of older pupils drawn from local 
schools. This tradition, dating from the height of the Brezhnev era war cult, is known as 
'Post No. 1', reflecting the special 'sacred' significance of the place where the tomb of 
the heroes of Malaia zemlia is located on Heroes' Square. This ritual was inaugurated in 
1975, the year following Brezhnev's visit to Novorossiisk, by veteran naval captain 
Vitalii Lesik, with the support of the Communist Party and Komsomol gorkom,
947
 
although the tradition is now facilitated and funded by the town council through its 
department of culture, which provides uniforms for the young guards.
948
 
Some parents recall with nostalgia their own stints of guard duty from their 
youth,
949
 and appreciate a constructive activity provided by the state for their children 
which replicates the values of the older generations.
950
 Welcoming this aspect of 
vospitanie for their children, they proudly watch and photograph them.
951
 For different 
reasons, the young people themselves appear content to take part in the ritual, regarding 
selection for the duty as an honour, which also brings relief from school and the chance 
to strut around the square armed with an automatic rifle.
952
 
Composed originally from Komsomol or Pioneer members, the guard of 'living 
memory' is now fulfilled by twenty schoolchildren, ten boys and ten girls aged fourteen 
to sixteen, who have a whole week off school for their turn in the duty roster, involving 
1,900 young people annually drawn from most schools in the town. The tradition is so 
longstanding, the only one in the region to continue during the 1990s,
953
 that it now 
commemorates not only the heroes of Malaia zemlia, but also former Postovtsy (people 
who stand on military guard) who died in Afghanistan or Chechnia. In an almost 
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unchanging continuation of the Soviet tradition, the young guards wear naval uniform 
and take a solemn oath, a reminder of that made by the Malozemel'tsy prior to the 
landings: 
As I start my guard duty at Post No. 1 by the flame of eternal 
glory, I solemnly swear to be worthy to the end of my days of 
the memory of the heroes who gave their lives in the battles for 
the fatherland!  
I swear to hold my weapons in my hands as firmly as did Tsezar' 
Kunikov and Nikolai Sipiagin, defenders of the Hero-City of 
Novorossiisk!
 954
 
Previous Postovtsy include influential members of the local community, including the 
Deputy Director of the Maritime Museum, and current town councillors, who have an 
inherent wish to retain the ritual.
955
 In this way a self-propagating mechanism for the 
inter-generational maintenance of memory is effected, which is endorsed by schools,
956
 
parents,
957
 and young people.
958
 
For decades Captain Lesik taught groups of young people how to march and hold 
their rifles,
959
 presenting the official face of the town to important visitors and foreign 
delegations and patrolling his territory on Heroes' Square until well past his 90
th
 
birthday.
960
 Both the ritual and its leader have apparently built up their own myth over 
the years: Lesik is an Honoured Citizen of Novorossiisk and Post No. 1 appears in 
school lessons of patriotism, stimulating creative work by pupils, such as the acrostic 
poem composed collaboratively by a group of children for the sixty-fifth anniversary of 
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Victory Day.
961
 Praising Lesik for his vospitanie of Postovtsy, the poem sites him at the 
centre of Heroes' Square. Although he is an integral part of Post No. 1, the local 
authorities recently felt the need to install two deputies to work alongside Lesik, to 
ensure provision for succession and the continuity of this tradition which places the 
young generation at the heart of the mnemonic identity of the town.
962
 
Not all the activities for children are organized under the auspices of the school or 
family, however. Those without families live in social institutions which are also 
included in the official memory campaign. Children from an orphanage near Myskhako 
are taken with veterans on trips to war monuments, including the old cruiser 'Mikhail 
Kutuzov' moored in Novorossiisk's harbour.
963
 Furthermore, coachloads of children 
from sanatoria in Gelendzhik are taken to visit the main Malaia zemlia monument on 
the sea shore,
964
 while orienteering tours for teenagers from other regions take groups of 
hikers to sites of memorial interest in the rugged hinterland of Malaia zemlia.
965
 
Monumental tourism is nothing new: trips for children to famous war sites were 
led by the Red Pathfinders, an organization founded by the Komsomol and the army in 
1965. According to Tumarkin, these children sometimes took part in search activities, 
collecting military artefacts, while occasionally finding soldiers' remains.
966
 Children 
seem to be interested still in this type of search work, organized in Myskhako by School 
No. 27. The teenage searchers themselves sometimes take part in the re-interments, 
marching alongside the coffins and giving a final rifle salute. This participation is 
                                                     
961
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apparently voluntary, as testified by a short film made by local schoolchildren of one 
such ceremony in 2008.
967
 
If the state, according to the Bekar School syllabus for patriotism, wishes to 
combat disaffection amongst youth, it is clearly successful judging by the actions of the 
pupils of School No. 27.  The attitude they display to fallen soldiers in their amateur 
videofilm appears very different from that of the young men in the opening scenes of 
the film 'We are from the Future', whose cynicism about human remains was 
highlighted by their portrayal as neo-fascists. An element of extreme right-wing 
nationalism in Russia has surfaced in the last two decades particularly among young 
people, sometimes skinheads, epitomized by the Pamiat' (Memory) group with its black 
shirts typical of a neo-fascist, often anti-Semitic ideology.
968
  
Although some respondents pointed to the growth of neo-fascism in major 
cities,
969 
my research in Novorossiisk uncovered a little but no overwhelming evidence 
of disaffection in regard to war memory on the part of young people.
970 
 This may partly 
be due to the efforts of families, the town council and educational institutions, but also 
to a wider state campaign to mobilize youth in the cause of nationalism. For example, 
the pro-Kremlin nationalist youth movement, Nashi (Our People), was formed in 2005 
to encourage patriotism, probably by no coincidence in the same year that the  
St George ribbon movement was first deployed and the year following the Orange 
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Revolution in Ukraine
971
 If veterans are exploited by the state for their political capital, 
then the younger student generation appears to be used strategically to drum the rest of 
the population into the desired quasi-military order, a tactic sometimes attributed to 
Nashi members. Furthermore the summer camp for young people aged from eighteen to 
thirty organized annually at Lake Seliger by Rosmolodezh, the Federal Agency for 
Youth Affairs, promotes both patriotism and service in the armed forces in what appears 
to be a training camp for the leaders of tomorrow. Originally intended for thousands of 
Nashi activists, since 2012 it has been open to all, with visits from élite regiments and 
its own eternal flame.
972
 The military-patriotic work linking young people and the 
armed forces that was prevalent in the Komsomol in the latter stages of the Soviet 
Union continues today. 
Despite some evidence of local disaffection, Councillor Andrievskii is 
optimistically convinced that, with the continuing conservative emphasis on vospitanie 
of the young citizens of Novorossiisk, the upcoming generation will continue the 
memory tradition. In general my observations and responses from interviewees support 
the attitude that Novorossiisk has a special identity with respect to war memory in 
comparison with other regional centres, which will probably override any potential 
disaffection among its young for years to come. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
My research indicates that the cross-generational propagation of war memory to the 
young depends on the mutual reinforcement of a complex and closed social network. 
My hierarchical diagram of the influence of the various agencies involved indicates the 
driving force of the state in its cultivation of the new war cult under the Putin régime, 
which feeds down directly via the mass media and indirectly via the regional and town 
authorities to the younger generation.  
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My research reveals a mixture of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms for 
memory propagation, where the state, school and family play the most important roles 
in socialization of the young. Young people are subjected to a concerted mnemonic 
campaign which is successful in most cases, although resisted by some. The most 
ubiquitous means of transmission is the school, the nexus for other multiple influences, 
where propagation is most effective when it fosters the proactivity of students of all 
ages, and joins with the family to render lessons on local history more personal and 
geographically relevant for pupils. Attempts by some educational institutions to digitize 
memory appear also to make it more appealing to young people. Furthermore, my 
evidence suggests that the most effective methods of cross-generational transmission of 
memory are those which reduce the temporal and spatial distance between older and 
younger generations with the vividness of film or war reconstructions. 
The genetic terminology applied to remembrance today points to the action of a 
traditional, familial bottom-up force within the top-down state war cult, serving to 
complicate the mechanism of memory construction. This dynamic also reinforces the 
state narrative, if leading to the mnemonic stasis typical of an identity built on past 
tribal exploits, a cult of ancestors and traditional moral characteristics. With a renewed 
emphasis on vospitanie under the Putin régime, the youngest and the oldest generations 
are increasingly united in often contrived social meetings - a forum for the transmission 
of memory under the conditions of a new war cult that aims to revive the traditional 
moral values of the Brezhnev era. This includes the cultivation of an attitude which 
regards military service and patriotic courage in a positive light, where making war 
(successfully) is valued. Parents may even learn aspects of the war myth from their 
children through the largely unplanned mechanism of reverse propagation, a further 
example of the key role of young people in the transmission of memory dating from the 
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founders of Beskozyrka. This not only reinforces the traditional propagation 
mechanism, but may increasingly result in future mnemonic stagnation.  
My interviews suggest that many citizens of Novorossiisk are avid consumers of 
television and newspaper revelations of 'the truth' about the war period, revealing a 
change in transmission mechanism from the oral propagation of the post-war years and 
the state-sponsored narrative of the Brezhnev and Putin war cults. Although access to 
information is changing, respondents indicate a continuing reliance on informal family 
discussions, although eye-witness testimony is now scarcely viable. For the moment 
both the state and the family remain guardians of memory, while the local authority 
takes responsibility for the custody of the many artefacts which will replace direct oral 
propagation in the future.  
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Conclusions: Looking back to the future 
Идут туристы, гости вереницей, 
Здесь каждый шаг историей храним. 
Они пришли 
В наш город поклониться 
За все, за все, что выстрадано им. 
[...] 
Земля Малая. Брожу по местам, 
Где окопы покрылись травою, 
Где смертельный когда-то хлестал 
Дождь осколков, порывисто воя.973 
 
 
 
The relatively few Western tourists visiting Novorossiisk are introduced to a town that 
seems to some to be 'stuck in a Soviet time warp'.
974
 Disembarking from their cruise 
ships for a few hours, visitors are whisked around the Valley of Death, the monument 
cruiser 'Mikhail Kutuzov' and the Malaia zemlia memorial complex.
975
 Even ordinary 
Russians far from Novorossiisk see life in the Hero-City portrayed as revolving around 
the iconic Malaia zemlia monument in key scenes from the recent popular film 
'Marafon' (The Marathon).
976
  
To today's visitor the myth of Malaia zemlia is conveyed by the main monuments, 
where a brief summary from a tour guide is still powerful enough to reduce tourists to 
tears.
977
 This is an eminently potent and marketable myth, both to outsiders and 
residents, with its unambiguous heroes and successful outcome. Memory is carefully 
filtered however: tourists are not shown the outlying monument to  
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 'Tourists walk, guests file past /Here we preserve history with every step. /They have come to our town 
to pay respect /For everything, for everything that it suffered. //Malaia zemlia. I wander around the 
places, /Where trenches have been covered with grass, /Where a deadly rain of shrapnel once lashed 
down /Howling fitfully.' ('Novorossiiskaia poema', by Nikolai Tatarkin, Gorod u moria, Krasnodar: 
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˂http://www.seadream.com/voyages/11322˃ [accessed 14/10/2014]. 
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 Telephone interview with Cruise Manager at 'Voyages of Discovery' (06/11/2012). 
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The Unvanquished to pay their respects to those Jewish civilians executed shortly after 
the town was occupied and who now appear to be suffering from agreed collective 
amnesia. Guides may point out the bas-reliefs of the heroes inside the Malaia zemlia 
monument, but Brezhnev is not singled out for mention; visitors learn nothing about his 
minor part in the war or his major role when in power in promulgating the war myth 
nationwide. The older generation across the country may still recall with derision 
Brezhnev's infamous war memoirs, but in this respect Novorossiisk has taken ownership 
of its identity from the man who did so much to formulate it. With Brezhnev virtually 
removed from the myth, a Heimat-like convergence in local and national remembrance 
as proposed by Alon Confino has been achieved, whereby there is an overlapping of 
national and local symbolism and interpretation.
978
 
With this new sense of ownership of their town's identity, many citizens of 
Novorossiisk feel a responsibility for propagation of a myth which is apparently not 
only good for the tourist trade and the town's regional prestige, but also for the 
vospitanie of the younger generation. In comparison with war memory in the West it is 
perhaps surprising that so many young people buy into the myth. However, Russia has 
seen a campaign of patriotism in the twenty-first century, with a focus through the 
school curriculum on the younger generation who will, in the future, bear the 
responsibility for remembrance. Today's myth is a powerful social construction, 
disseminated thanks to a strong commitment to memory on the part of the local 
authority, with a leading role played by the Mayor who both shapes and responds to 
local opinion.  
Locally, the myth of Malaia zemlia that was founded under Stalinism and 
propagated under Communism during the Brezhnev régime remains strong under Putin. 
Virtually every living participant may be dead, and many of the post-war generation 
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too, but the myth lives on successfully. This longevity is due to the undeniably positive 
narrative and proactive attempts to rejuvenate commemorative rituals. The sheer 
resonance of the myth with generations of citizens of Novorossiisk is clear from my 
research. Much may be made of the legendary February weather, but, alongside 
reconstructions on the actual site of the landings, the cold helps to engender a temporal 
proximity to the landing troops, promoting cross-generational empathy amongst current 
residents. Russian communities, in common with other traditional societies, have 
always been particularly fond of their canon of myths, legends and folk-tales, which is 
evident in Novorossiisk. Although there is a recent rapprochement with the objective 
history valued in the West, the subjective myth of Malaia zemlia retains its own 
attached legends: young Vitia is still remembered and Brezhnev on his evening stroll 
stands on his granite plinth, imbuing the myth with the emotional popular appeal 
lacking in the history books.  
Despite an element of legend, however, the myth of Malaia zemlia is based 
largely on undisputable fact, supported by increasing quantities of historical minutiae. 
Novorossiisk is successfully forging a relationship with its Soviet history, which is 
effective for the town by virtue of its largely unchallengeable nature. Thanks to its local 
significance and the unique Beskozyrka ritual, citizens seem content to adopt the myth 
and proud of their cultural and military heritage. In this respect, Novorossiisk represents 
an extreme case, where the desire for continued local war memory coincides with the 
national position on the continuation of memory, assuring the maintenance of the 
Hero-City's own special identity and status. 
The official myth today consists of a simple and generalized narrative about the 
landings with most of the historical detail provided by history classes in local institutes 
of higher education. Information about collaboration and punishment battalions is now 
more widely available, if still only discussed on the sidelines, as some in the town start 
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to appreciate the more unsavoury aspects of its history. The recent inclusion of 
Cossacks in the outward display of the war myth grates with some residents: tourists 
may attend a Cossack circus extravaganza and pass Cossacks on sentry duty at the 
Eternal Flame, but do not hear the whispers about their alleged collaboration with the 
enemy. These rumours have, however, become more insistent with the recent conflict in 
Ukraine, as louder allegations of Soviet collaboration have been voiced. The myth that 
was first widely disseminated during the Brezhnev régime was inclusive of all 
ethnicities, intended to unify the whole country. The same aim is apparent under Putin, 
although now the emphasis is largely on the Russian people rather than the entire Soviet 
Union. Since 2014 pro-government Ukrainian citizens have been depicted in a more 
negative light in the Russian state-controlled media, which are now promoting some 
division in the once unifying national war myth.  
My study represents an original contribution to scholarship on the sociology of 
myth-making and remembrance. My research into the mechanism of construction and 
dynamics of propagation of this local war myth has revealed the distinctiveness of 
mythology in the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia, based on a myth-making 
tradition dating from the war against Napoleon in Tsarist Russia and further honed in 
the aftermath of the October Revolution. Just as there is an historical continuity on 
Ulitsa Novorossiiskoi respubliki, linking the monuments to the town's 
nineteenth-century founder via the Revolution to Brezhnev's visit to confer the town 
with its Hero-City status, so the current identity of Novorossiisk depends on a temporal 
continuity from 1943 to today. This connection is not only evident in the monumental 
landscape of the town, but is also claimed within the moral and genetic character of its 
citizens.  
In general, this study of the local dimension in remembrance of the war has 
demonstrated a substantial coherence between the war narrative as disseminated from 
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above and supported through collective memory from below. However, my research has 
revealed the agency of construction and propagation of memory in Novorossiisk to be 
less clear-cut than Hobsbawm or Tumarkin would suggest, indicative of a complex 
relationship between the state and the individual citizen. Tumarkin sees only the 
'vulgarity and gigantism' of state-sponsored memorial complexes such as the Malaia 
zemlia monument at Stanichka.
979
  
 
 
The Malaia zemlia memorial
980
 
 
However, commemoration of the Malaia zemlia campaign is not totally dominated by 
the state. Individual citizens of Novorossiisk may live in the shadow of the 
Brezhnev-era monument, but individuals are also depicted in the faces of troops on its 
sides; in addition they are remembered through the single beskozyrka floating on the 
waves just off the shore, and by locally significant monuments that commemorate the 
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war dead on a smaller, more human scale. Furthermore, I have found some scope for 
individual and group proactivity in commemorative ritual and monumental memory, 
especially but not exclusively on the periphery of official memorial practices - 
grassroots memorial activity even more surprising in view of the top-down mnemonic 
environments of both war cults.  
This thesis also makes a valuable contribution to the political history of the 
Brezhnev era by its close examination of the relationship between the General Secretary 
and the citizens of his Hero-City. The war cult of the Brezhnev régime may have been 
centred on the persona of the General Secretary in the case of Malaia zemlia, but in the 
end was manipulated for the political purposes of the régime behind its ailing leader. 
With his loss of physical and mental capacity, Brezhnev became less credible in his 
position to the Soviet people, rendering a once popular war cult derisory after the 
publication of his memoirs. After Brezhnev's death his war cult imploded, its long-term 
impact fatally compromised by governmental over-exploitation.  
The war cult of the Putin era is not centred on the alleged exploits of one man, nor 
is Putin as frail as the elderly Brezhnev in his final years. Both these facts render the 
contemporary war cult potentially more enduring than that of the Brezhnev era, 
particularly as the recent conflict in Ukraine has triggered an increase in rhetoric 
referring to the Great Patriotic War in the Russian media. However, the approach to the 
past through an emphasis on military victory by means of the people's heroic sacrifice 
seems identical today to that in the Soviet Union at the height of Communism, while 
retaining much of the Soviet symbolism, albeit without the formal constraints of 
Socialist Realism. Building on some popular nostalgia for the Soviet past, President 
Putin has reclaimed some aspects of Soviet history. The war cult of the twenty-first 
century is disseminated through schools and ceremonies to a public widely, if not 
completely, united by its simple message, which still seems relevant to the régime: 
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deception and attempts at collaboration by the invading enemy from the West, defeated 
thanks to the sacrificial but eventually victorious struggle of the united people.  
It is not possible to predict the future of the war myth in Novorossiisk precisely, 
but my research has uncovered sufficient evidence to make some informed speculation. 
There is no reason to suppose that popular opinion will alter tack with a sudden wish to 
forget the local history evident in museums and libraries and on the streets of the 
Hero-City. Beskozyrka is successfully continuing after the death of Konstantin Podyma, 
the town has made plans for the replacement of Captain Lesik on Heroes' Square and 
Mayor Siniagovskii seems secure in his position of influence as a member of the 
majority United Russia party. The seventieth anniversary of the end of the war in 2015 
may mark a watershed, however; it has been named the 'year of the veteran' in some 
places in Russia, probably the recognition of a culmination in the direct participation of 
veterans in commemorative events.
981
 The end of direct transmission of war memory in 
Novorossiisk will conclude a tradition of inter-generational meetings, but this may 
equally result in fewer bored pupils as students are allowed to research local history 
independently. Even as the war myth gradually evolves into local history, it retains its 
relevance and utility for Novorossiisk: as long as it guarantees regional prestige and a 
stream of tourists, it will surely be supported by the local authorities and town council.  
Propagation of the myth is not merely a local initiative and it is doubtful if 
remembrance would be so popular if maintained in its own bubble outside the national 
mnemonic environment generated under the 'managed democracy' of the Putin 
government. The state's war myth has been increasingly deployed since the turn of the 
century as a metaphor for national cohesion and, more recently, to imbue 
self-confidence amongst Russians increasingly criticized by the West. Similarly, 
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 For example, 'Tuleev ob''iavil "Godom veteranov - godom Velikoi Pobedy" 2015 god', AIF, 
29/04/2014, ˂http://www.aif.ru/society/history/1159965˃ [accessed 06/09/2014]. 
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political authoritarianism has been gradually ramped up by a government looking to 
forestall any potential internal revolution, such as those occurring in neighbouring 
Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004 and 2014). The strong element of state control and 
centralization under the guise of a democratic society may not be evident or even matter 
to the ordinary resident of Novorossiisk, who takes it for granted and sees only the local 
result of the national war cult which has helped to fuel the popularity of the myth of 
Malaia zemlia.  
The main proponent of the national meta-narrative of the war is the President and 
the longevity of the current war cult may depend on the length of his tenure. The recent 
conflict with Ukraine and the perceived growing threat from the West has resulted in an 
inflation of nationalistic rhetoric. Vladimir Putin has developed an even tighter 
emotional hold on Russia with an increasingly powerful narrative of patriotism and 
militarism, both referring back to war victory.
982
  Since the annexation of Crimea Putin 
has personally promised to build up trade in the Novorossiisk area, including a new 
bridge across the Kerch' Straits and the formation of a new transport hub linking the two 
Hero-Cities of Novorossiisk and Sevastopol', with the development of a more modern 
transport network behind Novorossiisk.
983
 In conjunction with the growing naval base 
in Novorossiisk, this would boost the local economy considerably and probably 
stimulate not only the maintenance of monuments but also the budget devoted to 
remembrance. 
For the moment, though, the Russian economy continues to struggle as a result of 
Western sanctions and a weak rouble. This disruption may exacerbate the 
unsustainability of a national economy facing lower oil prices, and the local economy 
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26/09/2014, ˂http://www.novorab.ru/ArticleSection/Details/12606˃ [accessed 20/10/2014]. 
 316 
 
will no doubt suffer as the national embargo on some imports reduces the flow of goods 
through the port of Novorossiisk. The consequences may be similar to those of the 
1990s, when everyday financial concerns and decreasing official budgets displaced 
commemoration of the war from the political agenda nationwide. If state policies and 
President Putin become too unpopular, both he and his war cult may themselves be 
consigned to history. Whatever happens in the short to medium term, this thesis has 
demonstrated that the myth of Malaia zemlia is strong and stable enough to live on in 
Novorossiisk in the longer term as it mutates into local history, while the shadows of 
Brezhnev and the Brezhnev era monuments linger in the background.  
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Appendix A: Some concluding observations from a cross-section of 
contemporary citizens of Novorossiisk 
 
'Do you know, [...] I have travelled a lot in the world, but nowhere have I come across a 
more patriotic town than our Novorossiisk.' (Konstantin Podyma)984 
 
'I am proud of Novorossiisk and don't want to leave it. It has a splendid role in the 
history of the Great Patriotic War. People gave their lives for Novorossiisk and for our 
opportunity to live here. We, the children, are grateful.' (F1A) 
 
'People in Moscow don't know where Novorossiisk is, even today, so they don't know 
what happened here 65 years ago; maybe they don't want to know. Perhaps it wasn't as 
big a battle as Stalingrad, but it played a key role. Most people remember that Brezhnev 
fought here and that it's a Hero-City. It was strategic and significant.' (M1A) 
 
'This is an unusual town; it is important because it was defended by lots of people. Lots 
of heroes were here.' (M1B) 
 
'I feel pride; and responsibility here, and the memory of those who helped our 
generation. Pride in those who gave their blood for the town. They gave us life. We like 
the rituals and parades on special days; this reminds us to be grateful.' (M2D) 
 
'Malaia zemlia has become well known in the town. It is part of the town's organism, it's 
a natural matter of fact, it's like asking us how important it is to have feet.' (F3A) 
 
'We know that Novorossiisk is a special town, compared with Krasnodar; Malaia zemlia 
is part of the town when we have celebrations.' (F3D) 
 
'There is a bigger sense of patriotism here, in a Hero-City. The whole country suffered, 
but there is a special attitude to Hero-Cities. Here it is underlined by remembrance 
events more than in other places. It's a super town, and it is especially good to look 
across from the Maritime Academy to the Malaia zemlia monument.' (F3F) 
 
'Novorossiisk is a very significant place. I lived elsewhere, but now I like living in a 
Hero-City.' (F3G) 
 
'I am not from around here, but now I associate myself with this town, and feel really 
proud to live in a Hero-City. There is no other Hero-City nearby; even Krasnodar, 
which is twice as big, isn't a Hero-City. Now I call it my own and I like it more and 
more as the years pass.' (M3A) 
 
'You walk on land soaked in blood.' (M3D) 
 
'I like life in a Hero-City. I like its history. I think everything, monuments, nature, sea, 
and its history, are all linked with its mighty power. I want to transmit this to the next 
generation.' (M3F) 
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'Living in a Hero-City has little significance for life today, but I feel very proud of past 
events.' (F4A) 
 
'Living here brings responsibility and pride.' (F4E) 
 
'I like this town, with its historic past, and feel a sense of pride.' (F4F) 
 
'You have to think about what took place here, to know about it, to be sorry for the 
people.' (F4I) 
 
'This may be a war city, but the people are ordinary. Novorossiisk is just one of many. 
Leningrad, Stalingrad and Moscow are genuine Hero-Cities. But of course Malaia 
zemlia is part of my everyday life.' (M4A) 
 
'I was born in the former Soviet Union and I have always known that Novorossiisk was 
a Hero-City since my childhood. The attitude of people may have changed; it's not 
really in the press so much now. But now I just feel respect for the town which does not 
depend on the fact that it's a Hero-City; you don't need to live here to feel respect for the 
fallen.' (M4B) 
 
'This is a living place and this one place is special because this little bit of land was 
held. I am very proud and my son, when he was little, when we went to relatives, to 
other places in Russia, he always told people he lived in a Hero-City.' (F5A) 
'I got married and came here in my youth, and have a feeling of pride, but I may feel the 
same about any other town if I lived there. We live on the exact spot where the battles 
took place. On the anniversary of the landings, three-quarters of the people come to 
honour the heroes; everyone comes: civil servants, children, residents, old people, 
come, and it's really cold, but people come. They talk a lot about it then. It's better to 
talk than to forget.' (F5B) 
 
'Friends from some way away come to Novorossiisk, as this is a centre where memory 
is concentrated.' (F5D) 
 
'I feel a responsibility, living here, as if I am the visiting card of the town. I am very 
proud of the local heroes and the monuments.' (F5E) 
 
'I have lived here for fourteen years. This is an unusual town, not simple or ordinary. 
Everything reminds you of the war years. There is respect for the heroes, to whom the 
monuments are dedicated. Your heart beats, on the streets, and especially on Malaia 
zemlia, where people go to relax; it's attractive, and life goes on, but memory of the past 
is important. But I won't swim in the sea, because the ground is sacred; we are reminded 
of how much blood was shed. It is a responsibility for our children, to keep the town 
and its streets clean and to respect memory, look after the monuments and influence 
personal behaviour. Malaia zemlia is part of my everyday life, as you come across all 
these places all the time in our town.' (F5G) 
 
'I feel pride in my town, where there was a big battle.' (F5H) 
 
'We take memory and death so seriously, more than any other town.' (F5M) 
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'I have always lived here in Novorossiisk and feel a sense of responsibility. This is my 
personal view; it may be a small town, but this is a Hero-City. It was a real battle, lots 
of metal dropped on everyone, 1,250 kilograms per square metre, the beach-head was 
held, they defended the strategic gateway to the Caucasus, and stopped the Germans 
before they took the oil. That's the reasons it's a Hero-City. But Novorossiisk was so 
small, it did not get the historic recognition it deserved.'  (M5F) 
'I like the monuments but it's not important that this is a Hero-City.' (F6A) 
 
'I don't really feel a sense of responsibility for memory here.' (F6D) 
 
'Of course I feel a responsibility for memory, it's my own town, so we try to maintain 
memory, to teach our children, as best we can. But maybe Malaia zemlia isn't part of 
everyday life.' (6FE) 
 
'I am proud of my Hero-City.' (M6A) 
 
'I have a sense of respect and honour and some responsibility. The town was made a 
Hero-City after the victory, and each inhabitant has a feeling of responsibility and pride. 
It may be a small town, but it saw important events.' (F7A) 
'Maybe this isn't a real Hero-City because the population was not involved in the 
defence and the fighting.' (M7B) 
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Appendix B: Notes on sources and methodology  
 
This is a multi-disciplinary thesis with historical, cultural and sociological dimensions. 
It therefore employs a mixed-mode qualitative methodology, relying in particular upon 
a literary analysis of war memoirs; a sustained overview of the press in Novorossiisk 
from 1943 to the present; attendance at rituals of commemoration; observation of 
monuments and battle sites; the detailed examination of current educational practices; 
and extended personal interviews. 
Most memoirs were borrowed from the main Gor'kii Library in Novorossiisk, 
while others were given by individuals and the library in Myskhako. Many newspapers 
were accessed online, while past copies of local newspapers, notably Novorossiiskii 
rabochii and Novorossiiskie vesti, were found in the main Novorossiisk library. Copies 
of Znamia rodiny and other documents from the war and post-war years were consulted 
in the archives of the Novorossiisk Museum. A few items were found in the Russian 
State Archive for Literature and the Arts in Moscow. 
Research interviews in Novorossiisk were authorized by the University College 
London Ethics Committee.
985
 Field research and interviews were conducted in 
Novorossiisk in May 2010, March-April 2011 and February 2013. Discussions with 
four subjects were continued in England and email exchanges were conducted with ten. 
In total, 124 residents of Novorossiisk ranging in age from eighteen to ninety-three were 
interviewed for an average of an hour: some very extensive, in-depth meetings with 
experts were balanced by a few shorter interviews with less forthcoming subjects. 
Discussion lasted from thirty minutes to three hours, taking place in the subject's 
workplace, at home or on neutral territory, for example in the Bekar School or the 
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Myskhako town hall. A list of thirteen preliminary questions (at Appendex D) was used 
to help structure the conversations as the basis for extended discussions. This guided 
interview was modified flexibly during interviews to allow for the free flow of 
conversation. In the case of experts, questions were tailored in order to obtain more 
specific information. All discussions were conducted in Russian.
986
 
Access to a wide range of interviewees of various ages and ethnicities was 
obtained through the good offices of the Bekar School, where parents and grandparents 
of pupils were invited to private meetings in a classroom in 2011. The letter of 
invitation and the agreement pro forma are detailed at Appendix D.
987
 One advantage of 
this approach was easy access to a useful number of subjects. However, following the 
Ethics Committee advice to provide in the letter of invitation an example of questions to 
be asked during the interview, in addition to general information about my research, 
prospective interviewees were put off at first, fearing that they would appear ignorant 
about the detailed history of the war. Only once the first ten or so interviewees reported 
back to their friends that the experience was more interesting than daunting did a steady 
flow of subjects materialize as the interview network expanded.  
Access to expert interviewees and significant post-holders in the town was gained 
thanks to my professional network, with interviews mainly held in their places of work. 
A further large tranche of interviewees was introduced by key colleagues. Finally, many 
elderly interviewees were accessed thanks to the Veterans' Council in Myskhako and all 
were interviewed either at the Veterans' Council, in their homes or in a public place of 
their choice. All interviewees were offered the chance to have a friend alongside them, 
which was usually not accepted, although in the case of older, potentially vulnerable 
volunteers, I insisted that a member of the Veterans' Council or a relation was present. 
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 In view of the suspicion in Russia over the signing of documents, some respondents agreed verbally to 
the interview, but declined to formalize their agreement with a signature. 
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Light refreshments were offered to all those attending my place of work, and I was 
invariably offered hospitality in the homes or offices of interviewees, which helped the 
conversation to flow more naturally.  
Although most interviewees seemed very enthusiastic to talk to me, I was equally 
concerned to protect them. No juveniles were interviewed and precautions were taken to 
protect older subjects from potentially distressing memories. It was always stressed at 
the beginning of the interview that respondents were able to stop if they found the 
conversation difficult. In practice, I found that women were more than happy to talk to a 
woman interviewer without any self-consciousness, whilst four men, who were rather 
hesitant about the experience at first, soon overcame their initial lack of confidence. I 
conducted risk assessments for my own safety before my field-trips but encountered no 
personal problems. Although one older woman initially accused me of being a spy, she 
agreed after two hours' conversation that I was, after all, 'one of ours'.
988
 Although I 
explained carefully to respondents the nature of my research, I had to deal sensitively 
with one man who felt wrongly that I was trying to prove that the myth of Malaia 
zemlia was not based on fact, but was merely a legend.
989
 In only one case did I 
terminate the interview prematurely when a relatively young woman became distressed 
at the thought that young people today may fail to respect the memory of the war 
dead.
990
 Several subjects, both men and women, returned to me days after our initial 
meeting with further information that they thought would be of interest.  
My gradual integration into this parochial community improved as I was able to 
interview many respondents on several occasions over the years and build up a more 
meaningful and trusting relationship. On occasions it appeared that some responses 
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 F7E. 
989
 M4E. 
990
 F3G. 
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were rehearsed and that perhaps interviewees were telling me what I wanted to hear.
991
 
Over time I was able to establish if these responses stayed the same or if more was 
forthcoming.  
Confidentiality of response was guaranteed, although some experts agreed to 
waive this right. Some agreed to their name being mentioned if they were speaking in 
an official capacity, but requested that they remain anonymous in connection with any 
personal opinion expressed during the interview. This points to some possible tension 
between official and private opinion. The position of respondents is only included 
where relevant. Anonymous interviewees in Novorossiisk are identified using the coded 
identity: 
'F (female) or M (male)/first digit of age on date of first interview/identifying letter'.  
For example, F4D is a female in her forties. A full list of anonymous coded identities 
and the dates of their interviews is detailed at Appendix C.  
One disadvantage of using a network based around a local school could be that 
interviewees may have a common social environment. In fact, this was not a serious 
problem, as subjects had a wide range of backgrounds and many more interviewees 
were sought from other sources. The main disadvantage was that my sample included 
substantially more females than males, possibly because fewer men of working age 
were available for interview during working hours. This may also reflect both natural 
demographics and the premature death of men who saw wartime service. Of the 124 
interviewees, fifty-five were male and sixty-nine female, a ratio of 4:5, with males 
comprising 44.4% of the total sample, compared with 55.6% for females. The age 
distribution of interviewees is shown in the bar charts below, where red indicates female 
and blue male respondents.  
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 For example, F6D, F6H, M6M, F7B, F7C, F7D, F8A, F8C and F8D. 
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Age distribution of interviewees 
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Male sample 
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Few young people under the age of twenty were interviewed, as ethical 
considerations prevented the direct questioning of children under the age of eighteen. It 
must be stressed that, in many cases, the exact age of subjects was not known exactly 
such that the coded identity sometimes reflects a best guess at the first digit of the 
person's age. Based on these inaccurate statistics, there is a modal age range of 50-59, 
with lower estimated mean and median age ranges. 
Interviewees comprised people from various backgrounds, including teachers and 
lecturers, students in higher education, military personnel, historians, librarians, 
architects, town councillors, journalists, divers, lawyers, shopkeepers, economists, 
business people, housewives and pensioners. In the list of individual interviewees at 
Appendix C socioeconomic class has been based on the National Readership Survey 
categories commonly used in market research, with an expansion of group E (the 
unemployed) to distinguish between students (E1), housewives (E2), and retired persons 
(E3), and with the previous class, where known, included in brackets. No jobseekers of 
working age or persons under the age of eighteen were interviewed. In all cases, 
however, the respondent's perceptions and subjective discourse on memory were more 
important than their social background. 
 
Socioeconomic classifications employed 
A  higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations 
B  intermediate managerial, administrative and professional occupations 
C1 supervisory or clerical and junior managerial, administrative and 
professional occupations 
 
C2 skilled manual occupations 
D semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations 
E1 students 
E2 housewives 
E3 retired persons 
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In addition to the interviews in Novorossiisk, I interviewed briefly and on an ad 
hoc basis thirty-four subjects from places in Russia far removed from Novorossiisk in 
order to compare their understanding of Malaia zemlia with the attitude in Novorossiisk.  
However much I have delved into the mind and memory of Novorossiisk over the 
years, I remain conscious that there remains a wealth of untapped resources for future 
research. I have built up working relationships with several community leaders and have 
been granted privileged access to much material, but have not been able to visit the 
regional archives in Krasnodar. Further research is necessary to uncover the local 
Communist Party documents relating to Brezhnev's visit to Novorossiisk and the 
development of the Beskozyrka ritual. In Moscow my time in the state archives was 
limited and the treasure trove of documents relating to Beskozyrka awaits research in 
Podyma's archive in the Russian State Archive for Socio-Political History (RGASPI). 
My personal academic interest lies in the hundreds of letters written by troops on 
Malaia zemlia and held in the Novorossiisk museum archives.
992
 From this albeit 
censored source the very first mention of 'Malaia zemlia' could be established and 
perhaps the veracity of some of the snapshots of memory featuring in later memoirs.  
  
                                                     
992
 See footnote 113. 
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Appendix C: List of Interviewees 
Subject Socioeconomic 
class 
Date interviewed 
F1A E1 13/05/2010 
F1B E1 31/03/2011 
F1C E1 31/03/2011 
F1D E1 03/04/2012 
M1A E1 14/05/2010 
M1B E1 07/05/2010 
M1C E1 31/03/2011 
M1D E1 31/03/2011 
F2A E1 14/05/2010 
F2B E1 31/03/2011 
F2C E1 31/03/2011 
F2D C1 18/03/2011 
F2E C1 19/03/2011 
F2F C1 23/03/2011 
F2G E1 06/02/2013 
F2H E1 06/02/2013 
M2A E1 10/05/2010 
M2B E1 31/03/2011 
M2C E1 31/03/2011 
M2D E1 31/03/2011 
M2E E1 31/03/2011 
M2F C1 31/03/2011 
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Subject 
 
 
 
Socioeconomic 
class 
 
Date interviewed 
 
 
M2G C1 18/03/2011 
M2H C1 19/03/2011 
M2I E1 06/02/2013 
M2J E1 06/02/2013 
F3A C1 06/05/2010 and 10/05/2010 
F3B C1 09/05/2010 
F3C C1 15/03/2011 
F3D D 15/03/2011 
F3E E1 16/03/2011 
F3F D 16/03/2011 
F3G C1 18/03/2011 
F3H C1 18/03/2011 
F3I E1 18/03/2011 
F3J C1 25/03/2011 
F3K C1 19, 23 and 29/03/2011 
 
M3A B 10/05/2010 and 9/2/2013 
M3B C2 22/03/2011 
M3C C2 22/03/2011 
M3D C2 22/03/2011 
M3E B 16/03/2011 
F4A B 09/05/2010 and 8/2/2013 
F4B B 14/05/2010 
F4C C1 15/05/2010, 17/03/2011 and 
01/04/2011 
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Subject 
Socioeconomic 
class 
 
Date interviewed 
F4D C1 15/05/2010 
F4E E1 14/05/2010 
F4F E1 18/03/2011 
F4G D 15/03/2011 
F4H E1 16/03/2011 
F4I D 17/03/2011 
F4J C1 25/03/2011 
F4K C1 06/02/2013 
F4L A 04/02/2013 and 05/02/2013 
F4M C1 03/02/2013 
M4A B 15/05/2010 
M4B C2 17/03/2011 
M4C A 29/03/2011 
M4D C2 08/02/2013 
M4E C2 09/05/2010 and 29/03/2011 
M4F B 07/02/2013 
F5A B 13/05/2010 
F5B C1 14/05/2010 
F5C A 12/05/2010 
F5D A 06/05/2010 
F5E A 12/05/2010 
F5F C1 21/03/2011 
F5G C1 15/03/2011 
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Subject 
Socioeconomic 
class Date interviewed 
F5H C1 16/03/2011 
F5I C1 18/03/2011 
F5J B 23/03/2011 
F5K C1 23/03/2011 
F5L C1 25/03/2011 
F5M B 01/04/2011 
F5N A 02/04/2011 
F5P B email correspondence only 
F5Q B 16/03/2014 
M5A C1 18/03/2011 
M5B B 18/03/2011 
M5C A 09/05/2010 and 23/03/2011 
M5D B 23/03/2011 
M5E B 26/03/2011 
M5F A 29/03/2011 
M5G D 24/03/2011 
M5H B 16/05/2010 
F6A E3(D) 15/05/2010 
F6B B 01/04/2011 
F6C E3(C1) 14/05/2010 
F6D E3(D) 09/05/2010 and 29/03/2011 
F6E C2 15/03/2011 
F6F E3(D) 15/03/2011 
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Subject 
Socioeconomic 
class Date interviewed 
F6G C1 14/01/2012 
F6H C1 05/02/2013 
M6A E3(D) 10/05/2010 
M6B B 14/03/2011 
M6C B 31/03/2011 
M6D B 24/03/2011 
M6E B 24/03/2011 
M6F B 22/03/2011 
M6G C1 21/03/2011 
M6H E3 09/05/2010 
M6I C2 22/04/2011 
M6J A 06/02/2013 
M6K B 03/02/2013 
M6L A 03/02/2013 
M6M B 05/02/2013 
F7A A 13/05/2010 and 26/03/2011 
F7B C1 08/05/2010, 19/03/2011 and 08/02/2013 
F7C E3(D) 13/05/2010 and 19/03/2011 
F7D E3(D) 09/05/2010 
F7E E3 05/02/2013 
M7A E3(C2) 16/03/2011 
M7B E3(A) 21/03/2011 
M7C E3(C1) 21/03/2011 
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Subject 
Socioeconomic 
class Date interviewed 
M7D E3(A) 22/03/2011 
F8A E3(C1) 10/05/2010 and 08/02/2013 
F8B E3(D) 10/05/2010 and 19/03/2011 
F8C E3(B) 05/05/2010 
F8D E3(C1) 01/04/2011 
M8A E3(D) 10/05/2010 
M8B E3(C1) 19/03/2011 
M8C E3(B) 03/02/2013 
F9A E3 12/04/2011 
M9A E3(A) 07/05/2010 
M9B E3(B) 03/02/2013 
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Appendix D 
Interview questions and documentation 
 
Points covered in conversations with interviewees 
 
The following leading questions, posed in Russian, were used as the basis for extended 
discussions with participants. 
 
1. What does it mean to you to live in a Hero-City?  
2. Does this involve any responsibility on your part, in your opinion? 
3. Why are the defenders of Malaia zemlia considered to be heroes? 
4. What memoirs about Malaia zemlia do you think are the most significant? 
5. What do people think about the links between Brezhnev and Malaia zemlia? 
6. Why do we remember Malaia zemlia, and what can we learn from this 
commemoration? 
7. Have the remembrance rituals changed at all over the years? 
8. Does anybody simply want to forget it? 
9. What is the significance of war monuments today in Novorossiisk? 
10. What is the role of the family, schools, teachers, the media, the local authorities, 
the town council and the local museum in forming people's attitude to Malaia 
zemlia? 
11. Is it important to remember the campaign? 
12. Is Malaia zemlia part of your everyday life? 
13. Is anyone disaffected with remembering the war and Malaia zemlia?  
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Letter of invitation to potential interviewees 
 
Информационное письмо и приглашение на собеседование для проведения 
исследовательского проекта 
Вам вручат копию этого информационного письма 
Название проекта:  Память о Малой Земле 
Данное исследование одобрено Комитетом по Этике Лондонского Университета 
(University College London) 
(Идентификационный номер проекта 2748/001) 
Имя:  Вики Дэвис 
Рабочий адрес:  Факультет Славянских наук, Лондонский Университет, Лондон, Англия 
(School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, 
England) 
Контактная информация:  
Вики Дэвис:      vicky.davis@ucl.ac.uk 
Анна Данилова: 64 33 58 
Ирина Никитина: (905) 474 04 49 
Эльвина Сеттарова: (918) 437 15 32  
Приглашаем ................................................................ принять участие в этом проекте 
Детали исследования:   
Данный исследовательский проект для докторской диссертации изучит отношение 
жителей города Новороссийска к местной военной истории и ее героям, а также 
отношение людей и их участие в памятных датах и акциях, посвященных Великой 
Отечественной Войне в прошлом и настоящем. Если Вы согласны принять участие в 
данном исследовании, Вас пригласят на собеседование, которое может продлиться от 
одного до двух часов.  Во время нашей беседы Вас будут задавать вопросы о жизни в 
городе-герое со множеством памятников и мест, напоминающих о военном прошлом. 
Работа будет опубликована в Англии, однако она не будет содержать Ваше имя, 
поскольку Вы будете идентифицироваться под номером участника, и Ваши взгляды 
будут оставаться анонимными. Записи нашего разговора будут надежно храниться и 
будут уничтожены в конце проекта.   
Вы не обязаны участвовать в данном проекте. Если Вы согласитесь принять участие, Вы 
можете пригласить кого-нибудь присутствовать при Вашем разговоре (родственника, 
друга, члена Совета Ветеранов).  
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Если во время собеседования у Вас возникнет желание прекратить разговор, Вы можете 
сделать это в любое время, не указывая причин.  Также Вы можете попросить нас 
уничтожить все записи нашего разговора до публикации этого исследования в 2015 году.   
Если Вы согласны принять участие в этом проекте, Вы можете оставить себе данный 
документ.   
Вы можете обсудить эту информацию с другими и задать нам интересующие Вас 
вопросы, если Вам что-то непонятно или нужна дополнительная информация. 
Вся информация будет собрана и храниться в соответствии с Законом Соединенного 
Королевства о защите данных от 1998 года.   
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Formal consent to interview 
 
Форма согласия на участие в исследовательском проекте 
Пожалуйста, заполните данную форму после того, как вы прочтете 
Информационное письмо и/или прослушаете устное объяснение о данном 
исследовании. 
Название проекта:  Память о Малой Земле 
Данное исследование одобрено Комитетом по Этике Лондонского Университета 
(University College London) 
(Идентификационный номер проекта 2748/001) 
Спасибо за Ваш интерес к этому исследованию. Перед тем, как вы согласитесь принять 
участие, человек, организующий данное исследование должен разъяснить Вам суть 
проекта. 
Если у Вас возникли какие-либо вопросы относительно проекта или собеседования, 
пожалуйста, задайте вопросы исследователю до того, как Вы решите принять участие. 
Вам выдадут копию Формы согласия, которую Вы можете оставить себе.  
Заявление Участника 
 
Я............................................................................................................. 
 
 ознакомился с вышеуказанной информацией и понимаю, что включает данное 
исследование. 
 
 понимаю, что, если я в любое время решу, что больше не хочу принимать участие 
в проекте, я могу известить об этом исследователей и прекратить участие в 
проекте немедленно. 
 
 даю согласие на обработку моей информации для целей проекта.  
 
 понимаю, что такая информация относится к строго конфиденциальной и будет 
обработана в соответствии с положениями Закона Соединенного Королевства о 
защите данных от 1998 года.  
 
 согласен, что мне даны разъяснения о данном проекте и готов принять участие в 
исследовании.  
 
 
 
Подпись:..............................................    Дата:..................................................... 
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